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California Supreme Court Survey
June 1986-August 1986
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey is a briefsynopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.

I. ATTORNEY'S FEES ........................................
The determinativefactor in ascertainingthe right
to seek attorney'sfees under section 1021.5 of the
Civil Procedure Code (privateattorney general
doctrine) is the nature of the relief sought, not the
proceduraldevice by which the action is brought:
In re Head . ..........................................
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................

If a plaintifffails to file a personal injury or
wrongful death suit against a public entity within
one hundred days, he is precluded from bringing a
cause of action unless he seeks relief within a
reasonable time showing that a timely claim was
not made because of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise,or excusable neglect, and the public entity
fails to demonstrateprejudice: Bettencourt v. Los
Rios Community College District ......................
B. The decision to grant or deny a preferential trial
setting rests, at all times, in the discretion of the
trial court in light of the totality of the
circumstances: Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co .........
C. As required by section 340.5 of the Civil Procedure
Code, the statute of limitationsfor a minor in a
medical malpracticeaction is three years from the
date of the alleged wrongful act (or until the
minor's eighth birthday), and it is not tolled, as it
was at common law, until the negligence is
discovered: Young v. Haines ..........................
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Unless otherwise provided, suspension of a jail
term, imposed as a condition of probation,does not
suspend compliance with the other terms of
probation,and a municipal court does not lose
jurisdiction to execute a jail term, stayed upon
defendant's request, pending appeal when the
appeal runs longer than the period of probation: In
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In the 1980 amendment to section 261 of the Penal
Code, which defined rape, the legislature purposely
omitted the requirement of resistance by the victim:
People v. Barnes ......................................
Sections 667 and 1192.7(c)(23) of the Penal Code,
which allow sentence enhancementfor repeat
offenders, apply to assault with a deadly weapon
and other seriousfelonies involving personal use of
a dangerous weapon: People v. Equarte ..............
A trialjudge exercising discretion under section
1170.1(h) of the Penal Code may strike a statutory
sentence enhancement, provided the trialjudge
states for the record the circumstances in
mitigation, and his decision is neither arbitrary,
capricious,nor unsupported: People v. Jordan .......
If the Board of Prison Terms finds "substantial
disparity" in the punishment, the trial court is
required to reduce the sentence unless the court can
justify the disparity: People v. Martin ...............
A defendant could be convicted of, but not punished
for, both sodomy and lewd conduct based on one
criminal act: People v. Pearson ......................
Sections 667 and 1192.7(c)(8) of the Penal Code,
which jointly provide a five-year sentence
enhancementfor repeat offenders, apply to prior
convictions only if the prosecution can establish,
without going beyond the record, that the defendant
personally used a dangerous weapon: People v.
Piper .................................................
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ...................................
A. The lawful presence of a police officer on the basis
of an exigent circumstance can justify the
subsequent warrantless entry of another officer for
the purpose of interpretingwhat the first officer
had already seen: People v. Duncan ..................
B. In the absence of cross-admissibilityof evidence, the
trial court, in a capital case, may be required to
sever separate charges of the same class of crimes:
People v. Smallwood ..................................
C. When a priorfelony conviction is an element of a
crime and the defendant stipulates to it, Article I,
section 28(f) of the California Constitution requires
the trial court to reveal the fact, not the nature, of
the prior conviction to the jury:
People v. Valentine ....................................
D. The discovery of a wounded victim during the
investigation of a robbery gives an officer
reasonablecause to enter and briefly search an
apartmentfor additionalpersons: Tamborino v.
Superior Court ........................................
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X.

PRIVACY .................................................

Various provisions of the Civil and Vehicle Codes,
designed to ensure privacy, prevent the Department
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capital improvements is a "special assessment," and
not a "userfee, "from which the School District,as
a public entity, is exempt: San Marcos Water District
v. San Marcos Unified School District .................
C. Former section 225 of the CaliforniaRevenue &
Taxation Code violates the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution by discriminating
against a class of interstatecommerce: Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles ...................
X IV .
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A. A statement appearingin a newspaper review, set
off in quotations, prefaced with a qualijicationthat
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duties as an employee, he extends an unauthorized
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I.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
The determinativefactor in ascertainingthe right to
seek attorney'sfees under section 1021.5 of the Civil
Procedure Code (privateattorney general doctrine) is the
nature of the relief sought, not the procedural device by
which the action is brought: In re Head.

In In re Head, 42 Cal. 3d 223, 721 P.2d 65, 228 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1986),
three prison inmates successfully challenged, in habeas corpus proceedings, the implementation procedures of the Department of Corrections for the work furlough program authorized under sections
6260 to 6265 of the Penal Code. The inmates were represented by the
Prison Law Office, a privately supported group of attorneys who provide direct legal services at no cost to prison inmates. The superior
court found that the procedures were constitutionally inadequate. In
addition, the court held that the inmates should have been considered individually in order to determine their eligibility for participation in the program under procedures that would have afforded due
process. The ruling was affirmed on appeal. The superior court
granted attorney's fees of $3,350, pursuant to section 1021.5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter section 1021.5].
The Director of Corrections appealed and the court of appeal reversed. The court of appeal held that section 1021.5 applied only to
civil cases, and since habeas corpus proceedings were of a criminal
nature, attorney's fees were not authorized under the statute. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of
appeal.
The supreme court noted that section 1021.5 was a codification of
the inherent power of the court to award attorney's fees under the
"dprivate attorney general" rationale. Pursuant to this rationale, private litigants who successfully bring suits which enforce a strong
public policy are awarded attorney's fees. Section 1021.5 recognizes
the need for enforcement of public policies by private actions. In order to encourage private actions, there must be a mechanism authorizing the award of attorney's fees or the expense of litigation would
deter private parties from initiating these actions.
The court noted that in the past, attorney's fees have been permitted for mandamus actions rather than for habeas corpus actions. No
question would have been raised if the present action had been
brought under a writ of mandamus, even though the same rights
would have been vindicated. See Daniels v. McKinney, 146 Cal. App.
3d 42, 193 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1983) (mandate proceeding brought by jail
inmates to vindicate their right to exercise).
The court of appeal held that section 1021.5 did not apply merely
because the procedures for habeas corpus are found in the Penal
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Code. Rather, the court relied upon the language in Fogelson v. Municipal Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 858, 175 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1981), which
stated that "attorney fees provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure
do not deal with criminal actions, unless the words or context compel
a holding that they do." Id. at 862, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 66. However,
Fogelson is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The fees
sought in Fogelson were for the defense and appeal in a criminal
prosecution. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal's
conclusion that nothing in section 1021.5 could be construed to include an award of attorney's fees for the defense of criminal cases.
Section 1021.5 does not apply in cases where the "primary effect is
the vindication of the litigant's personal rights.... ." Head, 42 Cal. 3d
at 228, 721 P.2d at 68, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 186. Nor does it apply simply
because the defense offered incidental benefits to other similarly situated defendants.
However, sections 1473 to 1509 of the Penal Code do not define or
establish defenses. Rather, they merely create a procedure for inmates to vindicate their rights relating to confinement. The determinative factor is not how the action is brought but the impact of the
litigation.
The court stated that inmates have numerous constitutional and
statutory rights which are not only of interest to the inmates themselves, but to the public in general: freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment; religious freedom; freedom from racial discrimination;
due process; payment for labor; treatment of prisoners; and the work
furlough program at issue in this case. Actions brought to enforce
these rights bear no indicia to a criminal prosecution; their purpose is
to "compel a state or local officer to comply with duties imposed on
him by regulation, statute, or constitutional provision." Head, 42 Cal.
3d at 230, 721 P.2d at 69, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Choosing to bring an
action to vindicate these rights by habeas corpus rather than writ of
mandamus does not alter the substance of the action.
The respondent's main argument was that section 1021.5 did not
apply to criminal proceedings, of which habeas corpus is one. Furthermore, the respondent contended that the superior courts would
become inundated with habeas corpus petitions that merely sought
an award of attorney's fees. The supreme court rejected these arguments as unpersuasive stating that if the actions are not brought
under habeas corpus proceedings, they could be brought by mandamus, declaratory relief, or by the individual inmates in propria persona. The effect of this would be to increase the burden on the

courts. "Without the assistance of counsel, in propria persona inmates would likely file many more petitions, and impose a greater
burden on the judicial system, than that imposed by a single, wellresearched, attorney-prepared petition." Id. at 231, 721 P.2d at 70, 228
Cal. Rptr. at 189. Moreover, mandamus and declaratory relief actions
tend to be more complex than habeas corpus proceedings and are potentially subject to higher attorney's fees awards.
The court concluded that when ascertaining the legislative intent
for the purposes of construing the language of a statute, there is a
presumption "that the Legislature did not intend absurd results." Id.
at 232, 721 P.2d at 70, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 189. To deny an award of attorney's fees in a habeas corpus proceeding but award fees in an action for declaratory relief or mandamus, which seeks to vindicate
identical rights, would be anomalous and inconsistent with the rules
of statutory construction. Statutes should be construed so as not to
frustrate the legislative purpose. The court concluded that where a
restriction on the availability of attorney's fees is not clearly mandated by the language of section 1021.5, one will not be judicially construed. Thus, section 1021.5 authorizes the award of attorney's fees to
lawyers who initiate proceedings to vindicate rights of prison inmates, regardless of whether the action is brought by a complaint for
declaratory relief, petition for mandamus, or petition for habeas
corpus.
STEPHANIE FANOS

II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. If a plaintifffails to file a personalinjury or wrongful
death suit against a public entity within one hundred
days, he is precludedfrom bringing a cause of action
unless he seeks relief within a reasonable time showing
that a timely claim was not made because of mistake,
inadvertence,surprise,or excusable neglect, and that the
public entity fails to demonstrateprejudice: Bettencourt v.
Los Rios Community College District.

In Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College District, 42 Cal. 3d
270, 721 P.2d 71, 228 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1986), the supreme court held
that the trial court should liberally grant relief under section 946.6 of
the Government Code if the plaintiff's failure to file a claim with an
appropriate public entity can be excused. Pursuant to section 911.2,
the plaintiff was required to file a claim with the correct public entity within 100 days after the cause of action accrued. The court further held that excusable neglect can be found if the plaintiff's
misapprehension about the defendant's legal status was reasonable
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and if he showed diligence in pursuing the claim. In this case, the
court found that the trial court's refusal to grant relief was an abuse
of discretion.
The plaintiffs in this case were the parents of a student who
drowned while on a field trip sponsored by the Sacramento City College. Pursuant to section 911.2 of the Government Code, plaintiffs'
counsel filed a wrongful death claim with the State Board of Control
under a mistaken belief that the college was a part of the state government. Actually, the college was a part of the Los Rios Community College District [hereinafter the District]. Section 911.2 requires
claimants to file a claim with the correct public entity within 100
days. When the plaintiffs learned of the error, 100 days had already
passed. Pursuant to section 911.4, the plaintiffs' counsel presented an
application for leave to file a late claim to the defendant. The application, however, was denied. The plaintiffs' counsel then sought relief under section 946.6 by filing a petition to the superior court. This
petition was also denied.
On appeal, the plaintiffs successfully contended that their counsel's
failure to file a tort claim against the proper defendant was excusable. The court, in deciding whether the misapprehension was excusable, considered the following: 1) the nature of the error; and 2)
whether the plaintiffs' counsel showed diligence in pursuing the
claim.
In determining whether the nature of the error was reasonable,
the court used the objective reasonable person test: whether a reasonably prudent person would make a similar mistake under the
same circumstances. The court held that a reasonably prudent person could make a similar mistake. It noted that the counsel's unfamiliarity with the various college districts was reasonable considering
that he neither lived nor practiced law in Sacramento. The court also
commented on the complexity of California's higher education system. The defendant disagreed and argued that the plaintiffs' counsel
had an opportunity to discover the error within the statutory period
because he received correspondence on letterhead stationery which
indicated that the college was part of the District. The court rejected
this argument by holding that a reasonable person would focus on
the content rather than the letterhead on the stationery.
In determining whether the plaintiffs' counsel was diligent, the
court noted that his various activities showed due diligence. He contacted the defendant's legal advisor to request information and to advise him of any possible tort claims against the defendant. He also

hired an investigator. Additionally, he promptly responded to
counter his mistake by filing various forms of relief from the 100-day
requirement of section 911.2.
The court further reasoned that the policy consideration behind
section 911.2 was to give notice to public entities of a possible claim.
It held that when the plaintiffs' counsel informed the defendant's
legal advisor of a possible claim, it served a function similar to that of
section 911.2.
Based on the court's holding, several conclusions can be made.
First, section 946.6 will be construed in favor of relief in order to enable the trial court to decide cases on the merits. Second, if the
plaintiff shows diligence in pursuing a claim by promptly filing the
action against the proper public entity, then the court seems to be
more willing to find the mistake excusable.
SUNG-DO GONG
B.

The decision to grant or deny a preferential trial setting
rests, at all times, in the discretion of the trial court in
light of the totality of the circumstances: Salas v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.

In Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 42 Cal. 3d 342, 721 P.2d 590, 228
Cal. Rptr. 504 (1986), the California Supreme Court held that the
trial court always has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for
trial preference pursuant to section 36(d) of the Civil Procedure
Code. This is true despite the five-year limitation period set forth in
section 583.310 of the Civil Procedure Code. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 583.310-583.360 (West Supp. 1986) (reenacting in substance
CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 583 (West 1955) (repealed 1984)).
On September 12, 1979, the plaintiffs filed an action against the defendants, Sears, Roebuck & Co. [hereinafter Sears], and a friend of
the minor plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. The action was based on the accidental
shooting of the minor plaintiff by his friend, which occurred while
testing a new rifle purchased from Sears. An at-issue memorandum
requesting a jury trial was filed on June 3, 1980. The trial court sent
a "Notice of Trial Setting Conference and Intention to Dismiss on
Court's Own Motion" to the plaintiffs. This notice required that the
plaintiffs, within ten days of receipt, provide the other parties with
written notice of the hearing which was scheduled for September 21,
1983. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 344, 721 P.2d at 591, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
The plaintiffs, however, merely notified Sears by telephone the day
before the hearing. Consequently, the court took the trial setting
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conference off the calendar and removed the case from the civil active list.
During the following ten months, the plaintiffs did not attempt to
reinstate their case on the civil active list nor have it set for trial. On
August 1, 1984, they gave notice to Sears of an ex-parte application
for an order shortening time, and for a hearing on a motion for trial
preference under section 36(d). The latter was filed on August 3,
1984, forty days before the five-year bar set forth in former section
583(b) of the Civil Procedure Code.
Sears filed an opposition and urged the court to dismiss the action
on its own motion pursuant to former section 583(a) of the Civil Procedure Code. This section provided the following: "[t]he court, in its
discretion, may dismiss an action for want of prosecution pursuant to
this subdivision if it is not brought to trial within two years after it
was filed." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583(a) (West 1955) (repealed
1984) (reenacted in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.410 (West Supp.
1986)).
The trial court's tentative ruling denied the motion for trial preference. However, it ordered a second hearing to be held three days
later and urged the plaintiffs to file supplemental papers in the interim. The plaintiffs failed to submit any additional authority to support their position and the court denied their motion for preference.
The five-year limitations period lapsed without the plaintiffs taking
any action to file either a motion for reconsideration or a second motion for preference. The court dismissed the case pursuant to section
583(b), in response to the defendant's motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed and the court of appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding
that the decision to grant or deny a motion for trial preference rested
in the sound discretion of the trial court and no abuse of discretion
was shown on the record.
The supreme court granted review due to a conflict in the appellate courts on this issue. Compare Campanella v. Takaoaka, 160 Cal.
App. 3d 504, 206 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1984) (no discretion) and Katoff v.
F~fseoff, 172 Cal. App. 3d 991, 218 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1985) (no discretion)
with Karubian v. Security Pacific National Bank, 152 Cal. App. 3d
134, 199 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1984) (discretion). The court disapproved
Campanella and Katoff to the extent that they preclude the trial
court from considering the plaintiff's unreasonable delay and lack of
diligence in the determination of whether to grant or deny a motion
for trial preference when the five-year limitation period of section

583(b) is imminent. Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 345, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 506.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision. It rejected
the plaintiffs' assertion that as a matter of law, forty days was adequate time to set their case for trial, and that therefore, the trial
court had a mandatory duty to grant their motion for preference to
avoid the impending five-year limitations period. Id.
The supreme court noted that section 36(d) specifically states that
the trial court shall exercise its discretion in ruling on motions for
trial preference. It provides the following: "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant a motion
for preference served with the memorandum to set or the at-issue
memorandum and accompanied by a showing of cause which satisfies
the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting such
preference." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 36(d) (West 1982). The plaintiffs argued that as a matter of law, "cause" is shown when a preferential setting is necessary to avoid dismissal under section 583(b).
They argued this is true even when the plaintiff is guilty of unreasonable delay and lack of diligence. The court rejected this argument
stating that, while the approach of the five-year limit under section
583(b) is an important factor, under section 36(d) it is not exclusive.
Therefore, the trial court should consider all of pthe surrounding
circumstances.
The court compared its decision in Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co., 34 Cal. 3d 554, 669 P.2d 9, 194 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1983), to the
case at bar. In Wilson, the supreme court held that the considerations involved in a motion for preference under section 36(d) are the
same as those involved in a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
under section 583(a). "'[I]n each instance the motion is addressed to
[the trial court's] sound legal discretion; the motivating factors in the
exercise of that discretion would be pertinent to both motions.'
Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 346, 721 P.2d at 592, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (quoting
Wilson, 34 Cal. 3d at 561, 669 P.2d at 13, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 777). The
court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances, including the "'dilatory action of the plaintiff, the condition of the court's
calendar, the rights of other litigants, and the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.'" Id. (quoting Wilson, 34 Cal. 3d at
561, 669 P.2d at 13, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 777). The Wilson court concluded that since identical considerations were involved under section 36(d) and section 583(a), the trial court could "dismiss sua sponte
under [section 583(a)] in response to a plaintiff's motion for preferential setting [under section 36(d)] without notifying the plaintiff in advance of its intention to dismiss." Id. at 346-47, 721 P.2d at 592, 228
Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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The court noted that in both Wilson and in the case at bar, the
plaintiffs were guilty of a lack of diligence and offered no justification for the delay. In addition, the plaintiffs in both cases relied on
the public policy favoring a trial on the merits. The court stated that
the policy against disposing of litigation on procedural grounds will
prevail only when a plaintiff makes a showing of excusable delay,
which the plaintiffs did not do. The court stated that in light of Wilson, the issue becomes whether the trial court had the discretion to
deny the plaintiffs' motion for trial preference when dismissal under
section 583(b) was the likely result.
The plaintiffs, relying on language in Weeks v. Roberts, 68 Cal. 2d
802, 442 P.2d 361, 69 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968), contended that, although
the court did have the power to dismiss under section 583(a), as in
Wilson, "it also had a mandatory duty to grant an early trial setting
to prevent dismissal under section 583(b)." Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 347,
721 P.2d at 593, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 507. In Weeks, the court stated that
"[the] preferred procedure would be to grant preferential dates expressly without prejudice to a motion to dismiss." Weeks, 68 Cal. 2d
at 808, 442 P.2d at 365, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 309. The court noted that this
same dictum led to the holdings in Campanella and Katoff.
The court explained that the ruling in Weeks was prompted by a
concern that the courts could dismiss an action merely as a convenience to the courts, even though the defendants had not sought dismissal. The court emphasized that at the time of Weeks, section
583(a) provided that "[t]he court may in its discretion dismiss any action for want of prosecution on motion of the defendant and after
due notice to the plaintiff ...." Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 348, 721 P.2d at
593, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583(a) (West
1955) (repealed 1984)) (emphasis added). Thus, two separate proceedings were necessary, one to rule on the trial preference under section
36(d) and another to rule on the defendant's motion to dismiss under
section 583(a). One year after Weeks, section 583(a) was deleted.
Thus, the need for two separate proceedings, which Weeks required,
was eliminated, and the court could dismiss sua sponte.
The court concluded that a trial court does not have a mandatory
duty to grant a trial preference when the likely consequence is dismissal pursuant to the five-year limitation set forth in section 583(b).
Rather the decision to grant or deny the motion rests at all times in
the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised in light of the
totality of the circumstances. Moreover, a discretionary standard is
consistent with the legislative purpose of encouraging "diligent and

orderly prosecution by requiring plaintiffs to make some showing of
excusable delay." Salas, 42 Cal. 3d at 349, 721 P.2d at 594, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 508.
In conclusion, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs did not attempt to show excusable delay or justify their request. Their failure
to initiate discovery and submit supplemental briefs in favor of their
position evidenced their dilatory conduct. In light of such conduct,
coupled with their failure to show cause for excusable delay, the
plaintiffs forfeited their right to a preferential trial date. Therefore,
dismissal was proper.
STEPHANIE FANOS
C. As required by section 340.5 of the Civil Procedure Code,
the statute of limitationsfor a minor in a medical
malpracticeaction is three years from the date of the
alleged wrongful act (or until the minor's eighth
birthday), and it is not tolled, as it was at common law,
until the negligence is discovered: Young v. Haines.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Young v. Haines,' the supreme court unanimously held that section 340.5 of the Civil Procedure Code2 [hereinafter section 340.5] is
the applicable statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions
and could be retroactively applied if the plaintiff was awarded a reasonable time in which to bring the action. 3 They further held that
the tolling provision for adults should be read into the provision for
1. 41 Cal. 3d 883, 718 P.2d 909, 226 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1986). Chief Justice Bird wrote
for the unanimous court, with Justices Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, Lucas and
Panelli concurring.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) provides in part:
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement
of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for
commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the
following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person. Actions by a minor shall be
commenced within three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six years shall be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides
a longer period. Such time limitation shall be tolled for minors for any period during which parent or guardian and defendant's insureror health care
provider have committed fraud or collusion in the failure to bring an action
on behalf of the injured minorfor professional negligence.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 651 P.2d 815, 186 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1982); Osborne v. Los Angeles County, 91 Cal. App. 3d 366, 154 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1979).

California Supreme Court Survey

[Vol. 14: 453, 1987]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

minors in order to provide minor plaintiffs with equal protection of
the law. However, the court rejected the incorporation of the common law doctrine of the delayed-discovery rule4 into section 340.5.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A minor plaintiff, Tracey Young, filed a complaint alleging that she
sustained injuries as a result of hypoxic birth trauma5 which was
caused by negligent medical treatment given by the defendants-the
doctors, the hospitals, and the other health care providers. The complaint was filed on October 22, 1980, approximately eighty-four days
after the plaintiff's eighth birthday, and 100 days after the discovery
of the cause. It further alleged that the plaintiff and her mother
were unaware of the cause of her disability until on or about July 22,
1980, when a physician diagnosed her injuries as being the result of
hypoxic birth trauma.
The defendants demurred on the ground that the action was untimely under section 340.5.6 The plaintiff contended that the action
was timely because the applicable statute of limitations was section
29 of the Civil Code 7 [hereinafter section 29] which adhered to the
delayed-discovery rule. 8 However, the trial court sustained the de4. "Under the delayed discovery rule a cause of action does not accrue, nor [does]
the statute of limitations start to run, until plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover the negligent cause of his or her injury." Young, 41
Cal. 3d at 890, 718 P.2d at 911, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 549. See generally Annotation, When
Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against MalpracticeAction Against Physician, Surgeon, Dentist, or Similar Practitioner,80 A.L.R. 2D 368 (1968).
5. Hypoxia refers to "deficiency of oxygen reaching the tissues of [the] body."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 717 (1971).
6. See supra note 2. For a general discussion see 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts
and Institutions § 179 (1977); Comment, Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act"
An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829 (1979); Note, Price of Health
Care Availability: Economics of Medical Malpractice,11 Sw. U.L. REV. 1371 (1979).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1982) provides the following:
A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far
as may be necessary for its interest in the event of its subsequent birth; but
any action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained prior to
or in the course of his birth must be brought within six years from the date of
the birth of the minor, and the time such minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be excluded in
computing the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Id.
For a general discussion see Note, Torts: Infants-Cause of Action for PrenatalInjury, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 76 (1951); Note, Calfornia'sResponse for Wrongful Death of a
Stillborn Fetus: Justus v. Atchison, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 589 (1978); Comment, The
Fetus as a Legal Entity-FacingReality, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 126 (1971).
8. In Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1956), section 29 of

fendant's demurrer and held that section 340.5 was the controlling
statute of limitations. The action was subsequently dismissed when
the plaintiff failed to further allege facts necessary to toll the statute
of limitations under section 340.5.
On appeal, the plaintiff raised several contentions. First, she contended that the applicable statue of limitations was section 29 of the
Civil Code and not section 340.5 of the Civil Procedure Code. She
also argued that if section 340.5 were the applicable statute, then applying it retroactively would unconstitutionally deprive her of the
benefits of section 29 which adhered to the delayed-discovery rule.9
She further contended that section 340.5 should be construed as retaining the delayed-discovery rule.10
III.

A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Section 340.5 is the Applicable Statute of Limitations

Since the plaintiff and her mother did not discover the cause of the
disability until 100 days before the complaint was filed, the statute of
limitations would have been tolled and the action would have been
considered timely, pursuant to section 29 which governs prenatal and
birth injuries. However, under section 340.5, which governs injuries
resulting from medical malpractice, the action would have been
barred as the complaint was filed eighty-four days after her eighth
birthday, without any allegation of facts which would toll the limitation period. In solving this apparent inconsistency, the court examined section 1859 of the Civil Procedure Code"l [hereinafter
section 1859] and the legislative history of section 340.5.12
Pursuant to section 1859, "when a general and particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former."1 3 In this
case, both sections 29 and 340.5 were very specific. The former imposed limitations on actions relating to prenatal and birth injuries,
while the latter governed personal injuries resulting from medical
malpractice. The court held that section 340.5 was the applicable
statute since it was a later enactment and it was a specific legislative
response to medical malpractice insurance cases with the intent to
the Civil Code was construed as incorporating the delayed-discovery rule. Young, 41
Cal. 3d at 892, 718 P.2d at 913, 826 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
9. The plaintiff's argument was based on the fact that her injury had occurred
three years before the enactment of section 340.5.
10. The plaintiff's contention was based on the case of Black Kite v. Campbell, 142
Cal. App. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983) (incorporating the common law delayed-discovery rule into section 340.5). Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 895, 718 P.2d at 915, 226 Cal. Rptr.
at 553.
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1982).
12. Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 894, 718 P.2d at 914, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1982).
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differentiate medical malpractice victims from other personal injury
victims.

14

B. Retroactive Application of Section 340.5 Did Not Preclude the
Right to the Benefits of Section 29
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the retroactive application of section 340.5 would unconstitutionally deprive her of the right
to enjoy the benefits of section 29,15 the court simply held that the
statute may have a retroactive effect if the plaintiff was given a reasonable time16 in which to initiate the suit. In this case, the plaintiff
was injured in 1972 and the code was enacted in 1975. Thus, since the
plaintiff had five years to bring the cause of action, the court held
that this was a reasonable amount of time.
C

Section 340.5 Does Not Retain the Delayed-Discovery
Tolling Rule.

The plaintiff's final contention, that section 340.5 should be interpreted as retaining the delayed-discovery tolling rule, was based on
two arguments. First, she argued that the provision did not expressly
exclude the common law.17 Second, she contended that interpreting
section 340.5 without the delayed-discovery rule would deny minors
equal protection of the law.1s This was because the tolling provision
for minors could be interpreted as being more restrictive than it was
for the adults.19
In rejecting both arguments, the court held that the numerated
tolling provision of section 340.5 was intended to replace the common
law rules. Thus, the court reasoned that the legislative intent was to
14. Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 894, 718 P.2d at 914, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
15. Id. at 891 n.5, 718 P.2d at 912 n.5, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 550 n.5.
16. See, e.g., Osborne v. Los Angeles County, 91 Cal. App. 3d 366, 154 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1979).
17. See supra note 10. In Young, the supreme court rejected the Kite court's interpretation of section 340.5 and held that it did not incorporate the common law delayeddiscovery rule. Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 718 P.2d at 915, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. In Kite v. Campbell, 142 Cal. App. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983), the court
held that the tolling provisions in the second sentence of section 340.5 (fraud, intentional concealment, and the presence of a foreign body) were applicable only to actions
by adults. The Kite court also noted that the statute began to run for adults on the
"date of injury," while it began to run for minors on the "date of the wrongful act." In
order to avoid this discrepancy, the Kite court read the common law delayed-discovery
rule into section 340.5 for minors. This was rejected by the court in Young. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.

expressly exclude the common law delayed-discovery doctrine. However, the court recognized that the potential for the different treatment of minors could violate the equal protection clause.20
The court, citing Reed v. Reed,21 held that a classification can be
justified under the equal protection clause if it is reasonable and
" 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "22 Based on this test, the court
upheld the classification of medical malpractice victims from other
injury victims as a reasonable response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis. However, considering the strong public policy of protecting minors, the court ruled that distinguishing minors from
adults within the category of malpractice could not be justified.
Therefore, the court held that the separate tolling provision for minors was not exclusive, and that the tolling provision for adults
should therefore be applied to the minors. Thus, the court found an
alternative means to avoid the constitutional problem, while upholding the legislative intent to differentiate the statue of limitation of
malpractice victims from other victims. Consequently, both adult
and minor medical malpractice victims could evoke the tolling provision by alleging fraud, intentional concealment 23 or the presence of a
foreign body. The case was subsequently remanded for further proceedings in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to allege any
facts that may toll the statutory period.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Young v. Haines, the question of whether the delayed-discovery rule should be read into section 340.5 was an unsettled issue,
resulting in sharp disagreement among the appellate courts. In
Young, this question was settled by the court's rejection of the common law statute of limitation tolling rules in medical malpractice
suits. Consequently, in medical malpractice suits, nondiscovery of
the injury or the cause can no longer be an excuse to toll the statu20. "As Kite noted, serious constitutional problems would arise from an interpretation of section 340.5 which imposed harsher limitations on minors than adults."
Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 896, 718 P.2d at 916, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See also id. at 718, P.2d
at 917, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
21. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 900, 718 P.2d at 918, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (quoting Reed,
404 U.S. at 75-76).
23. It should be noted that nondiscovery is differentiated from concealment.
Nondiscovery cannot be an excuse while concealment without discovery can toll the
statute. Following this line of reasoning, concealment by the defendant cannot toll the
statute if the plaintiff discovered the injury. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 890, 141 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1977) (patient's ignorance and unaware-

ness of the injury cannot toll the statute of limitation period).
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tory period. However, there was one issue the court chose not to address: the inconsistency in the time of the commencement of the
statutory period for adults and minors. On its face, the general commencement time is the "date of injury" while that of the minors is
the "date of the alleged wrongful act." This difference can be less
favorable to minors since certain injuries may not be detected for
sometime. Nonetheless, the court, in a footnote, avoided the issue by
stating that "this particular form of discrimination against minors is
left for another day." 24 Given the court's discussion of the equal protection concerns, it is likely that if the difference is less favorable to
minors, it would be unconstitutional.
SUNG-Do GONG

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Involuntary polygraph testing of government employees
who are not public safety officers violates the
constitutionalrights to privacy and to equal protection:
Long Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long
Beach.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Long Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long Beach,'
the supreme court considered whether polygraph testing of public
employees, not public safety officers, was allowable as a condition of
their employment. The court held that such testing was unconstitutional because it violated the right to privacy and to equal protection.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1982, the Long Beach Marine Bureau [hereinafter the Bureau], a
subdivision of the Long Beach Tidelands Agency, a city government
agency, suspected some of its employees of stealing from its boat
launch ramp machines. Pursuant to an administrative investigation,
24. Young, 41 Cal. 3d at 897 n.10, 718 P.2d at 916 n.10, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 554 n.10.
1. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal Rptr. 90 (1986). Justice Broussard wrote
the majority opinion, with which Justices Mosk, Reynoso, Grodin, and Lui concurred.
Justice Elwood Lui, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, was assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Chief Justice Bird
wrote a separate concurring opinion, with which Justice McClosky (Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council) concurred.

the Bureau ordered that twenty-six employees undergo polygraph
tests. The Long Beach City Employees Association [hereinafter the
CEA], a representative of the employees, filed for and was denied a
temporary restraining order and an injunction. Under threats of dismissal, most of the employees complied with the orders to undergo
the tests. Only one employee ultimately refused to comply with the
2
order to undergo the test.

The CEA, as the representative of the government employees, asserted that the compulsory tests violated the employees' rights to privacy and to equal protection guaranteed by the California and United
States Constitutions.3
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Involuntary Polygraph Tests Violate An Individual's
Constitutionally Protected Right to Privacy.

The right to privacy encompasses the right to mental privacy. 4 Involuntary polygraph tests impinge on the right to privacy in several
ways. First, typical polygraph tests commence with a pre-test interview which is used by the examiner "to determine whether there are
'any emotional or psychological factors which would adversely affect
the reliability of the test results.' "5 This pre-test interview includes
6
personal questions unrelated to employment.
Second, polygraph tests are inherently intrusive because they record emotional responses to questions even when the subject does not
verbally answer them. 7 Furthermore, an employee may decide not to
refuse to answer personal questions for fear that his or her job may
be threatened or that he or she will appear dishonest.8
The city argued that since all of the questions related to the employees' employment, there was no privacy violation.9 The court re2. Id. at 942-43, 719 P.2d at 661-62, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92.
3. The California Constitution guarantees the right to privacy. CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 1. The right to equal protection is guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and the California Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
4. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). See also
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (discussing the
origins and the concept of the right to privacy).
5. 41 Cal. 3d at 945, 719 P.2d at 664, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (quoting Comment, Privacy: The Polygraphin Employment, 30 ARx. L. REV. 35, 36 (1976)).
6. 41 Cal. 3d at 945, 719 P.2d at 664, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
7. Id. at 947, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (citing Gardner, Wiretapping the
Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verication in Employment, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
295, 305 (1984); Comment, Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context: Suggested Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Competence, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 113, 117 (1981)).
8. Id. (citing Comment, supra note 7, at 118 n.21).
9. 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95. The city relied on Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968), holding that a public employee (police of-
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jected this argument since it was indisputable that some of the pretest and control questions asked were personal in nature and did not
relate in any way to the employment responsibilities of the employees.10 Furthermore, the court found that since polygraph tests record
thoughts and feelings even absent verbal answers to questions, the
tests "inherently intrude upon the constitutionally protected zone of
individual privacy.""
B. Legislative Classificationof Employees, Into Those Protected
From Involuntary Polygraph Testing (PrivateEmployees and
Public Safety Officers) and Those Not ProtectedServes No
Compelling State Interest and Therefore Denies Those Not
Protected of Their ConstitutionalRight to Equal Protection.
Section 432.2 of the Labor Code prohibits the administration of
polygraph tests as a condition of employment, but excepts federal,
state, and local government employees from this protection.12 Section 3307 of the Government Code provides that public safety officers
are protected from involuntary polygraph tests as a condition of their
employment.13 Therefore, only government employees who are not
public safety officers can be compelled to undergo polygraph tests as
a condition of their employment. The CEA claimed that such legislative classification impinged on its members' constitutionally protected right to equal protection.
The general rule is that "[a] legislative classification rationally related to achieving a legitimate state purpose will normally be deemed
constitutional unless it infringes upon a fundamental interest or creates a suspect classification."'4 Since the court determined that the
testing infringed on the employees' fundamental right to privacy, the
city had the burden of proving a compelling governmental interest
ficer) cannot be discharged for refusing to waive his constitutional right of selfincrimination and Szmaciarz v. State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 145 Cal. Rptr.
396 (1978), holding that in a noncriminal investigation into his conduct, a police officer
may be compelled to answer questions under pain of dismissal without the opportunity
to invoke the right against self-incrimination.
10. 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
11. Id. See also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw § 234 (1974); McKINNEY's DiGEST 3D Privacy § 3 (1984).
12. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1986).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980).
14. 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (citing Serano v. Priest,
18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1976)).

which was served by the classification.15
The city claimed that a "rational relationship" test should be applied rather than a "compelling interest" test, because the employees
did not have a fundamental right to government employment, relying
on Civil Service Association v. Civil Service Commission.16 The
supreme court overruled Civil Service Association to the extent that
it held that a rational basis test should be used.17 The court held that
the fundamental interest being protected was the right to privacy
rather than the right to continued public employment. Therefore, a
higher degree of judicial scrutiny was required.
The city asserted that the compelling interests justifying separate
treatment of regular government employees included the following:
(1) the special position of trust which public employees are in; and
(2) the right of the public to an honest and impartial government.' 8
The court dismissed these arguments because it did not consider
either of these interests strong enough to supersede the employees'
fundamental right to privacy.' 9 Furthermore, the court held that
even if those state interests were compelling enough to supersede the
employees' right to privacy, the classification in the statutes was not
20
based on sound policy reasons.
In Civil Service Association, the California Court of Appeal applied a rational basis test and upheld the legislative classification as
not violative of the right to equal protection, on facts similar to those
at hand.21 The classification was upheld because the policy behind
the statute which exempts public safety officers was to maintain good
labor relations in those jobs where interruptions in performance
could endanger the public.22
The court noted that the court of appeal did not consider the broad
scope of the definition for "public safety officers," which includes positions which are not critical to public health and safety. 23 Therefore,
the policy behind the classification did not apply to all of the public
safety officers included in the statute. 24 Thus, the court held that the
classification created unequal treatment which was not justified.25 In
15. Id. (citing Serano, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); White
v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975)).
16. 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1983).
17. 41 Cal. 3d at 952, 719 P.2d at 668, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98. See also McKINNEY'S
DIGEST 3D Constitutional Law §§ 87, 94 (1984).
18. 41 Cal. 3d at 952-53, 719 P.2d at 669-70, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 955, 719 P.2d at 671-72, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
21. Id.
22. See Civil Service Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 459, 188
Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1983).
23. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3301 (West 1980).

24. 41 Cal. 3d at 955, 719 P.2d at 671, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
25. Id. at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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conclusion, the court held that the involuntary polygraph testing vio26
lated the employees' rights to privacy and to equal protection.
IV.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

Chief Justice Bird believed that the court should have seized the
opportunity to rule that the involuntary polygraph tests violated the
employees' right to privacy, and to base the holding of the opinion on
that violation rather than on the equal protection basis.27 The Chief
Justice extensively analyzed the right to privacy and subjected the
facts of the case to the Bagley test.28 That test is used to determine
whether a government entity can require an employee to waive a
29
constitutional right as a condition of employment.
The Bagley test requires that the government entity show the following: "(1) the condition reasonably relates to the purposes of the
legislation which confers the benefit; (2) the value accruing to the
public from the conditions imposed manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of the constitutional right; and (3) there are no available alternative means less offensive to the constitutional right."30
Chief Justice Bird reasoned that the second prong of the test was not
met because of the significance of the right to privacy and the unreliability of the results of polygraph tests. 31 In addition, the third prong
was not met because of the availability of other means of investigating theft.32 Therefore, since the Bagley test was not met, Chief Justice Bird agreed with the majority that there was no compelling
public interest which superseded the employees' right to privacy. 33
V.

CONCLUSION

Involuntary polygraph testing of public employees as a condition of
their employment violated their constitutionally protected rights to
privacy and to equal protection. The effect of this decision was to declare that the part of section 432.2 of the Labor Code which excepts
government employees from the protection it offers other employees
26. Id.
27. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).
28. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
29. Id.
30. 41 Cal. 3d at 959, 719 P.2d at 674, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
31. Id. at 960, 719 P.2d at 675, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
32. Id. at 961, 719 P.2d at 675, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
33. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring).

was unconstitutional. This decision also overruled Civil Service Association to the extent that it conflicted with this holding.34
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

IV.

CRIMINAL LAW
A.

Unless otherwise provided, suspension of a jail term,
imposed as a condition of probation, does not suspend
compliance with the other terms of probation, and a
municipal court does not lose jurisdiction to execute a
jail term, stayed upon defendant's request, pending
appeal when the appeal runs longer than the period of
probation: In re Bakke.

In In re Bakke, 42 Cal. 3d 84, 720 P.2d 11, 227 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1986),
the supreme court held that unless otherwise provided, suspension of
a jail term imposed as a condition of probation did not relieve the defendant of compliance with the other terms of probation. In addition,
the court held that a municipal court does not lose its jurisdiction to
execute the jail term stayed upon the defendant's request pending
appeal, even though the appeal ran longer than the period of
probation.
On December 20, 1979, David Roy Bakke was convicted of misdemeanor credit card forgery. His sentence was suspended and he was
placed on three years formal probation with conditions including restitution and a 60-day jail term. Bakke was released on his own recognizance pending appeal, and the judgment was affirmed on May 2,
1984.
During the pendency of the appeal, Bakke's probation was revoked
on two separate occasions because he violated the probation conditions. After the second violation on April 3, 1983, the period of probation was extended to April 4, 1984, and the court ordered a stay of
execution of the jail term and ordered Bakke to comply with the restitution condition of his probation. Additional stays were issued on
May 25, 1983, August 22, 1983, and October 28, 1983.
After the judgment was affirmed on June 13, 1984, the municipal
court made an order extending the period of probation to June 13,
1986, and ordered the jail term to commence on July 19, 1984. Bakke
then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and contended that the
municipal court had lost its jurisdiction to execute the jail term because the appeal ran longer than the stipulated period of probation.
In denying Bakke's petition, the court disapproved of In re Ken34. Civil Service Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 806 (1983).
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nick, 128 Cal. App. 3d 959, 180 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1982), and People v.
Soukup, 141 Cal. App. 3d 858, 190 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1983), to the extent
that they were inconsistent with the court's analysis in the case at
bar. In Kennick, the court of appeal held that unless the court provided otherwise, a stay of execution suspends all the probationary
conditions, not just the jail term. The Kennick court reasoned that
because confinement usually precedes release into society under probationary supervision, it would be the exception rather than the
norm for a judge to stay only the jail term and not the other conditions of probation pending appeal. Kennick, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 963,
180 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
The supreme court noted that, although the stay in Kennick was
similar to the stay in the case at bar, the defendant in Kennick had
not been subjected to revocation and reinstatement of probation. In
the instant case, the municipal court's intent that the other conditions of probation remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal
was manifested in the revocations for violations of those conditions.
If Kennick were correct, the municipal court would not have jurisdiction to enforce the probation as it did. The court further rejected
the Kennick reasoning in stating that a trial court is not likely to release a recently convicted defendant into society without supervision.
Bakke, 42 Cal. 3d at 88, 720 P.2d at 13-14, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 665. Thus,
the supreme court held that, unless the municipal court provided
otherwise, issuance of a stay of execution pending appeal does not
suspend operation of any condition of the probation other than the
provision for imposition of a jail term. Id. See also In re Osslo, 51
Cal. 2d 371, 377-78 n.6, 334 P.2d 1, 5-6 n.6 (1958).
The court stated that the general rule regarding probation jurisdiction is that "a probation order may be revoked or modified only during the period of probation." Bakke, 42 Cal. 3d at 89, 720 P.2d at 14,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 666. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.3 (West 1982). See
also In re Daoud, 16 Cal. 3d 879, 882, 549 P.2d 145, 146, 129 Cal. Rptr.
673, 674 (1976). However, a probationer may consent to a continuance
of a proceeding beyond the period of time authorized by statute in
which the court may act.
The court analogized the instant case to the situation in which a
defendant requests a continuance of a revocation hearing to a date
beyond the period of probation. A defendant cannot complain that
the court lacks jurisdiction to render a decision in the continued
hearing because it was extended beyond the date of the probation
when he sought the extended date. See People v. Ham, 44 Cal. App.

3d 288, 188 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1975); In re Griffin, 67 Cal. 2d 343, 431
P.2d 625, 62 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967). Also, a request for a stay of execution of a jail term, which is similar to a request for a continuance,
necessarily presumes that the proceedings will resume at a later date.
While the continuance is extended to a certain date, the stay is generally extended to the time the judgment is affirmed. Thus, the court
concluded that the municipal court did not exceed its jurisdiction in
ordering the execution of the jail term upon affirmance of the judgment even though the stipulated period of probation had passed.
STEPHANIE FANOS

B. In the 1980 amendment to section 261 of the Penal Code,
which defined rape, the legislaturepurposely omitted the
requirement of resistance by the victim: People v. Barnes.
In People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 721 P.2d 110, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1986), the California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Bird, clarified the legislature's new position on whether a victim's resistance is a requirement of rape. In a unanimous decision,
the court reversed the court of appeal which required a showing of
resistance on the part of the victim.
During the rape in question, the victim had not forcibly resisted because she was afraid that the appellant was going to injure her further. The appellant had been threatening the victim prior to the
rape and had flexed his muscles and told her he could make her do
anything he wanted. The victim testified that she felt that the appellant was acting like a psychotic. During the sexual intercourse, the
victim exchanged kisses with the appellant and fell asleep afterward.
After returning home, the victim called Kaiser Hospital and reported
to the sexual trauma center for an examination. The court of appeal,
which relied in error on the pre-1980 statute, reversed the jury's conviction and held that the state had not met the statutory requirements for rape because the victim had not forcibly resisted the
appellant's attack.
Prior to the 1980 amendment, the statute defined rape as an act of
sexual intercourse in which the victim resists, but the "resistance is
overcome by [the] force or violence" of the perpetrator, or in which
the victim "is prevented from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by [the] apparent power of execution
...

."

CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2),(3) (West 1978). The amended stat-

ute substituted the resistance requirement with the requirement that
the rape be "accomplished against a person's will by means of force
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1986).
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The appellant argued that the change in the statute did not change
the requirements for establishing rape because resistance was never
required prior to the amendment. Therefore, the appellant argued
that the amendment was not applicable in determining whether the
crime of rape was committed.
The court rejected this argument by referring to the legislative history of the amendment which clearly indicated that the purpose of
the amendment was to delete the requirement of resistance. The
court referred to special language in Assembly Bill number 2899
which stated that the amendment would delete the resistance
requirement.
A thorough history of the requirement of resistance in rape cases
was presented, and the court also discussed current research which
has shown the following: (1) there are many ways in which rape victims react to the terror of sexual assault, including freezing and appearing relaxed and calm; (2) resistance by the victim may increase
the risk of further injury; and (3) the victim should make the choice
of whether to resist based on the circumstances of the situation. The
1980 amendment reflected these recent findings by eliminating the
requirement of resistance, thereby bringing proof of the crime of
rape into conformity with other heinous crimes, such as robbery and
assault, which do not require a showing of resistance by the victim.
The victim in the instant case showed substantial fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury despite the fact that she exchanged kisses
with the appellant and fell asleep afterward. It was likely that the
victim played along with the appellant in order to avoid further injury, and the fact that she fell asleep, perhaps only for a few minutes,
was not important. The court suggested that the victim may have
been physically and mentally exhausted after the trauma ended. The
court also gave weight to the jury's finding of rape.
Thus, the court held that the State had met the evidentiary requirements of section 261(2) of the Penal Code, as amended. The appellant's convictions of rape and of the related crime of false
imprisonment were affirmed, thereby reversing the court of appeal's
judgment.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

C. Sections 667 and 1192.7(c)(23) of the Penal Code, which
allow sentence enhancementfor repeat offenders, apply to
assault with a deadly weapon and other seriousfelonies
involving personal use of a dangerous weapon: People v.
Equarte.
In People v. Equarte,42 Cal. 3d 456, 722 P.2d 890, 229 Cal. Rptr. 116
(1986), the supreme court broadly interpreted some of the recidivist
sentence-enhancement provisions: sections 667 and 1192.7(c) of the
Penal Code. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
enhancement provisions are inapplicable to the crime of assault with
a deadly weapon and other crimes where the use of a dangerous
weapon is an element of the crime itself. Instead, the court chose to
focus on the scope of section 1192.7(c)(23) of the Penal Code. This
section incorporates into the categories of serious felonies, any felony
wherein a dangerous or deadly weapon is employed by the defendant
himself, including assault with a deadly weapon. The ruling in
Equarte expressly overruled People v. Bradford, 160 Cal. App. 3d 532,
206 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1985) and People v. Sutton, 163 Cal. App. 3d 438,
209 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1985).
In 1982, the voters of California approved Proposition 8 by ballot.
Proposition 8 imposed an additional sentence of five years upon conviction of certain "serious felonies" when the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony of like magnitude. The five-year
sentence enhancement provision of Proposition 8 is codified in section 667 of the Penal Code. The list of crimes triggering section 667 is
contained in section 1192.7(c). Of the twenty-five specific offenses included, subsection (c)(23) provides that "any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon," will activate
the enhancement provisions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(23) (West
1982). A sentence would not be prolonged, however, unless both the
current and prior offenses fell within the purview of the enhancement provisions.
In 1983, the defendant was arrested for assault with a deadly
weapon. The state alleged that the defendant had a prior conviction
of a "serious felony." Accordingly, the prosecution advocated the invocation of the five-year enhancement statute. The defendant admitted that his prior conviction was considered a "serious felony."
However, the defendant offered four interrelated arguments to preclude his present conviction from being enhanced.
First, the defendant maintained that subsection (c)(23) should not
include assault with a deadly weapon or any crime in which the use
,of a dangerous weapon is an element of the underlying offense. The
defendant called the court's attention to California's other sentence
enhancement statutes. For example, section 12022(b) of the Penal
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Code adds a year to the prescribed sentence for a felony in which a
dangerous weapon is used during the commission of the crime. This
section, however, specifically exempts crimes in which the use of a
dangerous weapon is a necessary element of the crime. Likewise,
section 12022.7, which enhances a defendant's sentence by three years
if the victim suffers great bodily injury, explicitly states that it is inapplicable to a crime having the infliction of great bodily injury as
one of its components.
In further support of his argument, the defendant cited People v.
Bradford, 160 Cal. App. 3d 532, 206 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986). In Bradford, the defendant disputed the applicability of the enhancement
provisions to his previous offense. The Bradford court narrowly construed the language of subsection (c)(23) to exclude felonies such as
assault with a deadly weapon and other felonies having the use of a
dangerous weapon as an essential element.
In rebuttal, the supreme court mentioned People v. Jackson, 37
Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985) and People v. Arwood, 165 Cal. App. 3d 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1985). The Arwood
court found Bradford to be at odds with its view of the enhancement
provisions. The Arwood court, which interpreted Jackson, found that
it was the intent of the voters, in enacting Proposition 8, to prolong
sentences to deter egregious criminal conduct regardless of whether
such conduct fit neatly into one of the pre-existing criminal offenses
listed in the enhancement provisions. In Equarte,the court sustained
the Arwood statutory construction, and thus, disapproved Bradford
and People v. Sutton, 163 Cal. App. 3d 438, 209 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1986) (a
case relying on Bradford's analysis).
The defendant's second argument was that section 1192.7(c)(23)
should not include assault with a deadly weapon because this would
make sections (c)(11) and (c)(13) unnecessary. Subsection (c)(11)
covers assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer, and (c)(13)
includes any use of a deadly weapon by an inmate. The court countered the defendant's conclusion by noting that the enhancement
provisions were not precisely written. As an example, the court mentioned that attempted murder fits within three of the designations.
The defendant's third and fourth arguments addressed the adequacy of the People's case. The defendant contended that the complaint failed to allege that he personally used a dangerous weapon
and the complaint also failed to set forth the number of the exact
subsection of 1192.7(c) with which he was being charged. The court
responded by reminding the defendant that he waived his ability to

raise this objection by failing to demurrer to the prosecution's complaint. The defendant also claimed that the jury never specifically
found that he personally used the weapon. The court dismissed this
argument also. There was no accomplice to the assault conviction,
thus, no factual dispute existed as to the defendant's personal use of
the dangerous weapon.
In conclusion, the court rejected all of the defendant's arguments
in favor of broadly interpreting the enhancement provisions. The
court's ruling provides that subsection (c)(23) applies to assault with
a deadly weapon and other serious felonies where the use of a dangerous weapon is an element of the crime itself. In sustaining the liberal, substantive interpretations of both Jackson and Arwood, the
court evidenced sympathy for the electorate's desire to protect themselves against habitual criminals.
VALERIE FLORES

D. A trialjudge exercising discretion under section 1170.1(h)
of the Penal Code may strike a statutory sentence
enhancement,provided the trialjudge states for the
record the circumstances in mitigation, and his decision
is neither arbitrary,capricious, nor unsupported: People
v. Jordan.
In People v. Jordan, 42 Cal. 3d 308, 721 P.2d 79, 228 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1986), the supreme court reviewed the actions of the sentencing
judge in exercising his discretion pursuant to section 1170.1(h) of the
Penal Code by striking enhancements from the defendant's punishment. The prerequisite for the exercise of such discretion is that the
judge must state for the record the mitigating circumstances prompting him to strike the additional punishment. Thereafter, in order to
reverse the trial judge's action, the appellate court must find that the
action was arbitrary, capricious or so unreasonable that it resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.
A review of the trial judge's conduct in this case was complicated
by the entangled factual record: the testimony was contradictory; the
victimized witness was absent; and the evidence presented was conflicting. Nonetheless, the defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. The judge delivered the maximum
sentence in consideration of the defendant's many prior offenses.
However, the judge exercised his discretion not to impose the applicable statutory sentence enhancements. As his grounds for striking
the enhancements, the judge cited three mitigating factors: 1) the
petty nature of the defendant's prior convictions; 2) the defendant's
advanced age of 59 years; and 3) the judge's belief that the crimes
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were not egregious. Rather, the judge believed that the crimes resulted from a dispute over repayment for the cost of a hamburger.
The People appealed the ruling, contending that the judge's decision
not to apply the enhancements was an abuse of his discretion.
In order to examine the validity of the judge's conduct, section
667.5(b) of the Penal Code must be analyzed. This section mandates
a one-year sentence enhancement for each past prison term received
by the defendant. Thus, the defendant's past imprisonments invoked
the application of this section.
The mandate of section 667.5(b) may be overcome, however, by section 1170.1(h). The latter provision gives a trial court discretion to
strike an enhancement where mitigating circumstances are present
and the judge states those circumstances for the record. The trial
judge complied with this requirement by stating the three factors he
considered important enough to mitigate the otherwise appropriate
enhancements.
In light of the express grant of discretion given by section
1170.1(h), the supreme court in Jordan held that a judge enjoys extensive protection in the use of that discretion. The standard of review allows an appellate court to overturn a trial judge's sentencing
decision only if that sentence is arbitrary, capricious, or so unreasonable that it results in a miscarriage of justice.
More particularly, the supreme court rejected the People's contention that the exclusive list of circumstances constituting proper mitigating factors was set out in Rule 423 of the California Rules of
Court. The supreme court held that other nonlisted factors may support a trial judge's discretion to withhold sentence enhancements.
Furthermore, the supreme court held that an exercise of discretion
falls within Rule 423 when a judge states merely that his or her decision was based on "the facts of the case." Moreover, Rule 409
presumes that a trial court considered the Rules of Court in determining a sentence.
The court in Jordan also refused to accept the People's argument
that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in accepting a version
of disputed evidence which was not the most probable. The court
ruled that a mix of evidence presented which provides a basis for a
judge's understanding is sufficient.
In addition, the supreme court was not persuaded by the People's
assertion that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating ones
and, therefore, the trial judge acted improperly. The court stated
that evidence for and against mitigation need not be weighed

mechanically. Section 1170.1(h) of the Penal Code gives a sentencing
judge sufficient discretion to strike enhancements even when the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.
Thus, although section 667.5(b) of the Penal Code mandates specified sentence enhancements, section 1170.1(h) gives a trial judge extremely broad discretion in declining to extend a defendant's
sentence. This discretion may not be questioned by an appellate
court if it is supported in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious,
nor so unreasonable as to result in a miscarriage of justice. Refusing
to enhance a sentence is not proper, however, unless the judge states
the mitigating factors on which the decision is based. A refusal based
on a statement as vague as "the facts of the case" is permissible. A
judge's interpretation of the evidence, even if not the most likely,
will be allowed to provide the basis for striking an enhancement. Finally, the discretion of a sentencing judge is so broad that his action
will not be set aside even where the aggravating circumstances outnumber the mitigating factors.
VALERIE FLORES
E. If the Board of Prison Terms finds "substantial
disparity"in the punishment, the trial court is required
to reduce the sentence unless the court can justify the
disparity: People v. Martin.
In People v. Martin, 42 Cal. 3d 437, 722 P.2d 905, 229 Cal. Rptr. 131
(1986), the supreme court held that a trial court must accept the
Board of Prison Terms' [hereinafter the Board] finding of "substantial disparity" between the sentences imposed on the defendant and
the other defendants in similar offenses, unless the court finds that
the Board erred in its review. The court further held that the trial
court must give "great weight" to the Board's finding by reducing the
sentence in accordance with the Board's recommendation, unless the
court can justify the disparity.
In this case, the jury found the defendant guilty on five counts of
robbery. In two counts, the defendant was found to have used a
knife. Prior to sentencing, the defendant was arrested for two additional charges of robbery with a firearm, to which he plead guilty.
Consequently, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment: five years for the principal robbery; a one-year enhancement
for the use of a knife; and six one-year terms for the six other robberies. Pursuant to section 1170(f)(1) of the Penal Code, the Board
reviewed the sentence to determine the existence of a possible
disparity.
In its initial study, the Board found a substantial disparity in the
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sentencing in the present case as compared to similar cases. The Sentencing Review Unit then began a further examination of the record.
The Board's studies revealed that section 1170.1 of the Penal Code
limited consecutive sentences for subordinate terms to five years.
Therefore, the Board found that the trial court's six one-year terms
for the additional six robberies were incorrect. It also found that
the average period of imprisonment for individuals convicted of
crimes similar to the instant case was seventy-seven months. A panel
of the Board further conducted an independent study, and concurred
with the Board's findings. Consequently, the Board advised the court
that its sentence was substantially disparate from the norm, and
recommended five to ten years imprisonment as the appropriate
punishment.
The trial court disagreed with the Board's methodology. The court
argued that the Board had failed to examine the defendant's personality, his attitude, and the nature of the particular offense. Therefore, the trial court's acceptance of the Board's recommendation was
limited to the legal correction, and it ignored the Board's finding on
disparity. Thus, the defendant's sentence was reduced from twelve to
eleven years.
On appeal, the defendant successfully contended that the trial
court had abused its discretion in refusing to comply with the Board's
recommended punishment. Therefore, the question presented before
the supreme court was what degree of "weight" the trial court should
give the Board's finding.
The court began its analysis by reviewing the legislative intent behind section 1170(f). The court reasoned that the purpose of the section, was to promote uniformity in sentencing by diminishing
inequitable disparities which often result from the differing attitudes
of judges. Therefore, the court adopted a two-step approach to the
issue: 1) the trial court must accept the Board's finding of disparity
unless the court, based upon substantial evidence, finds that the
Board erred; and 2) the court must also reduce the sentence unless it
could justify the disparity. When rejecting the Board's sentencing
recommendation, the trial court is required to support its decision
with an articulate statement of reasons.
The decision illustrates the court's desire to encourage uniformity
in sentencing, but not at the expense of the trial court's right to exercise discretion in particular cases that warrant disparity. Consequently, the trial court was required to comply with the Board's
findings on disparity. However, if a trial court finds a special need

for disparate sentencing in a particular case, there is room to exercise
its discretion. In order to do so, the trial court must support its decision with an articulate statement.
SUNG-DO GONG
F. A defendant could be convicted of, but not punishedfor,
both sodomy and lewd conduct based on one criminal act:
People v. Pearson.
In People v. Pearson,42 Cal. 3d 351, 721 P.2d 595, 228 Cal. Rptr. 509
(1986), the California Supreme Court held that a defendant could be
convicted of, but not punished for, both sodomy and lewd conduct
based on the same act. The defendant was convicted of two counts
each of sodomy and lewd conduct based on his acts upon two children. Sentences for the two counts of sodomy were stayed.
The defendant based his argument on the rule stated in People v.
Cole, 31 Cal. 3d 568, 645 P.2d 1182, 183 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1982). In Cole,
the supreme court held that a defendant could not be convicted of
two crimes based on one criminal act if one crime was a lesser included offense of the other. The defendant argued in the alternative:
(1) lewd conduct was a lesser included offense of sodomy; or (2) sodomy was a lesser included offense of lewd conduct. The court rejected both of these arguments.
The court held that lewd conduct was not necessarily included in
sodomy because lewd conduct, as stated in section 288(a) of the Penal
Code, requires a specific intent of "arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such
child." Sodomy, however, is a general intent crime pursuant to section 286(c) of the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 288(a), 286(c)
(West Supp. 1986). Therefore, it is possible to commit sodomy without having the specific intent required for lewd conduct.
The court also held that sodomy was not necessarily included in
the crime of lewd conduct. Section 954 of the Penal Code allows a
defendant to be convicted of as many offenses as are charged, and
does not provide an exception for necessarily included offenses. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1982). It is unclear why the court did
not challenge the Cole rule with its interpretation of section 954 of
the Penal Code and resolve the issue of whether a defendant could
be convicted of multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal act
when one of the offenses was a lesser included offense of the other.
The defendant also relied upon People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184
P.2d 512 (1947), where the court concluded that rape was a lesser included offense to lewd conduct because the statutory provision for
lewd conduct lists rape as an example. The court did not find Greer
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controlling because its holding conflicted with the provisions of section 954. In addition, the court noted that the discussion in Greer was
merely dictum since the conviction therein was reversed on other
grounds prior to the court's reaching the issue of whether rape was a
lesser included offense of lewd conduct. Therefore, the court held
that the defendant could be convicted of both sodomy and lewd conduct. However, section 654 of the Penal Code prohibits punishment
for multiple offenses arising out of the same act, so the sentence for
sodomy was necessarily stayed.
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the sodomy conviction, which was stayed, could be later used for enhancement purposes
for subsequent offenses. The court noted that since section 654 of the
Penal Code prohibits concurrent sentences for multiple convictions
arising out of the same act, the sodomy conviction, which was the
lesser offense, was required to be stayed. See In re Wright, 65 Cal. 2d
650, 422 P.2d 998, 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967).
The court then decided that section 654 also prohibits enhancement
based on stayed convictions. The court reasoned that such use of
stayed convictions would in effect result in multiple punishment
which is proscribed by section 654. The court held that this must be
the rule unless and until the legislature provides otherwise.
Section 1170.1(i), which disallows limitations on the number of enhancements to be used in forcible sex offenses, did not apply to this
case because sodomy and lewd conduct are not forcible sex offenses.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(i) (West Supp. 1986). Furthermore,
the statute does not express a clear intent to allow enhancement for
multiple convictions based on the same act.
Article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution, which provides that "[a]ny prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding ...shall subsequently be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding," did not affect the court's holding because this holding allowed the use of multiple convictions for enhancement to the
extent that the legislature so authorized. CAL. CONST.art. I, § 28(f).
The primary holding of this decision was that neither sodomy nor
lewd conduct is a lesser included offense of the other. Justice Lucas,
in his dissent, felt that the discussion of the use of the stayed conviction for enhancement purposes was effectively dicta since it was a
premature issue.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

G. Sections 667 and 1192. 7(c)(8) of the Penal Code, which
jointly provide a five-year sentence enhancementfor
repeat offenders, apply to prior convictions only if the
prosecution can establish, without going beyond the
record, that the defendant personally used a dangerous
weapon: People v. Piper.
In People v. Piper,42 Cal. 3d 471, 722 P.2d 899, 229 Cal. Rptr. 125
(1986), the California Supreme Court was presented with a second
opportunity to define the language of California's recidivist sentence
enhancement provisions. The court chose to strictly construe sections 667 and 1192.7(c) of the Penal Code [hereinafter the Enhancement Provisions]. Therefore, the Piper opinion requires the
prosecution to actually litigate the defendant's use of a dangerous
weapon before the Enhancement Provisions may be invoked under
subsection (c)(8).
Piper was charged with and convicted of arson in 1983. In addition
to a two-year sentence for arson, the trial court imposed five consecutive years to the term pursuant to the Enhancement Provisions. The
increase was attributed to the defendant's prior conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle. The defendant appealed the sentence enhancements and the supreme court granted review.
Both the current and previous convictions must be "serious felonies" within the meaning of the Enhancement Provisions if a sentence is to be extended. Although arson is expressly listed as item
(c)(14) of the 25 "serious felonies" of section 1192.7, the defendant's
prior offense of shooting at an occupied vehicle is not specifically
enumerated. The prosecution maintained, however, that the previous
conviction was covered by the two general categories of the Enhancement Provisions: subsections (c)(8) and (c)(23) of section 1192.7.
Subsection (c)(23) includes "any felony in which the defendant per-

sonally used a dangerous or deadly weapon."

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1192.7(c)(23) (West 1982). This subsection expressly states, and the
court's opinion in People v. Equarte, 42 Cal. 3d 456, 722 P.2d 890, 229
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1986), confirms that in order for a crime to fall within
the purview of that subsection, the People, as part of their case, must
demonstrate that the defendant personally used a dangerous weapon.
Subsection (c)(8) covers "any felony in which the defendant used a
firearm." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(8) (West 1982). The prosecution urged an interpretation of subsection (c)(8) which did not include personal use by the defendant as an element. In response, the
court made three observations. First, the grammatical composition of
the subsection suggests that personal use is, in fact, a component.
Second, the court echoed the principles previously set forth in People
v. Walker, 18 Cal. 3d 232, 555 P.2d 306, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976), that
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whenever vicarious liability is to be imposed, legislative intent to that
effect must be clearly expressed. The Piper court held that in subsection (c)(8) no such legislative intent was evident. The court's third
response to the prosecution's position was that if subsection (c)(8)
was at all ambiguous, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the
defendant. For those reasons, the court concluded that subsection
(c)(8), as well as subsection (c)(23), require a demonstration of the
defendant's personal use of a dangerous weapon.
The court further stated that whether the defendant personally
shot at the occupied vehicle was neither actually nor necessarily litigated at defendant's previous trial. The defendant could have been
an aider or abettor. Moreover, the court refused to allow the prosecution to go behind the record of the previous conviction to prove additional facts necessary to show personal use.
In summary, personal use is required by subsections (c)(8) and
(c)(23) of section 1192.7 of the Penal Code. The prosecution in Piper
was unable to establish that the defendant personally used a firearm
in the past crime, as they were confined to the record of what was
actually or by implication adjudicated. Thus, the court ruled that the
five-year enhancement was improperly applied by the trial court.
Even though the defendant's recent arson conviction constituted a
"serious felony," the fact that the prior conviction did not fall within
one of the crimes enumerated within the Enhancement Provisions
prevented the defendant's sentence from being extended.
In Equarte, the companion case published immediately preceding
Piper,the court also examined the Enhancement Provisions. There,
the court, in a broad interpretation, held the general wording of subsection (c)(23) to apply to assault with a deadly weapon and other serious felonies involving personal use of a dangerous weapon,
although the crimes were not expressly listed therein. The broad
and flexible application given to the Enhancement Provisions in
Equarte was undermined by the narrow Piper holding. Piper
removes the likelihood of sentence enhancement for previous crimes
which involved more than one defendant, where it is unclear from
the record which defendant personally used a dangerous weapon or
was convicted as an accomplice. Further, Piperburdens future prosecutions by requiring the foresight to develop an extensive factual record, showing personal use by the defendant, so that the conviction
may one day be used as a prior offense capable of invoking the Enhancement Provisions. The Piper decision neglects the voters' objective, in enacting generic provisions in the Enhancement Provisions

which was to close loopholes which enable habitual criminals to continue to victimize society.
VALERIE FLORES

V.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

The lawful presence of a police officer on the basis of an
exigent circumstance can justify the subsequent
warrantlessentry of another officer for the purpose of
interpretingwhat the first officer had already seen:
People v. Duncan.

In People v. Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d 91, 720 P.2d 2, 227 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1986), the supreme court unanimously affirmed the exigent circumstance exception to the general warrant requirement. Specifically,
the court held that the lawful presence of an officer on the basis of
an exigent circumstance can further justify the subsequent warrantless entry of another officer who was present solely for the purpose
of interpreting what the first officer had already seen. However, in
the event of a disruption of the continuity of subsequent entries, the
court required the state to establish independent exigent circumstances for those entries.
In this case, an officer entered the defendants' premises without a
warrant, suspecting a burglary to be in progress. Instead, he found a
laboratory with a strong odor of ether. Suspecting it to be an illicit
drug laboratory, he requested the assistance of his supervising officer
who, upon arrival, called a vice control officer. When a neighbor informed the officers that the defendant was approaching, they left the
premises.
The vice control officer later arrived and detected the odor of ether
from the driveway. The two officers then related what they had
seen. At that point, the vice control officer called the fire department and the federal drug enforcement agency. He then entered the
premises with the other officers and concluded that the laboratory
was used to manufacture illicit drugs. When the firefighters arrived,
he ordered them to ventilate the premises and to turn off both the
electricity and the gas.
The defendants were charged with possession of methylamine and
phenyl-2-propanone with intent to manufacture, transport and sell
methamphetamine, and the transportation and sale of metamphetamine. At trial, they moved to suppress the evidence. Upon the
court's denial of their motion, they pleaded guilty and the court ordered them to be placed on a conditional probation, to which the defendants appealed. On appeal, the state conceded that the burden of
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justifying the warrantless entries was on the state, and relied on the
exigent circumstance exception to the general warrant requirement.
To determine the existence of exigent circumstances, the court
used a two-step test: 1) a factual question to determine whether the
officers knew or believed that exigent circumstances existed; and 2) a
legal question to examine whether the officers' responses were reasonable under the circumstances. In determining the reasonableness
of the officers' conduct, the court further held that the officers must
be able to point to and articulate specific facts which would warrant a
reasonable person to take immediate action.
The court found exigent circumstances for the entry of the first officer on two grounds. First, the initial intrusion on the defendants'
privacy was justified by the reasonable suspicion that a burglary was
in progress. Second, his continued presence was justified by a new
suspicion that the laboratory was used to manufacture illicit drugs
which gave rise to a new exigent circumstance.
The court justified the supervising officer's warrantless entry
through the lawful presence of the first officer. The court reasoned
that the supervising officer was present solely for the purpose of interpreting what the first officer had already seen. Thus, the additional intrusion on defendants' privacy was minimal.
The court, however, required an independent justification for the
third officer's warrantless entry. This requirement was premised on
the theory that the continuity of the entry was disrupted when the
two officers left the premises. The defendants contended that under
People v. Dickson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 192 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1983),
the officer's entry could not be justified because the odor of ether
alone was held to be insufficient to constitute an exigent circumstance. The supreme court acknowledged that since ether has numerous legitimate uses, odor alone cannot constitute an exigent
circumstance. However, the court disapproved Dickson to the extent
that such reasoning implies that an officer who senses the odor of
ether must cease further investigation. The court held that odor is
"indicative" of possible danger. The court concluded that the officer
was lawfully acting to preserve life and property, especially in light
of the extremely volatile nature of ether. Therefore, his entry was
justified as being reasonable.
The court's holding seems to indicate its willingness to limit private rights where the general public is endangered by private misconduct. When relying on exigent circumstances, however, the court

will require officers to justify warrantless entries with articulable
and specific facts which would warrant immediate action.
SUNG-DO GONG
B. In the absence of cross-admissibilityof evidence, the trial
court, in a capital case, may be required to sever separate
charges of the same class of crimes: People v. Smallwood.
In People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr.
913, modified, 42 Cal. 3d 710a (1986), the supreme court required
cross-admissibility of evidence for the joinder of two or more different offenses of the same crime in capital cases. The court wanted to
prevent "substantial prejudice" unless the benefit of the joinder
could be shown to outweigh the prejudice. Consequently, the court
found that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to sever
separate murder counts to be an abuse of its discretion under section
954 of the Penal Code. The court's holding was based on its finding
that a capital case "compelled" it to analyze the severance issue "with
a higher degree of scrutiny and care." 42 Cal. 3d at 426, 722 P.2d at
203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 920 (quoting Williams v. Superior Court, 36
Cal. 3d 441, 454, 683 P.2d 699, 707, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 708 (1984)). As a
result, the court reversed the death penalty.
In this case, the state charged the defendant with two separate
murder counts, which occurred seven months apart, each with special
circumstances. Consequently, if the court were to try the two offenses separately, the evidence of one offense would be inadmissible
at the trial of another. In a pre-trial motion, the defendant urged the
court to sever the two charges in accordance with section 954 which
authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion to sever different
offenses of the same class of crime. Considering the absence of crossadmissibility of the evidence, the defendant argued that joinder
would prejudicially cause a "spillover effect," resulting in reinforcement of the weaker case with the evidence of the stronger case. 42
Cal. 3d at 425, 722 P.2d at 202, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 918. However, the
trial court denied the motion, and the jury found the defendant
guilty on one offense while it failed to reach a verdict on the other.
Subsequently, the trial court, sitting without a jury, imposed the
death penalty on the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the two counts. Relying on Williams, the majority
agreed and held that if "substantial prejudice" can be shown, the trial
court's refusal to disjoin the charges constituted an abuse of
discretion.
To determine the existence of "substantial prejudice," the majority
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began its analysis by examining the cross-admissibility of evidence.
The majority held that in the absence of cross-admissibility in capital
cases, the court should review the severance issue with a "higher degree of scrutiny and care" by examining the possible "spillover" effect from the joinder. Consequently, although the majority
acknowledged cross-admissibility as an element in its analysis, it essentially made cross-admissibility a prerequisite to joinder in capital
cases. Since the present case lacked cross-admissibility, the majority
had little difficulty finding a "substantial prejudicial effect" from the
trial court's denial to sever the charges, despite the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. As a result, the majority reversed the
death penalty.
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Bird, with whom
Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin concurred, may have little
value as a precedent due to the recent ejection of Bird, Reynoso, and
Grodin from the court. Therefore, further discussion of the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Lucas, with whom Justices Mosk
and Panelli concurred, was warranted in order to determine the new
court's possible approach to the issue.
Justice Lucas strongly criticized the majority for reversing the
death penalty solely on the basis of the trial court's error in refusing
to sever the two murder charges. The dissenting justices disagreed
with the majority with regard to the scope of discretion authorized
under section 954 of the Penal Code, and in the use of cross-admissibility of the evidence in finding "substantial prejudice." The dissenting justices also argued that Williams was irrelevant to the issue
presented before the court.
The dissenting opinion began its discussion by examining the scope
of discretion given to the trial court. The dissent argued that section
954 allows broad discretion with respect to the disposition of a severance issue. Therefore, the dissent was not troubled by the trial
court's exercise of discretion in denying the defendant's pre-trial
motion.
The dissent also found fallacy in the majority's analysis of the
"substantial prejudice" element. First, the dissent pointed out that
cross-admissibility should be a factor in the inquiry and not a prerequisite to proper joinder. Justice Lucas wrote that "[t]he majority
magically transmute[d] an element guaranteeing proper joinder into
a prerequisite to proper joinder." Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 434, 722
P.2d at 209, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
The dissenting justices also differed with the majority in reviewing

the case for any "spillover" effect. The majority examined the evidence presented at the time of the motion to determine whether a potential for a "spillover" effect existed; the dissent, on the other hand,
argued that the court should review the actual evidence presented at
the trial. In doing so, the dissent found overwhelming evidence of
the defendant's guilt on both counts. Furthermore, the justices disagreed with the majority's decision to require higher scrutiny of the
severance issue in capital cases. It pointed out that the Penal Code
authorized the trial court to exercise its discretion in all criminal
charges. The code did not require the trial court to employ a higher
standard for capital cases.
The dissent also pointed out that the cases cited by the majority
were inapposite. The majority relied upon Williams and Coleman v.
Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, cert. denied,
451 U.S. 988 (1981). However, the dissenting opinion reasoned that
both cases dealt with pretrial review of severance rulings and potential prejudice resulting from joinder of cases while the issue in this
case was whether actual prejudice resulted from the denial of
severance.
Based on the recent removal of Chief Justice Bird and Justices
Reynoso and Grodin, the following conclusions are warranted. First,
the absence of these three justices from the court will inevitably result in the overruling of the present case. Considering Governor
Deukmejian's affirmative stance on capital punishment, the new
court's view on the issue may drastically shift the pendulum to the
other side. Second, assuming the court does change its view on capital punishment, the dissenting opinion serves as an indication of the
future court's position. It is likely that the Bird court's various interpretations of criminal procedure to reverse death penalty decisions
will be undone by the new court. What remains to be seen, however,
is the magnitude of the change and the period of time the new court
will take to inject its view.
SUNG-DO GONG
C.

When a priorfelony conviction is an element of a crime
and the defendant stipulates to it, Article I, section 28(f)
of the California Constitution requires the trial court to
reveal the fact, not the nature, of the prior conviction to
the jury: People v. Valentine.

In People v. Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr.
25 (1986), the supreme court held that when a defendant stipulates to
a prior felony conviction which is an element of a crime, the California Constitution requires that the trial court disclose this stipulation
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to the jury. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) [hereinafter section 28(f)].
However, the court held that the nature of the prior conviction
should be withheld as such information would be irrelevant in determining the defendant's ex-felon status. It also addressed whether the
trial court's incorrect disclosure concerning the nature of the defendant's prior felony convictions to the jury constituted harmless error.
In this case, the defendant, who was charged with armed robbery
and possession of a concealed firearm by an ex-felon, agreed to stipulate to his prior convictions if the trial court would withhold such information from the jury. The trial court, however, held that the
open court requirement of section 28(f) compelled the court to deny
the defendant's request. As a result, the trial court allowed the jury
to learn both the fact and the nature of the defendant's prior felony
convictions.
On appeal, the defendant contended that section 28(f) retained the
pre-existing rule of People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167
Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980). In Hall, the court held that once the defendant
stipulates, neither the fact nor the nature of the prior convictions
could be revealed to the jury. The defendant further argued that the
disclosure of his stipulation would be irrelevant.
The Valentine court rejected the defendant's argument and overruled Hall. The court reasoned that the Hall decision was not based
on the question of relevance but on due process. The court then
ruled that the constitutional amendment may be interpreted to limit
the scope of existing state constitutional due process protections provided that the federal due process protections are not violated. Moreover, the court observed that the language of section 28(f) clearly
expressed legislative intent to restore the common law prior to Hall.
Therefore, the court overruled Hall to the extent that the jury may
now learn of the defendant's stipulation to his prior convictions.
However, the court held that the nature of the prior convictions
should be withheld from the jury. It noted that since the defendant's
ex-felon status was established, the nature of his prior crimes was irrelevant to the current charge of "possession of a firearm by an exfelon." The court further reasoned that disclosing the nature of the
prior crime would violate the federal due process right to a fair trial.
Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court had misconstrued
section 28(f).
The People contended that the trial court's error was harmless,
and that the prejudicial effect was dispelled when the defendant testified. The court disagreed, noting that had the trial court correctly

interpreted the section, the defendant might not have taken the
stand. In concluding that the error was not harmless, the court also
relied on the discrepencies between the victim's initial description
and the defendant's appearance when arrested, the defendant's alibi
and the temporal proximity of the prior conviction. Consequently,
the court granted a new trial on all counts.
Finally, concerning the question of construing the first sentence of
section 28(f) as allowing the trial court an unlimited use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the court held that the trial court
retained discretion to balance the impeachment value and the prejudicial effect.
SUNG-DO GONG
D.

The discovery of a wounded victim during the
investigation of a robbery gives an officer reasonable
cause to enter and briefly search an apartmentfor
additionalpersons: Tamborino v. Superior Court.

In Tamborino v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 3d 919, 719 P.2d 242, 226
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1986), the defendants unsuccessfully moved to suppress contraband evidence found during a warrantless walkthrough
search of their home. The defendants sought a writ of mandate in
the court of appeal to set aside the trial court's unfavorable decision.
The supreme court subsequently denied the writ.
After receiving a radio call reporting a robbery and the presence of
a bleeding victim, police arrived at the defendant's apartment,
knocked, and forcibly entered after receiving no answer. The defendant was approaching the door barefoot, wearing a bathrobe with
blood on his head, neck and hands. Due to the limited report, police
were not sure if he was a victim or a suspect; thus, for their own
safety, the officers brought him outside the apartment and handcuffed him. Without questioning him, the officers immediately reentered the apartment to perform a sweep search for other victims or
suspects. During this limited warrantless search, narcotics paraphernalia was seized and the defendants were subsequently charged with
possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale pursuant to section 11351
of the Health and Safety Code. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11351 (West Supp. 1986).
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the "plain view"
doctrine which allows the police to seize contraband found in plain
sight during a lawful search. In order to justify their actions, however, the officers must show that their decision was based on specific
and articulable facts. The court reasoned that the defendant's injuries, coupled with the limited police report, constituted articulable
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facts warranting the brief search of defendants' apartment to ascertain whether additional persons, victims or suspects were inside. Relying on the "common sense" and "concern for human life"
rationales, the court concluded that the officers' actions were not
unreasonable.
In addition, the court compared the facts of this case to a homicide
investigation case where the United States Supreme Court held that
"when the police come upon the scene of a homicide, they [may legally] make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there
are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). The court analogized the present investigation of a robbery involving a wounded victim with the
homicide investigation and approved the officers limited walkthrough
search. When a man is barefoot, bleeding, and wearing a bathrobe,
"reasonable" suspicion is created in the officer's mind as to whether
such person was a victim or a suspect. In addition, the reliability of
the defendant's response created exigent circumstances affording the
officers a right to reenter without a warrant. Rather than enjoying
the "luxury" of questioning the defendant whether or not others
were inside, the court concluded that "immediate action was warranted," and authorized the warrantless search.
ARIAN COLACHIS

VI.

ELECTION LAW
A court will invalidate an absentee ballot only upon a
showing of fraud, coercion, or ballot tampering: Wilks v.
Mouton.

In Wilks v. Mouton, 42 Cal. 3d 400, 722 P.2d 187, 229 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1986), the supreme court held that a court will invalidate an absentee ballot only upon a showing of fraud, coercion, or ballot tampering. The election to incorporate the community of East Palo Alto
passed by a margin of fifteen votes: 1,782 in favor and 1,767 opposed.
Of those votes, 272 were cast by absentee ballots. The plaintiffs, voters in the election, sought to invalidate the election on the grounds of
improper handling of certain absentee ballots. If the plaintiffs' challenges had been sustained, certain absentee ballots would have been
invalidated and the result in favor of incorporation reversed.
In stating that its primary duty was to validate the election unless
it was plainly illegal, the court continued to recognize the distinction

between mandatory and directory provisions in election laws. Rideout v. City of Los Angeles, 185 Cal. 426, 197 P. 74 (1921). A violation
of a mandatory provision invalidates the election. A deviation from a
directory provision, however, will not invalidate the election if there
was substantial observance of the law and the outcome of the election was not affected, or if the voters' rights were not injured by such
deviation. The court also stated that it was bound by the trial court's
determination of the facts when they are supported by substantial
evidence.
First, the plaintiffs challenged fifteen of the absentee ballots that
the county clerk mailed to a third party. Those ballots were mailed
to the third party because the absentee applications filed by the voters required the clerk to do so. The plaintiffs argued that the county
clerk violated section 1007 of the Elections Code, which requires that
ballots be mailed only to the voters' residences and not to third parties. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1986). The court found
that the plaintiffs' argument was groundless. The court stated that
section 1007 did not contain such a requirement; on the contrary,
other sections of the absentee ballot provisions allow the voter to designate a mailing address different from his residence address. See
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 1006, 1451 (West Supp. 1986).
In addition, the court refused to be persuaded by the plaintiffs' supplemental argument. The plaintiffs argued that the California Attorney General's determination that section 1007 does not authorize
delivery of absentee ballots to authorized representatives of the voter
was controlling. See 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 439 (1979). The California Attorney General stated that the legislature intended that third party
delivery is not allowed unless the voter meets the usual time requirement for applying for an absentee ballot. Id. at 442. In Wilks, the
absentee voters met the time requirement for applying for their absentee ballots. Under the plaintiffs' argument, the absentee voters
were not allowed to use a third party to deliver their ballots. Consequently, their ballots were void. The majority stated that the Attorney General's opinion was inconsistent with section 1001 of the
Elections Code which states that the absentee ballot provisions
should be liberally interpreted in favor of the absentee voters. CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 1001 (West Supp. 1986). Since the legislature allowed
voters to receive ballots at a location other than their residences, "we
can assume that the Legislature anticipated that in some cases a third
party would convey the ballot to the voter." Wilcs, 42 Cal. 3d at 40506, 722 P.2d at 191, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 4. Since no mandatory provisions
of the Elections Code were violated, the court refused to invalidate
these fifteen ballots.
Next, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of forty-five absentee
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ballots that were completed with the assistance of incorporation proponents. Upon substantial evidence, the trial court determined the
following: 1) the assistance was done at the request of the voter; 2)
there was no fraud or coercion; and 3) any disclosures on the part of
the voter were made voluntarily. Also, the trial court concluded that
no ballot had been tampered with and that the absentee ballots
which were cast represented the free choice of the voters. Assuming
that the trial court's findings were true, the plaintiffs argued that the
secrecy of voting was violated when the voter voluntarily made disclosures. Therefore, even in the absence of tampering, the ballots
should be invalidated. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs'
argument.
The court stated that the provision in the California Constitution
relating to voter secrecy does not mean that absentee ballots be cast
in secret. The provision" 'was never intended to preclude reasonable
measures to facilitate and increase exercise of the right to vote such
as absentee.., voting.'" Wilks, 42 Cal. 3d at 409, 722 P.2d at 193, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 6 (quoting Peterson v. City of San Diego, 34 Cal. 3d 225,
230, 666 P.2d 975, 978, 193 Cal. Rptr. 533, 536 (1983)). See also CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 7. Since the court determined, upon a showing of
substantial evidence, that no absentee voter was coerced to give up
the right to vote in secret, the forty-five absentee ballots were not invalidated. The court further stated, in dicta, that it is the legislature's responsibility-not the court's-to address any weaknesses in
the absentee voting provisions which are open to potential abuse.
The plaintiffs also attacked forty-six absentee ballots that were
personally delivered to the ballot box between May 9 and May 24,
1983 by the chairperson of EPACCI, the committee favoring incorporation. It was not until May 24, 1983, however, that the assistant
county clerk informed the clerk in charge of the ballot box that absentee ballots could be delivered only by the voter. The plaintiffs
contended that section 1013 of the Elections Code directs the voter to
return the completed ballot personally or by mail. CAL. ELEc. CODE
§ 1013 (West Supp. 1986). Delivery of the absentee ballot by a third
party was not contemplated by the statute and, therefore, the ballots
delivered between May 9 and May 24, 1983 should have been
invalidated.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that section 1013
did not condone the voters' use of a third party to deliver the absentee ballot. The court, however, did not agree "that the voters' and...
clerks' inadvertent violation of this provision require[d] that we dis-

enfranchise the voter in the face of a trial court finding that there
was no fraud or tampering with the challenged ballots." Wils, 42
Cal. 3d at 411, 722 P.2d at 195, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 8. The court also disagreed with a court of appeal's decision that held that provisions
prohibiting third party-delivery of absentee ballots were essential to
preserving the integrity of elections. Fair v. Hernandez, 138 Cal.
App. 3d 578, 188 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1982).
The court regarded section 1013 as directory in nature and not
mandatory. Since the section is directory in nature and the violation
did not change the result of the election, the absentee ballots should
not be invalidated. In addition, the court relied on the fact that section 1013 did not prevent the fair expression of the electorate will or
injuriously affect the rights of the voters involved.
Lastly, the plaintiffs challenged sixteen absentee ballots returned
in envelopes in which the voters' residence addresses failed to agree
with the address on their affidavit of registration. The court concluded that section 1015 did not require the election official to compare addresses, but only the signatures on the identification envelope
with the signature on the affidavit of registration. CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 1015 (West Supp. 1986). Therefore, the absentee ballots were not
invalidated.
RICHARD J. WITTBRODT

VII.

EVIDENCE
The Luce rule is adopted prospectively, and a procedure
is establishedfor applying the Castro rule to cases tried
prior to the Castro decision: People v. Collins.

In People v. Collins, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 722 P.2d 173, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1986), the California Supreme Court prospectively adopted the rule
established in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984). In an opinion
written by Justice Mosk, the court also established a procedure for
appellate courts to follow in applying the rule set out in People v.
Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985), for preCastro cases.
The defendant Collins was charged in 1983 with either burglary or
receiving stolen property. At trial, the prosecution wanted to disclose
prior burglary and robbery convictions for impeachment purposes if
the defendant testified. The defendant moved to exclude the prior
convictions, but the trial court denied the motion. The trial court
held that it had no discretionary power as it was bound by article I,
section 28(f) of the California Constitution. Section 28(f), which was
adopted in 1982 as part of Proposition 8, authorizes impeachment of a
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witness with prior felony convictions. The defendant chose not to
testify and was convicted of second degree burglary.
At trial, the defendant argued that the court had the discretion to
exclude evidence of the prior convictions pursuant to section 352 of
the California Evidence Code. This section gave the court the discretion to exclude the use of a prior conviction when its probative value
is outweighed by the risk of undue influence. See People v. Beagle, 6
Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
In Castro, the California Supreme Court recently held that
although section 28(f) authorizes the impeachment of a witness by
prior felony convictions involving moral turpitude, section 352 does
indeed provide the court with discretionary power in deciding
whether to exclude or include the convictions. However, Castro was
decided in 1985, subsequent to the present case. Therefore, the trial
court did not rely upon Castro for its decision to allow the prosecution to use the convictions for impeachment.
The defendant appealed the denial of the motion to exclude. The
prosecution urged the court of appeal to adopt the rule set out in
Luce. The Luce rule prohibits a party from appealing a denial of a
motion to exclude prior convictions if the defendant failed to testify.
The court adopted the Luce rule, but held that it would take effect
prospectively in order to avoid fundamental unfairness to the defendant who relied in good faith on the law in effect at the time he made
his decision not to testify.
In adopting the Luce rule, the court held that it did not violate the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination either under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution or under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. The defendant had argued
that the Luce rule would usurp his right to remain silent due to the
resulting expense of not being able to appeal the denial of the motion
to exclude. The court held that the Luce rule did not usurp the defendant's right to decide whether to testify, but only made that decision more difficult. The court held that the Luce rule was
constitutional and would be applied prospectively. Therefore, the defendant was able to appeal the trial court's decision.
The court of appeal had affirmed the trial court's determination
that it was bound by section 28(f) and, therefore, had no discretion to
consider the motion to exclude. The supreme court reversed, and
held that the Castro rule applies to those cases tried before the date
of the Castro decision but which were still pending upon appeal. The

court then formulated a procedure for appellate courts to follow in
applying the Castro rule.

The procedure established by the court can apply to factual situations analogous to the instant case. The procedure requires that the
appellate court make an initial determination as to whether the prior
convictions were inadmissible as a matter of law or upon the trial
court's discretion. A conviction would be inadmissible as a matter of
law in three situations: (1) if the conviction, pursuant to Castro, did
not involve moral turpitude; (2) if the appellate court concluded that
the trial court could only find it inadmissible, in the exercise of its
discretion; or (3) if the conviction lost felony status by operation of
law.
If the trial court's determination of admissibility was discretionary,
and the defendant testified at trial, the appellate court must assess
the probable effects of the impeachment on the disposition of the
case. If the impeachment did not truly affect the outcome, the Castro
error was harmless. Otherwise, the case must be remanded to the
trial court, and the trial court must exercise its discretion and decide
whether the error was harmless or prejudicial.
If the defendant did not testify at trial, the issue is automatically
remanded to the trial court to exercise its discretion and to determine whether the error was harmless or prejudicial. In so determining, the trial court directs the defendant to offer proof in camera as
to what his testimony would have been.
In applying the procedure to the instant case, the court held that
since both burglary and robbery involve moral turpitude, those convictions were not inadmissible as a matter of law. Therefore, the decision whether to include or exclude them was discretionary. The
court directed the court of appeal to remand the case to the trial
court to follow the procedure outlined.
By adopting the Luce rule, an appeal of a denial of a motion to exclude use of prior convictions for impeachment is prohibited when
the defendant fails to testify. A detailed procedure for the lower
courts to follow in applying the Castro rule has now been clarified.
The procedure will apply to cases tried prior to Castro, but which involve issues relating to article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution and section 352 of the Evidence Code.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE
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VIII.

FAMILY LAW
A California court is authorized to grantan ex-spouse an
interest in the gross amount of a military retiree's
pension oritted and unadjudicatedin previous divorce
proceeding: Casas v. Thompson.

In Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal. 3d 131, 720 P.2d 921, 228 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1986), the supreme court held that the Federal Uniform Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act [hereinafter FUSFSPA], authorizes
a court to partition a gross amount of a military retiree's pension
which was omitted from an earlier divorce decree, for the benefit of
the former spouse. The court based its decision on the legislative intent behind FUSFSPA and past California case law precedent.
A regular or reserve commissioned officer of the United States
who retires after twenty years of service is entitled to retirement
pay. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391, 3929 (West Supp. 1986). The plaintiff in
Casas, brought an independent action, fourteen years after her divorce decree was entered, to divide her husband's military retirement
pension, overlooked in the earlier divorce proceeding. The defendant
had been receiving such payments for ten years prior to this action.
In March of 1982, the trial court held, pursuant to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), that the defendant's pension was his separate property, not subject to court divestiture. Before judgment was
entered, the plaintiff urged the lower court to recognize FUSFSPA,
which was enacted February 1, 1983, and allowed respective states to
treat military retirement pensions as community property. 10
U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West Supp. 1986). Thereafter, the trial court found
that the plaintiff was entitled to thirty percent of the retiree's disposable retirement payments from the time that she filed this complaint
for partition.
Disposable pay, as defined in FUSFSPA, is the total or gross pay to
which the military member is entitled, less certain statutory deductions. 10 U.S.C.A. 1408(a)(4) (West 1983). The decision to use "gross"
pay rather than "disposable" pay was based on the individual tax liability already paid by the defendant on those sums, and to avoid a resulting "accounting nightmare." Both parties appealed. The plaintiff
claimed that she had an interest in the gross, not disposable, pay
from the time her ex-spouse received his first payment in 1970. The
defendant contended that his retirement pay was not subject to apportionment, and in the alternative, that any award for future payments be limited to disposable pay.

The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings except with
respect to the issue of disposable pay. The court of appeal ruled that
"accounting nightmares" were not sufficient to justify such an award,
and awarded the plaintiff an interest in the retiree's gross pay.
The supreme court was presented with several issues upon review.
The plaintiff reiterated her right to the retirement pension from 1970
to 1980. The defendant presented the following arguments: (1) McCarty should be given retroactive application; (2) his retirement pension had not vested; (3) California law excludes retirement pay as
community property; (4) FUSFSPA prevents partition of his retirement pension because McCarty was decided after his divorce; and (5)
in the event that the pension was divided, FUSFSPA limits the apportionment to disposable, not gross, retirement pay.
It is settled law in California that in order for a former spouse to
claim a valid interest in omitted, unadjudicated property, he or she
must have had a divisible interest in it at the time of the dissolution.
See Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502
(1980). In addition, the classification of property as separate or community is determined at the time of acquisition. Prior to 1974, vested
military retirement pensions were subject to both classifications.
Thereafter, vested military pensions in California constituted community property. In re Marriage of Fithian,10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d
449, 111 Cal Rptr. 369 (1974). In 1980, the United States Supreme
Court held that retirement pension payments were the sole property
of the retiree, prohibiting its division. In 1983, Congress reacted by
enacting FUSFSPA which, in effect, nullified McCarty prospectively,
and, in part retroactively. In addition, it left the power to classify
such property to the respective states. 10 U.S.C.A. 1006 (West 1983)
(allows enforcement of pre-McCarty judgments). "Starting with the
last paragraph of the McCarty opinion itself, the judicial and legislative branches, state and federal, cooperated in a massive and largely
successful drive to make McCarty disappear-prospectively, presently
and retroactively." Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 421, 696 P.2d 656,
661, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167 (1985).
Based on these facts and others, the court denied the defendant's
first request to apply McCarty retroactively. The court relied on the
legislative intent to eliminate McCarty's effect, and on the fact that
McCarty established a new principal of law which overruled "clear
and past precedent." In addition, the court recognized that retroactive application would produce "injustice or hardship." Thus, the
court affirmed the lower court's finding of nonretroactivity.
Although the court refused to apply McCarty retroactively, it did
not do so with respect to Fithian,which classified vested military retirement pensions as community property. Fithian neither over-
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turned an established principal of law nor produced hardships by
applying it retroactively. Since the defendant had more than twentyone years of active service and was therefore eligible for a pension at
the time of the divorce, his military pension had vested. This military pension represented deferred compensation entitling the plaintiff to a one-half community property interest in the defendant's
pension.
The defendant's last argument was also refused. He argued that a
state is prohibited from awarding a former spouse more than the onehalf interest allowed in a retiree's disposable retirement pay. The
court failed to see the proposed limitation and criticized the defendant's unsupported theory which would create disparate treatment
among nonmember spouses with identical pension amounts. The defendant referred to the "implied preemption" issue addressed in McCarty. The court acknowledged that at the time McCarty was
decided, circumstantial evidence existed to justify prohibiting application of state community property laws to military pensions. Those
circumstances, which include the following, no longer exist: inability
to purchase an annuity out of the depleting retiree's pension; the desire to award the retiree what is essentially his or her own; and decreased enlistment for fear of transfer to a community property state.
All three predicates for McCarty disappeared with the enactment of
FUSFSPA and the court found no violation of the supremacy clause.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The defendant also relied on the express language of section
1408(c)(1) which provided that a state may treat disposable retired
pay as property of the retiree and his or her spouse in accordance
with state law. While the court recognized that FUSFSPA limited
states from applying their own family laws, the limitation existed
only as to "restrictions on garnishments of and direct payment from
retiree's disposable pay." In essence, under FUSFSPA a former
spouse is not limited to dividing disposable retirement income. Furthermore, California law before McCarty treated military retirement
pensions like all other community property dividing the total "gross"
benefits.
The court briefly analyzed the plaintiff's request for a community
interest in the pension for the period 1970 to 1980. The plaintiff felt
that because defendant had no recognized equitable defense, i.e., estoppel, waiver, laches or unjust enrichment, she was entitled to a
one-half interest in all retroactive payments. Notwithstanding this
fact, the court held that the determination of whether the retiree's

former spouse should receive past disbursements was ultimately left
to the discretion of the court. Applying equitable principles, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that it would be inequitable and unjust to require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff after he financially supported their five children before, during
and after the divorce. Partition of her husband's retirement pension
payments was limited to that received from 1980 forward.
ARIAN COLACHIS
IX. INSURANCE LAW
A.

Section 12993 of the Insurance Code exempts insurance
companies from civil liabilityfor making reports to the
Bureau of FraudulentClaims pursuant to section 12992,
provided that there is no malice: Frommoethelydo v. Fire
Insurance Exchange.

In Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 42 Cal. 3d 208, 721
P.2d 41, 228 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1986), the supreme court held that section
12993 of the Insurance Code protected an insurance company from
tort claims filed by the company's insured, when the tort claims were
based on reports filed by the insurance company in compliance with
section 12992 of the Insurance Code. Section 12992 requires that an
insurance company file a report with the Bureau of Fraudulent
Claims [hereinafter the Bureau] whenever the insurer has reason to
believe that a fraudulent claim has been filed, unless subsequent information negates that belief.
The plaintiff filed a claim with the defendant insurance company
for losses sustained in a June, 1979 burglary. One of the documents
submitted to the insurer was a copy of a bill of sale for a stereo. The
printed date on the cash register tape had been erased and a date in
January was handwritten on the top of the bill of sale. Four other
copies of the bill of sale were dated July 19, 1979. After questioning
the plaintiff and the sales staff at the stereo store where the bill
originated, the insurance company concluded that fraud may have occurred. The district attorney recommended prosecution, and the
plaintiff was arrested on criminal charges. The insurer, in compliance with section 12992 of the Insurance Code, filed a report with the
Bureau. The criminal charges were later dismissed when the plaintiff revealed that he had witnesses who would testify to seeing the
stereo equipment at his residence prior to the burglary.
The plaintiff sued the insurance company for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of
section 790.03 of the Insurance Code which requires reasonably
prompt investigation and processing of insurance claims. The trial
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court awarded damages for economic loss (based on the cost of the
criminal defense and the amount of the claim, less the deductible),
emotional distress resulting from the criminal proceedings, and punitive damages.
The California Supreme Court held that section 12993 protected
the defendant from the tort claims filed by the plaintiff. Section
12993 provides a conditional privilege for insurance companies to report potentially fraudulent claims to the Bureau, providing that the
report was not made with actual malice. Actual malice exists when
"the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the
plaintiff or [when] ... the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for
belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Frommoethelydo, 42 Cal. 3d at
217, 721 P.2d at 46, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
The court reasoned that the defendant did not act with actual malice because it was reasonable to believe that fraud may have occurred, based on the testimony of the sales personnel at the stereo
store and the altered bill of sale. The plaintiff argued that since the
defendant would profit from a determination of fraud by not being
required to pay the claim, the report filed with the Bureau was submitted with actual malice. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that such a holding would mean that every report filed with
the Bureau would be filed with actual malice since an insurance company would always benefit from a showing of fraud.
The plaintiff also argued that the insurance company had a duty to
further investigate because of its duty of good faith and fair dealing,
as well as its fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff reasoned that since section 12992 did not require the filing of a report if
subsequent evidence disproved fraud, the insurance company had a
duty to search for that evidence. The court held that the privilege
provided by the actual malice standard of section 12993 was not to be
overcome by a lesser standard: the breach of a duty to investigate further. Since the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice on the part of
the insurance company, the latter was not liable for damages arising
from the report filed with the Bureau.
Nevertheless, the protection provided by section 12993 only applies
when the claim arises out of a report filed under section 12992.
Therefore, the insurance company was liable for failure to investigate
further, subsequent to the criminal prosecution at which the defendant was informed of the existence of witnesses who could disprove

fraud. The court separated the damages claimed by the plaintiff into
those arising from the filing of the report with the Bureau, and those
arising from the defendant's failure to investigate the claim subsequent to receiving notice of the existence of evidence disproving
fraud. Ruling that the damages for emotional distress, costs of defending the criminal prosecution, and the punitive damages were related to the filing of the report with the Bureau, the court only
awarded damages to compensate the plaintiff for the value of the
claim. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff could retry the
matter for other damages resulting from the defendant's failure to
investigate the claim further.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

B. Employer's liability insurancecoverage does not extend to
a non-employee who is employed by a related, though
legally separate,corporation: Producers Dairy Delivery Co.
v. Sentry Insurance Co.
In ProducersDairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Insurance Co., 41 Cal. 3d
903, 718 P.2d 920, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1986), the supreme court held
that an employer-employee relationship must be established before
employer's liability insurance coverage may be invoked. After examining the case's complicated factual situation, the court determined
that the requisite employer-employee relationship did not exist
where a worker was employed by a related, though legally distinct,
corporation. In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the function,
scope, and policy behind employer's liability insurance.
The related corporations in this case were Producers Dairy Delivery Company [hereinafter Producers], a supplier of milk, and LAS
Corporation [hereinafter LAS], a distributing service. Producers and
LAS purchased a "Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability
Insurance Policy" from Sentry Insurance Company [hereinafter Sentry], as well as a general liability insurance policy from Federal Insurance Company [hereinafter Federal]. Producers and LAS were
jointly listed as the "insured" on each policy.
Although Producers was LAS's primary customer, LAS did distribute the products of other companies. Moreover, LAS was licensed as a common carrier by the Public Utilities Commission.
When distributing milk for Producers, LAS independently contracted
with Producers to furnish drivers for the trucks owned and maintained by Producers. During distribution, Henry Noyes, a driver employed by LAS, was injured on a truck owned and maintained by
Producers. As a result of his injuries, Noyes collected benefits
through LAS's workers' compensation coverage with Sentry.
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Thereafter, Noyes filed a tort action against Producers, alleging
that its negligent truck maintenance caused his injuries. Producers
and Federal argued that Noyes was Producers' employee and therefore, was entitled only to the workers' compensation benefits he had
already received. The trial court held the following: 1) Noyes was exclusively an employee of LAS; 2) Sentry properly paid Workers'
Compensation benefits to Noyes on behalf of LAS; and 3) Producers
and Federal were liable to Noyes on his tort claim. The court of appeal affirmed. However, prior to petitioning the California Supreme
Court, Producers and Federal settled with Noyes for an amount less
than the judgment.
Subsequent to their settlement with Noyes, Producers and Federal
filed a suit against Sentry on two counts: 1) for declaratory relief
seeking reimbursement of the sum paid to Noyes on the basis that
the "employer's liability" portion of the Sentry policy extended coverage to Producers; and 2) for bad faith for refusing to defend Producers in the first action. The trial court judicially noticed the first suit
and entered summary judgment in Sentry's favor.
Upon review by the supreme court, the focal point of the opinion
was the employer's liability section of the policy issued by Sentry to
Producers. The court first dealt with the collateral estoppel issue. In
the first trial by Noyes against Producers, the question of whether
Noyes was an employee of LAS or Producers was at issue. The trial
court determined that Noyes was an employee solely of LAS. In the
second action by Producers against Sentry, Producers sought to establish that Noyes was its employee in order to be reimbursed by
Sentry. Sentry argued that the resolution of Noyes's employment
status in the first action collaterally estopped the discussion of that
issue in the second suit.
The court noted that the following elements were necessary to preclude litigation of an issue by collateral estoppel: 1) a necessary decision on the identical issue; 2) a final judgment on the merits of the
first suit; and 3) the presence of Producers in the first suit. The third
element was satisfied without discussion.
Producers maintained that the language of the employer's liability
section of the policy issued by Sentry was ambiguous and permitted
two reasonable interpretations of the term "employee." Thus, the
first element requiring a decision on the identical issue was destroyed. The court ruled, however, that the policy language as to
what constituted an employee was clearly applicable to both tort and

workers' compensation claims. Thus, the issues in the two suits were
identical.
Producers also argued that the settlement of the Noyes suit prior
to appeal to the supreme court did not render the necessary final
judgment on the merits. The court, relying on Sandoval v. Superior
Court,140 Cal. App. 3d 932, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1983), held that the settlement, especially after affirmance by the appellate court, was a final judgment on the merits for purposes of collateral estoppel.
Sentry established all of the elements required for application of
collateral estoppel. Therefore, the court concluded that Producers
was barred from alleging that Noyes was its employee in order to
compel Sentry's participation in the payment of monies to Noyes.
After the collateral estoppel issue was resolved, the court focused
on the employer's liability insurance which was issued by Sentry to
Producers. The court described the employer's liability coverage as
providing employers with "gap filler" coverage for liability that it incurs to an employee that is outside the scope of workers' compensation coverage (e.g., a tort action by an employee who is not subject to
workers' compensation laws). Employer's liability insurance coverage provides general liability protection for an insured in its capacity
as an employer. In the usual case, workers' compensation and employer's liability coverage are mutually exclusive.
Producers' main argument was that its close corporate relationship
with LAS, as evidenced by the fact that the two companies were
jointly listed as "insured" on the Sentry policy, together with the ambiguity in the language of the employer's liability provision, allowed
for an interpretation that Sentry was obligated to Producers for
Noyes' damages, notwithstanding the fact that Noyes was an employee of LAS.
The court began its analysis of Producers' argument by acknowledging the general rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy must
be resolved in favor of the insured. The court then considered
whether the policy was in fact ambiguous. Ambiguity exists when a
provision may be reasonably interpreted (construing the words contained therein in their usual sense) in two reasonable ways. Producers introduced the testimony of an officer who worked for both
Producers and LAS. The officer stated that both companies operated
as a single entity.
Furthermore, he believed that the Sentry insurance policy covered
Producers against claims of employees of either corporation.
Notwithstanding this testimony, the court deemed Producers' interpretation to be strained, given that it required a construction finding
that employer's liability insurance provided insurance for employees
of a company that the director knew was legally distinct.
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The court declined to consider Producers' interpretation reasonable on additional grounds. Initially, the court ruled that construing
the policy to provide an employer with coverage for a non-employee,
contravened the purpose behind the Insurance Code, which the court
noted was to protect workers by making available to their employers
specialized employer coverage at a low cost.
Moreover, the court noted that Producers' construction essentially
contended that a company would be protected against the claims of
non-employees whose actual employers were listed on the same policy as the company-an outcome which would detrimentally affect
beneficial group insurance arrangements. Finally, the court pointed
out that even if Producers' understanding were accepted, Producers
would be denied coverage by an exclusion in the very same policy
they sought to exploit. This fact led the court to hold secure in its
denial of Producers' interpretation.
In conclusion, the supreme court determined that one of the inherent features of employer's liability insurance is that it provides coverage to an insured in its capacity as an employer. Producers was
collaterally estopped from contending that Noyes was its employee.
Therefore, Producers was confronted with the overwhelming task of
demonstrating that the employer's liability provision of its Sentry
policy protected it against claims of a non-employee. The court was
unpersuaded that the subject provision was ambiguous enough to extend to non-employees. Further, the court rejected as unreasonable,
Producer's understanding that the close corporate relationship between it and LAS made the policy more flexible. In addition, the
court noted that a ruling for Producers would violate policy considerations behind the Insurance Code and would change the successful
nature of group insurance. It would also trigger a policy exclusion
which would prevent Producers' recovery in any event. Thus, the
lower court's judgment in Sentry's favor was affirmed.
VALERIE FLORES

X.

PRIVACY
Various provisions of the Civil and Vehicle Codes,
designed to ensure privacy, prevent the Department of
Motor Vehicles from releasing to third parties,
fingerprint records of applicantsprovided on the driver's
license application: Perkey v. Department of Motor
Vehicles.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles,' the California
Supreme Court considered whether disclosure by the Department of
Motor Vehicles [hereinafter DMV], of an applicant's fingerprint
records to third parties disinterested in motor vehicle safety violated
the applicant's right to privacy guaranteed by article I, section 1 of
the California Constitution. 2 In holding that the DMV's practice violated various provisions of both the Civil and Vehicle Codes, the majority prohibited the practice without addressing whether it also
contravened the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Chief
Justice Bird, in addition to authoring the majority opinion, wrote a
concurring opinion in which she detailed, in dicta, the intrusion into
a person's privacy which would occur if the Civil and Vehicle Codes
were not interpreted to preclude the DMV's dissemination of fingerprint information. Justice Mosk, in his dissent, disagreed with the
majority's statutory interpretation and rejected entirely the proposition that one's right to privacy is inclusive of fingerprint data.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1972, article I, section 1 of the California Constitution [hereinafter the Privacy Amendment]3 was amended to include privacy among
those inalienable rights to be enjoyed by the citizens of California.
Subsequently, the Information Practices Act of 19774 was enacted ex1. 42 Cal. 3d 185, 721 P.2d 50, 228 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1986). The majority opinion was
authored by Chief Justice Bird, with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin concurring. Chief Justice Bird also wrote a special concurring opinion. A separate dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Mosk, in which Justice Lucas concurred.
2. This provision states the following- "[a]ll people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
4. The information Practices Act of 1977 provides the following:
The Legislature declares that the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution of California
and by the United States Constitution and that all individuals have a right of
privacy in information pertaining to them. The Legislature further makes the
following findings:
(a) The right to privacy is being threatened by the indiscriminate collec-
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pressly as an enforcement instrument for the Privacy Amendment.5
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case was brought to the court's attention following the denial
of a driver's license to the plaintiff, Christopher Ann Perkey, exclusively on the basis of her refusal to be fingerprinted. The plaintiff
filed a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a license while
concurrently attempting to have the DMV's fingerprint requirement
ruled unconstitutional. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that the
DMV's release of her fingerprint information to third parties violated
6
the right to privacy afforded by the Privacy Amendment.
IV.

A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The FingerprintRequirement: Section 12800(c)

The supreme court's consideration of the plaintiff's claims began
with an inquiry into the constitutionality of the mandatory finger7
print requirement contained in section 12800(c) of the Vehicle Code.
The plaintiff's initial claim was that the DMV fingerprint requirement violated her substantive due process rights as no nexus existed
between the requirement and the State's concern for highway safety.
In addressing this allegation, the court echoed the finding in Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles8 that California does not
recognize the right to drive as being fundamental. 9 Thus, the court
stated that the appropriate standard under which to review the
DMV's fingerprint policy was the rational basis test. 10
In applying the rational basis test, the court examined the policy
tion, maintenance, and dissemination of personal information and the lack of
effective laws and legal remedies.
(b) The increasing use of computers and other sophisticated information
technology has greatly magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that
can occur from the maintenance of personal information.
(c) In order to protect the privacy of individuals, it is necessary that the
maintenance and dissemination of personal information be subject to strict
limits.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1985).
5. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 192, 721 P.2d at 54, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7. Section 12800(c) reads as follows: "Every application for a driver's license
shall contain all of the following information: ... (c) A legible print of the thumb or
finger of the applicant." CAL. VEH. CODE § 12800(c) (West Supp. 1987).
8. 30 Cal. 3d 70, 80, 634 P.2d 917, 922, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566, 571 (1981).
9. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 189, 721 P.2d at 52, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
10. Id.

behind section 12800(c). The majority credited the legislature with
requiring fingerprints of license applicants to safeguard the accuracy
of DMV records." The court also noted the steady increase in the
instances of fraud among drivers whose licenses had been revoked
due to driving infractions.' 2 The court then acknowledged that the
State's attempt to promote public safety by intercepting fraudulent li3
cense applications of hazardous drivers was legitimate.'
The court subsequently shifted its discussion to whether fingerprinting was a proper means for the State's pursuit of accurate
records. The opinion mentioned the unreliability of handwriting
samples (too small and easily imitated) or photographs (possibility
that appearance can be altered by wigs, makeup and facial hair).'4
Thus, the court ruled that suitable alternatives to fingerprinting for
i5
identification were unavailable.
In summary, the court concluded that the DMV's fingerprint requirement was a reasonable means of protecting dangerous drivers
from obtaining a license. Therefore, since it bore a rational relationship to highway safety, it did not violate the plaintiff's substantive
due process rights.16
B.

The FingerprintingProcess

The supreme court also discussed the contention that the DMV's
fingerprinting procedure violated the plaintiff's fourth amendment
right, under the United State Constitution, to freedom against unreasonable searches. The court stated that case law rejected the notion
that the fingerprinting process itself was objectionable.' 7 Further,
the court distinguished fingerprinting, which does not penetrate the
surface, from other more intrusive searches which are violative of the
fourth amendment.' 8 In addition, the majority acknowledged that
there were cases in which fingerprinting requirements have been upheld.' 9 Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff's second argument that the fingerprint process itself intruded into her
11. Id. at 190, 721 P.2d at 52, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 190, 721 P.2d at 53, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
14. Id. at 190, 721 P.2d at 53, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See United States v. Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81, 86 (7th Cir. 1981).
18. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible stomach pumping);
People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978) (involuntary extraction of semen).
19. See, e.g., Miller v. Murphy, 143 Cal. App. 2d 337, 344-46, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 74446 (1983) (involving a municipal ordinance which required all customers of pawnbrokers to supply fingerprints); People v. Stuller, 10 Cal. App. 3d 582, 593-97, 89 Cal. Rptr.
158, 165-67 (1970) (considering local police department ordinance which required the
fingerprinting of bartenders).
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20
constitutional rights.

C. Dissemination of FingerprintData
The plaintiff's final assertion was that the protection guaranteed to
her by California's Privacy Amendment was violated by the DMV's
practice of releasing fingerprint information to other governmental
agencies and private third parties. 21 The court analyzed the plaintiff's remaining contention by reviewing California's attempt to legislatively ensure privacy within the State. The court first recognized
the protection of privacy contained in California's Privacy Amendment.22 Also, the court stated that privacy in California is guarded
by the Information Practices Act of 1977,23 which the court found
was specifically enacted to enforce the policy behind the Privacy
Amendment.24 Moreover, the court regarded as significant the privacy provided jointly by sections 1798.24 and 1798.3 of the Civil Code,
which prohibit a governmental agency from disseminating descriptive, personal information.25
Despite the absence of a direct reference in the list of forbidden
disclosures of section 1798.3, the court interpreted fingerprint data to
be included by implication.26 The court decided that fingerprints are
descriptive, personal information; thus, they are more identifying
than a mere name or address which is specifically mentioned in the
statute.27
The majority, however, discussed a possible pitfall in its interpretation of the coverage of section 1798.3. It noted that section
1798.24(m), when read together with section 1808 of the Vehicle
Code, expressly allows public inspection of all driver's license appli20. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 191, 721 P.2d at 53, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
21. The court mentioned that the DMV makes applicant's fingerprints available to
nongovernmental entities such as private investigators. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 193 n.8,
721 P.2d at 55 n.8, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 174 n.8.
22. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 191, 721 P.2d at 54, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 172. See supra note 2
and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 721 P.2d at 54, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
25. Section 1798.24 provides that "[n]o agency may disclose any personal information ....
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.24 (West Supp. 1987). "Personal information" is defined by section 1798.3(a) as "any information that is maintained by an agency that
identifies or describes an individual, including, but not limited to, his or her name, social security number, physical description, home address, home telephone number, education, financial matters and medical or employment history ...
CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.3(a) (West Supp. 1987).
26. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 193, 721 P.2d at 55, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
27. Id.

cation information. 28 Further, the court mentioned that section 1810
of the Vehicle Code even permits the DMV to sell information provided on a driver's license application. 29 Although fingerprints are
technically provided on a driver's license application, the court declined to construe these various Civil and Vehicle Code provisions to
encompass fingerprints.3 0 Consequently, the majority held that fingerprint data may not be viewed publicly, disseminated, or sold by
the DMV to persons not connected with motor safety.S1
Perhaps due to the court's discomfort in excluding fingerprints
from the seemingly unambiguous mention of section 1798.24(m) of
the Civil Code and sections 1808 and 1810 of the Vehicle Code, it enumerated support for its far-reaching conclusion. In that regard, the
court focused attention on section 1808.5 of the Vehicle Code.32 That
section provides that those items on a driver's license application
which relate to a person's physical condition may not be publicly
viewed.33 The majority used that section to support their exemption
of fingerprints from the other application information available for
disclosure. The opinion noted that eyesight information could not be
disseminated because it was deemed to be related to an applicant's
physical condition.34 The court likewise considered fingerprints to be
protected information relating to a physical condition.35
To further support its conclusions, the court cited the principle of
statutory construction which provides that statutes should be interpreted so as to not conflict with constitutional protections.36 The
court stated that if sections 1808 and 1810 of the Vehicle Code were
construed to allow the DMV to disseminate fingerprint data to the
public, they might infringe upon the guarantees of the Privacy
Amendment. 37
Accordingly, the majority upheld the plaintiff's contention that the
disclosure to third parties by the DMV of fingerprint information
was improper. In reaching this decision, the court did not declare
that the disclosure provisions violated the constitutional protections
28. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 193, 721 P.2d at 55, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 193-94, 721 P.2d at 55, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
31. Id. at 197, 721 P.2d at 55-56, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
32. Section 1808.5 of the Vehicle Code states, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll records
of the [DMV] ...relating to the physical or mental condition of any person, and convictions of any offense involving use or possession of controlled substances... not arising from circumstances involving a motor vehicle, are confidential and not open to
public inspection." CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.5 (West Supp. 1987).
33. Id.
34. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 194, 721 P.2d at 55, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (citing 26 Op. Cal.
Att'y. Gen. 136 (1955) and 55 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 122 (1972)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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of the Privacy Amendment. Rather, the court interpreted the various provisions of the Civil and Vehicle Codes to forbid its disclosure.
The majority opinion, however, did suggest that dissemination of fingerprint information raised constitutional concerns.
V.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

As a companion to her majority opinion, Chief Justice Bird filed a
separate concurring opinion where she fully explored the privacy
concerns to which the majority opinion merely alluded. Her stated
purpose was to provide an alternate basis for finding the DMV'S fingerprint requirement invalid, in the event that the majority's statutory grounds were overturned.
The Chief Justice began by highlighting the relationship between
the technological advancement of society and the enactment of California's Privacy Amendment. 38 She cited the court's opinion in
White v. Davis,39 for the proposition that the Privacy Amendment
was enacted specifically to counter the rising level and sophistication
40
of surveillance.
Next, Chief Justice Bird discussed the peculiar character of fingerprints which makes their collection and dissemination in this computer age so threatening to privacy. She noted two unique aspects of
fingerprints: they can positively identify their creators, and latent
fingerprints can be lifted from a virtually infinite number of places.41
The Chief Justice mentioned, by way of example, the DMV's former
practice of lifting latent prints from the applications of those who
42
had refused to be voluntarily fingerprinted.
Thereafter, Chief Justice Bird discussed the nature of California's
right to privacy. She equated privacy to the fundamental rights guar43
anteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Thus, she felt it was essential that any interpretation of privacy be
38. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 195, 721 P.2d at 56, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
39. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 553 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). White involved the infiltration of a college campus by police posing as students. The police made unauthorized
reports of the activities of campus organizations. This police conduct was struck down,
in White's unanimous opinion, as violative inter alia, of California's Privacy
Amendment.
40. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 195, 721 P.2d at 56, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105).
41. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 196-97, 721 P.2d at 57, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
42. Id. at 197, 721 P.2d at 58, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 197, 721 P.2d at 58, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Bird, C.J., concurring).

consistent with first amendment case law.4 4
Subsequently, the Chief Justice compared the nonspeech first
amendment case of People v. Chapman,45 to the case at bar. In Chapman, the court extended privacy protection to the defendant's unlisted telephone number which the police had wrongfully obtained
without a warrant. Bird considered Chapman significant to Perkey in
three ways: first, fingerprints are more identifying than a telephone
number; second, one has a greater expectation of privacy in a fingerprint; third, in today's modern society, an individual needs a driver's
46
license as much or more than a telephone.
47
Chief Justice Bird also examined Perkey vis-a-vis White v. Davis.
Bird insisted that the police surveillance activities that were struck
down in White were less intrusive than the DMV's activities in
Perkey. As support for this belief, Bird noted that lifting latent fingerprints can detect a person's participation in activities. Also, the
growing use of computers allows the capturer of a fingerprint to tie
into a network which will disclose a whole dossier about a person.48
Further, Bird reiterated the four principal concerns of the Privacy
Amendment as set forth in White.49 Most applicable to Perkey was
the third concern: information collected for a valid, narrow purpose
would be improperly disseminated. Bird felt strongly that the DMV
should not be allowed to require fingerprints without guaranteeing
that they would not be endangered by misuse.
Obviously, Chief Justice Bird was convinced that the dissemination
by the DMV of fingerprint data violated the Privacy Amendment.
Facing voter polls which indicated that she would not be retained on
the California Supreme Court, Bird wrote an impassioned concurrence in what appears to be an attempt to ward off a subsequent reversal of the Perkey holding.
44. Id. at 197-98, 721 P.2d at 59, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
45. 36 Cal. 3d 98, 679 P.2d 62, 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1984).
46. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 199-200, 721 P.2d at 59, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
47. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
48. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 201-02, 721 P.2d at 61, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
49. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 202-03, 721 P.2d at 61-62, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring). The concerns of White included the following:
(1) 'government snooping' and the secret gathering of personal information;
(2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for
another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack of
a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records.
White, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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VI.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion directed at both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Bird's concurrence. He first attacked
the majority's holding as resting on speculation and assailed its statutory solution. He then proceeded to rebut the conclusion of the concurrence that dissemination of fingerprint records by the DMV is
necessarily an unconstitutional violation of privacy.
Justice Mosk discussed the speculative nature of the plaintiff's
claim. He viewed the allegation of her complaint as only a remote
suspicion that some unidentified authority might, at some future
time, adversely impact an undisclosed person should fingerprint confidentiality be denied. 50 Mosk deemed the plaintiff's contentions to
be too insubstantial to strike down the DMV's fingerprint
requirement. 5 1
Moreover, Mosk objected to the majority's statutory construction.
Mosk placed emphasis on section 1798.24(m) of the Vehicle Code,
which, when read in conjunction with sections 1800 to 1819 of the Vehicle Code, expressly allows the DMV to release information contained on a driver's license applicaton. 52 Among the exceptions to
those items which the DMV may release, 53 fingerprints are not expressly mentioned. Mosk explained that the majority opinion attempted to overcome this deficiency by choosing to consider
fingerprints to be a physical condition falling under the confidentiality requirement of section 1808.5 of the Vehicle Code.54 Mosk noted,
however, that physical condition has historically referred to medical
impairments, not identifying characteristics. 55 Mosk concluded this
argument by implying that the Vehicle Code is unambiguous in allowing dissemination of fingerprints and citing the principle that
50. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 204, 721 P.2d at 62, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
53. Section 1808.4 of the Vehicle Code prevents the DMV from releasing the home
address of certain officials; section 1808.5 disallows the release of information concerning an applicant's physical or mental condition; section 1808.6 prohibits the DMV's dissemination of certain convictions; and section 1808.7 makes dismissals of traffic
offenses confidential. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1808.4-1808.7 (West Supp. 1987).
54. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 205, 721 P.2d at 63, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra note 52.
55. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 205-06, 721 P.2d at 64, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

6
courts should not tamper with clear statutory directives.S

Justice Mosk's criticism of the concerns expressed in the concurrence is analytically weaker than his critique of the fragile statutory
scheme relied on by the majority. Mosk began this section of his dissent by praising the value of fingerprints in assisting coroners and for
identifying accident victims. 57 Mosk ignored entirely the main thrust

of the plaintiff's argument: namely, that the DMV violates an individual's right to privacy by disseminating fingerprint records to government and private entities, such as private investigators, who are
wholly unconcerned with motor vehicle safety. Presumably, the
plaintiff would not object to the release of fingerprints to coroners
and those identifying victims of accidents.
Subsequently, Mosk undermined his dissent by stating that if a
nonspeculative allegation which demonstrated improper dissemination of fingerprints was made, he would join in the conclusion that
the Privacy Amendment had been violated.S8 This statement by
Mosk leaves open the possibility that one whose fingerprints were
sold by the DMV to a private investigator could move the court to declare that the DMV's practice was unconstitutional.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The court in Perkey held that neither the DMV's fingerprint requirement itself, nor its fingerprint process was unconstitutional.
The court did, however, find that the dissemination by the DMV of
fingerprint records contravened various provisions of the Vehicle and
Civil Codes.
VALERIE FLORES

XI. PUBLIC FUNDS
Improper expenditures by a government official and
members of a Governor's task force are not a basisfor
personal liability because the agencies and departments
from which the funds were misappropriatedwere
reimbursed by the Governor, and thus they sustained no
injury: Stevens v. Geduldig.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stevens v. Geduldig,1 the California Supreme Court considered
56. Perkey, 42 Cal. 3d at 206, 721 P.2d at 64, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 207, 721 P.2d at 64, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
1. 42 Cal. 3d 24, 719 P.2d 1001, 227 Cal. Rptr. 405, modified, 42 Cal. 3d 253(A)
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three issues: (1) whether the improper use of public funds created
personal liability in the perpetrators although the agencies and departments were reimbursed by the Governor; (2) whether in-kind
contributions and use of manpower from different agencies and departments for purposes unrelated to such agencies and departments
could create personal liability; and (3) whether an unsuccessful plaintiff who nevertheless brought about a public benefit could recover attorney's fees related to the lawsuit compelling such benefit. The
court held that the defendants were not personally liable under the
first two issues, and remanded the case to the trial court for a deter2
mination of the third issue.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1972, the Governor established a task force to study taxation and
spending in California, and named Lewis Uhler as chairman. The
task force did not have its own budget and entered into an agreement
with the Department of Health Care Services [hereinafter DHCS] to
use the latter's revolving fund to account for its expenditures. Defendant Dwight Geduldig was then the director of the DHCS.3
Uhler entered into an agreement with the Department of Social
Welfare [hereinafter DSW] whereby the DSW agreed to reimburse
the DHCS up to $30,000.00 for the costs of a study of the tax impact
on welfare spending. Uhler entered into the agreement on behalf of
the task force and the DHCS, the DHCS being a party solely because
of its agreement to use its revolving fund to account for the task
force expenditures.4
At the time Uhler entered into the contract, he was not an agent of
the DHCS; however, one month later, Geduldig delegated to Uhler
the authority to enter into contracts pertinent to the task force, on
behalf of the DHCS. Uhler entered into five subcontracts with consultants who were to perform the study for a total cost of $8,703.21.
Although DSW never reimbursed the DHCS for the expenditures
made by Uhler in performing the study, the Governor reimbursed
the DHCS for such expenditures after this lawsuit was filed.5
Charles Hobbs was a member of the task force for less than three
(1986). Justice Broussard authored the opinion, with which Justices Mosk, Reynoso
and Grodin concurred. Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring opinion.
2. Id. at 28, 38, 719 P.2d at 1003, 1010, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 414.
3. Id. at 28-29, 719 P.2d at 1003-04, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
4. Id. at 29, 719 P.2d at 1003, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
5. Id. at 28-30, 719 P.2d at 1003-04, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.

months, at which time he decided to become a private consultant. He
entered into a consulting agreement with the Department of Human
Resources Development [hereinafter DHRD]. Geduldig, who was
then either director or deputy director of DHRD, studied unemployment and disability insurance, including the related tax aspects. The
source of his payments was an appropriation to the DHRD "for the
'administration of unemployment compensation disability benefits...
payable from the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund.'"6
The expenditures by the DHRD for payments to Hobbs were also re7
imbursed by the Governor after this lawsuit was filed. Various

other government agencies and departments8 contributed in-kind
funds and personnel services to the task force. These contributions
were not reimbursed by the Governor's office.9
In November or December of 1972, the task force determined that
a constitutional amendment was the best means of achieving a tax reduction. Although a proposed amendment was submitted, the legislature was unreceptive. The Governor decided that the amendment
should be submitted to the electorate as an initiative. At the time,
Uhler was also involved in preparing the measure for submission as
an initiative and continuing his duties as director of the task force.
He contended that he did not work on the initiative on state time.10
The task force was dissolved in June of 1973. Subsequently, both
Hobbs and Uhler worked on the initiative. The plaintiff, a taxpayer,
sued Uhler, Hobbs and Geduldig personally for improper use of public funds." The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, the following: (1) Uhler
had no authority to enter into the contract with DSW; (2) Uhler had
no authority to enter into the subcontracts with the consultants; (3)
Geduldig had no authority to delegate to Uhler such contracting authority; (4) payments to Hobbs by the DHRD were not appropriated
for in the budget; (5) payments for Uhler's expenses were not appropriated for in the budget; and (6) the personnel and in-kind support
received by the task force was not appropriated for in the budget.12
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and it held all three men
were personally liable for such expenditures and awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees.' 3
6. Id. at 30, 719 P.2d at 1004, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (quoting 1972 Cal. Stat. 156).
7. 42 Cal. 3d at 30, 719 P.2d at 1004, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
8. These included the Business & Transportation Agency, the Health & Welfare
Agency, the Governor's office, and the Department of Finance. Id. at 30, 719 P.2d at
1004-05, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
9. Id. at 30, 719 P.2d at 1005, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
10. Id. at 30-31, 719 P.2d at 1004-05, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
11. Id. at 31, 719 P.2d at 1005, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
12. Id.
13. The trial court entered judgment against Uhler for $94,231, against Geduldig
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III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Since Uhler was not an officer or employee of the DHCS,
Geduldig could not delegate to him the authority to enter into
contracts on behalf of the DHCS.

"[A] public official who controls public funds may be held personally liable to repay improperly expended funds if he has failed to exercise due care in permitting the expenditure."1 4 In order to exercise
due care, the official must only authorize expenditures which have
been appropriated by the legislature.' 5 The court held that the expenditures made through the DHCS for the task force were improper
because Uhler had no authority to make such expenditures.
Section 12854 of the Government Code allows a secretary of an
agency to delegate any powers he or she has to any officer or employee within the agency. Uhler was not employed by the DHCS, so
Geduldig had no authority to delegate any powers to him. Furthermore, the expenditures for the consulting subcontracts were not related to the functions of the DSW. Therefore, those expenditures
"violate[d] the principle that funds must be spent 'in accordance with
the legislatively designated purpose.' "16
The court held that the Governor's authority to require reports
from state agencies for budgetary and planning purposes did not legitimize the expenditures for Uhler's studies since the studies were
too general to fit squarely within the purposes of the DSW. Therefore, the court held that Geduldig and Uhler acted negligently.
B.

Expenditures by the DHRD for Hobbs' consulting contract were
improper because the study went beyond the purposes of the
DHRD.

The court held that Geduldig and Hobbs should be personally liable for the expenditures made by the DHRD to pay Hobbs on the
consulting contract, because the study on spending and taxes was not
related to the department's purpose of compensating disabled and unemployed workers. Therefore, the court held that Geduldig acted
and Hobbs for $18,652.89, and against Geduldig for $8,703.21. It awarded attorney's fees
of $18,750 against all three. Id. at 32, 719 P.2d at 1006, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
14. Id. at 32, 719 P.2d at 1006, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (citing Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.
3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976)). See also AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and
Employees § 17 (1984).
15. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 32, 719 P.2d at 1006, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
16. Id. at 33, 719 P.2d at 1007, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 17
Cal. 3d 206, 213, 551 P.2d 1, 6, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702 (1976)).

negligently by violating his duty of due care. It also held that Hobbs
should be liable on a theory of strict liability, since a contractor who
obtains money from the state on an illegal contract must reimburse
the state, even if the contract has been fully performed.17
C.

Since the Governor reimbursed the DHCS and the DHRD, they
sustained no injury upon which to predicate liability against
Geduldig, Hobbs or Uhler.

The court held that the Governor properly reimbursed the DHCS
and the DHRD for expenses of the task force.' 8 Since the Governor
had the authority to establish and fund a task force, he also had the
power to reimburse the improperly charged departments. 19 Since the
two departments were reimbursed, there was no injury, and the negligence actions against Geduldig and Uhler failed. Hobbs' strict liability was exonerated by the reimbursement in order to prevent unjust
enrichment to the state. 20 Consequently, none of the three men were
held liable on those actions.
D.

Uhler was not liablefor repayment of the value of the in-kind
contributions and services because there was insufficient
evidence as to their value or their inappropriateness.

The court held that Uhler would not be held liable for the value of
the contributions and services the task force received even though
the contributing agencies and departments, whose functions were unrelated to those of the task force, were not reimbursed. The court
explained that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence as to
the details of those transfers.2 ' Furthermore, the court noted that
the temporary sharing of resources and staff between departments
and agencies should not be discouraged because limited use of such a
procedure could provide flexibility when necessary. 22
E.

An unsuccessful party who nevertheless brings about a public
benefit may be able to recover attorney'sfees when his or her
actions compel a modification of the other party's behavior.

Section 1021.5 of the California Civil Procedure Code allows a successful party to recover attorney's fees on a private attorney general
17. 42 Cal. 3d at 35, 719 P.2d 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing Pacific Inter-Club
Yacht Ass'n v. Richards, 192 Cal. App. 2d 616, 13 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1961)). See also CAL.
JUR. 3D State of California § 59 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
18. Stevens, 42 Cal. 3d at 35, 719 P.2d at 1008, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
19. Id. at 36, 719 P.2d at 1008-09, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 37, 719 P.2d at 1009, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
22. Id. at 37, 719 P.2d at 1010, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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theory. 23 A party will be considered to have been successful under
this statute, even if he or she loses the lawsuit, if a significant right is
vindicated by compelling a modification of the other party's
behavior. 24
In the instant case, the taxpayer's filing of the lawsuit compelled
the reimbursement to the DHCS and the DHRD by the Governor,
thereby creating a significant public benefit. The court remanded
this case to the trial court for a determination of this issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court based its decision as to the impropriety of the Uhler contracts upon a negligence theory. However, this theory failed because
the element of damages was missing, since the injured parties were
properly reimbursed by the Governor. The Hobbs' strict liability action failed because enforcement of that action would result in unjust
enrichment and double recovery to the state due to Hobbs' uncompensated services. The court based its decision on the impropriety of
the in-kind contributions and services on the plaintiff's failure to
provide sufficient evidence. Since all of these holdings were based on
traditional legal principles, this case merely affirms the Governor's
authority to set up and fund task forces and to correct improper
funding of them by subsequent reimbursement.
Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion 25 followed the same analysis as the majority's. However, she emphasized the fact that Uhler's,
Geduldig's and Hobbs' actions were improper, and that since the Gov23. This section provides the following:
Upon motion, a court may award attorney's fees to a successful party against
one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of
private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be required to be filed therefor.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
24. Maria P. v. Riles, 167 Cal. App. 3d 158, 214 Cal. Rptr. 20, review granted, 184
Cal. App. 3d 1227, 701 P.2d 1173, 215 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1985). See also McKINNEY, CAL.
DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS 3D Costs § 7.

25. 42 Cal. 3d at 38, 719 P.2d at 1010, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 414.

ernor reimbursed the injured departments after the suit was filed,
the taxpayer's cause of action was validly filed.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

XII.

REAL PROPERTY LAW
A.

The trial court appropriatelyexercised the independent
judgment standard of review when it considered the
denial by the California Coastal Commission of a
developer's vested right exemption claim: Halaco
Engineering Company v. South Central Coast Regional
Commission.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Halaco Engineering Company v. South Central Coast Regional
Commission,1 the supreme court discussed the proper standard of judicial review to be applied when considering the denial of a vested

right exemption claim 2 by the California Coastal Commission. 3 The
supreme court held that the trial court had properly exercised an in4
dependent judgment standard of review.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1972, the state adopted the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Act 5 which was designed to protect the natural resources of the California coastline.6 This preservation effort was superseded by the California Coastal Act of 1976 [hereinafter Coastal Act]. 7 To further the
efforts of the Coastal Act, a commission [hereinafter Commission]

was established to oversee its application.8 The Coastal Act requires
developers to apply for and receive a permit from the Commission
and from the local governments prior to conducting development
1. 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986). The opinion was authored
by Justice Grodin with Justices Broussard, Lucas and Eagleson concurring. A separate
dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Reynoso with Chief Justice Bird
concurring.
2. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 13200-13500 (1981).
3. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986).
4. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 66, 720 P.2d at 24, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
5. 1972 Cal. Stat. A-181-88 (formerly CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 which
was automatically terminated in 1977 by § 27650; superseded by CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30000-30900 (West 1986)).
6. The express policy of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act was "the
permanent protection of the remaining natural and scenic resources of the coastal zone
..... " Coastal Zone Conservation Act, 1972 Cal. Stat. A-181 (formerly CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 27001) (West 1976).
7. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986). [California Coastal Zone
Conservation Act and California Coastal Act of 1976 both hereinafter Coastal Act].
8. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30300-30355 (West 1986).
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along the coast. 9
The Coastal Act, however, recognized that certain developments
(by virtue of their existence prior to adoption of the Coastal Act)
have vested rights which render them exempt from its permit requirements.O A party seeking a vested right exemption to the
Coastal Act's permit requirements was required to submit a claim for
such status and receive approval from the Commission" before the
vested right became absolute. A denial subjected a developer to the
permit application process, which imposed conditions upon development. 12 However, denials by the Commission were judicially
3
reviewable.1
Courts reviewing administrative decisions which have denied
claims involving vested rights have consistently employed the independent judgment standard of review. 14 In Halaco, the Commission sought to persuade the supreme court of the impropriety of that
standard.
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1965, plaintiff Halaco Engineering Company [hereinafter
Halaco] relocated its nonferrous scrap metal recycling plant to a
coastal area in Oxnard, California, which was zoned for heavy indus9. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30600 (West 1986). "Development" is defined broadly
as "on land, in or under water, the placement or erection of any solid material or
structure." Id. § 30106. The word "structure" encompasses such varying items as the
following: "building, road, pipe, flume, conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone line, and
electrical power transmission and distribution line." Id.
10. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 13200-13500 (1981).
11. Previously, the authority of the Commission was organized into several Regional Commissions and one State Commission. An applicant's first recourse was to
file with the Regional Commission. If the Regional Commission rendered an unfavorable decision, an applicant had a right to appeal to the State Commission provided that
the appeal presented a "substantial issue." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30625 (West 1986).
The State Commission succeeded to the power of the Regional Commission which was
terminated in 1981. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30305 (West 1986).
12. See Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr.
247 (1980).
13. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1986).
14. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n., 11 Cal. 3d
28, 34, 520 P.2d 29, 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808 (1974) (denial of employee death benefits
to widow). For decisions involving Coastal Commission actions see Transcentury
Properties, Inc. v. State of Cal., 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 844, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492 (1974)
(denial of a permit to develop residential community pursuant to tract maps approved
prior to adoption of Coastal Act); and Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional, 101 Cal.
App. 3d 38, 49, 161 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399 (1980) (denial of a permit to remodel a secondstory storage room into a restaurant).

trial uses. The operation of the plant required scrap metal to be
cleansed of impurities before its smelting. Waste water which resulted from the cleansing process was transferred to a settling pond
to allow the particles in the water to settle out. Periodically, the
pond was dredged and the settled material was used to form an expanding berm which served as the pond's boundaries.
Prior to construction, Halaco obtained the necessary permits from
the City of Oxnard [hereinafter the City] for the plant structures.
Halaco informed the City by letter of its intended use of a portion of
the property as a waste disposal pond which would change in dimension and size. Halaco included with its letters of intent a sketch of
the proposed pond which was not drawn to scale. Halaco actively inquired whether a permit was needed to operate the settling pond.
Oxnard's Building Department, the Department of Public Works and
the City Attorney informed Halaco that no permit was necessary. In
1970, Halaco began using the facility which included the pond. In
1972, the Oxnard City Council confirmed the prior administrative decision that no permit was required for Halaco's continued use of the
settling pond.
The Coastal Act was passed that same year. Subsequently, Halaco
installed an 18,000 gallon propane tank on its property. The passage
of the Coastal Act did not prompt Halaco to seek a permit to continue its operations nor to seek a permit for the propane tank. However, in 1978, Halaco filed a vested rights exemption claim with the
Commission for its entire operation. The filing was made in response
to the supreme court's decision in South Coast Regional Commission
v. Gordon,15 and prior to any action against Halaco by the City of Oxnard or the Commission.
The Regional Commission granted Halaco's vested rights claim as
to the plant, but excluded the settling pond and the recently installed
propane tank. Halaco's subsequent appeal to the Commission was denied based upon the lack of a "substantial issue."' 6 Halaco then filed
suit seeking a writ of mandate to compel the Commission to recognize its vested right to unencumbered continuation of its entire operation. Halaco requested that the trial court use its independent
judgment in review of the Commission's proceedings.
The trial court used the independent judgment standard of review
in its decision. It ruled that the use of the settling pond in its present
form was intended and considered in the original decision by the City
of Oxnard. Further, the trial court held that the pond was not lim15. 18 Cal. 3d 832, 558 P.2d 867, 135 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977). The court in Gordon
held that a vested right may not constitute a defense to an action by the Commission
absent a prior submission to the Commission of a claim for such vested right.
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ited to the size shown in the 1969 sketch. Therefore, Halaco had a
vested right in the pond and the Commission was required to acknowledge this right. The court also held that the installment of the
propane tank constituted a "development"17 in the Coastal area to
which no vested right attached and to which permit requirements applied. Both Halaco and the Commission appealed the trial court's
findings.
IV.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Independent Judgment Standard of Review

The precedential issue decided by the court in Halaco was whether
the independent judgment standard was the proper standard of review for a denial of a vested rights claim by the Commission. The
Commission asserted that courts should limit their inquiry to
whether or not the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence as viewed against the entire record.
The Commission prefaced its argument by acknowledging case
law,1S which has held that a court reviewing an administrative denial
of a vested rights claim should use its independent judgment to determine the propriety of the denial.19 The Commission, however,
contended that a denial of a vested rights permit exemption claim
does not affect the vested right itself. Rather, a denial merely subjects a development which has the benefit of a vested right to the administrative permit requirements. 20 A constitutionally vested right is
impacted only if the burden of the permit process or any conditions
imposed by the permit invades a claimant's due process rights. Thus,
it is only appropriate for a court to exercise its independent judgment
after action is taken by the Commission on the permit application.
While the court agreed with the Commission that a vested right is
not affected by the denial of an exemption, the court rejected the
Commission's conclusion.21 The court relied upon the existence of
contrary legislative intent as its rationale to uphold the use of the independent judgment standard of review. 22
17. See supra note 9.
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employer Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 34,
520 P.2d 29, 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974).
20. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 64, 720 P.2d at 22, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 674. See also Liberty
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
21. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 720 P.2d at 22-23, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
22. Id. at 64-66, 720 P.2d at 22-24, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 674-76.

The court noted inter-related reasons why the legislative intent
contradicted the Commission's argument against the application of
the independent standard of review. 23 First, the court interpreted
section 1094.5(c) of the Civil Procedure Code as a mandate that administrative decisions must, at some point, be subjected to the court's
independent judgment.24 Thus, if this standard were applied upon
review of the rejection of the vested rights exemption, a future court
reviewing the permit denial or conditions would be required to review the same facts arising out of the same hearing in order to meet
the requirement of section 1094.5(c). 25 This would produce distinct
proceedings since each would use a different standard of review. 26
The court held that this judicial inefficiency and confusion was not
intended by the legislature and could not be tolerated.27
Moreover, the court hypothesized as to the outcome if the court
were to decide that the first administrative decision, which concluded
that no exemption applied, was erroneous. The court noted that if
such a decision were made, the second administrative hearing on the
permit would be futile.28 The court held that the legislature's intent
could not be interpreted to condone this administrative duplication
and waste. 29 Thus, although no vested right is directly affected by an
exemption denial, the court must undertake its judicial review utiliz30
ing independent judgment.
B.

Remand

In addition to arguing that the trial court employed an improper
standard of review, the Commission claimed that the matter should
be remanded to the Commission for consistent findings, rather than
adjudicated by the court. The supreme court held that remand would
be unnecessary. 3 1 The court stated that the Commission's decision
was not supported by the evidence.3 2 Further, the impact of the judicial holding left no discretion in the hands of the Commission.33 In
summary, the court ruled that remand was inappropriate given the
Commission's unsupported decision and the court's obviation of the
34
Commission's discretion in the resolution of the matter.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

66, 720 P.2d at 23, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
66, 720 P.2d at 23-24, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 675-76.
65, 720 P.2d at 23, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
64-66, 720 P.2d at 22-24, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 674-76.
77, 720 P.2d at 32, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
78, 720 P.2d at 32, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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C

The Settling Pond

The dispositive factual issue presented by this case concerned the
status of the settling pond. The Commission ruled that Halaco had
no vested right in the pond beyond the parameters of the 1969 blueprint sketch supplied to the City of Oxnard. The Commission's finding was based on the requirement set forth in AVCO Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission.35 In AVCO, the
court held that a vested right may attach only to one who, in good
faith, relies upon a permit issued by the government and received
before the law changed.3 6 The Commission asserted that Halaco's
lack of a use permit for the enlargement of the pond beyond its initial size precluded the vesting of any right to its continued operation
and expansion.
Halaco argued that its entire project, including the settling pond,
was an integrated whole for which appropriate permits had been acquired. In the alternative, Halaco argued that a permit was not required for the operation of the pond. Halaco based this allegation on
the fact that the City of Oxnard interpreted its own ordinances as
placing no permit requirements on the pond. Halaco also contended
that it should not be limited to a drawing which it openly stated was
not drawn to scale. Halaco argued that it notified Oxnard of the
pond's expected growth, and that the City acknowleged that size
change was an inherent feature of the pond, yet still required no
permit.
The trial court, which exercised its independent judgment, ruled
that Halaco had aggressively sought a determination from Oxnard
about whether a permit was required. In reviewing the correspondence between Halaco and Oxnard, the trial court also held that
Halaco had made Oxnard fully aware that the pond would grow in
size and dimension. Aware of these facts, the City decided that a permit would not be required. Therefore, Halaco had satisfied the AVCO
criteria for a vested right exception.
In deciding what weight to give to the trial court's conclusions, the
supreme court cited the case of Aries Development Company v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission.37 The court interpreted the Aries decision as holding that where undisputed facts do
not establish one legal inference over another, the trial court's deter35. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
36. Id. at 791, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
37. 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1978).

ruination of the legal issue was binding on an appellate court.3 8 Thus,
the supreme court was bound by the trial court's finding that
Halaco's continued use and expansion of the settling pond created a
vested right that fell outside the permit requirements of the Coastal
Act.39
D.

The Propane Tank

Halaco proferred two theories for exempting its 18,000 gallon tank,
which was installed after the Coastal Act became effective, from permit requirements. First, Halaco argued that the tank did not constitute a "development" subject to the restraints of the Coastal Act
because it was personalty and moveable. The Coastal Act's definition
of "development" states that a non-structural item such as a pipe
constitutes a "development"40 and thus does not support Halaco's position.4 1 The court pointed to the installation of the tank by crane,
and the construction of concrete saddles to support it, as evidence
that the tank was a "development."42 Accordingly, the court rejected
Halaco's first assertion that the tank was not a "development" subject to regulation.43
Second, Halaco stressed the fact that the tank's integration into the
operation as a whole (the operation was exempt) would by extension
preclude the tank from being singled out for regulation. The court
pointed to persuasive arguments for refusing to exempt the tank. 44
The court noted that the tank had not been an "integral" component
of the system prior to the passage of the Coastal Act. 45 Rather, it had
recently been brought in for the convenience and economy of having
on-site fuel.46 Moreover, the court noted the fact that the City of Oxnard required an additional permit for the tank's installation.47 For
these reasons, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment
that the tank was a "development" and therefore, that the permit requirements of the Coastal Act applied.48
E.

Attorney's Fees
Halaco requested an award of attorney's fees from the Commission.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at
Id. at 76, 720 P.2d at
See supra note 9.
Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at
Id. at 77, 720 P.2d at
Id.

74, 720 P.2d at 29-30, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82.
30, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
76-77, 720 P.2d at 31, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
31, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 683.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 77, 720 P.2d at 31-32, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84.
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Halaco's claim was based on section 800 of the Government Code. 49
The court refused to find that the Commission's denial of Halaco's
vested rights claim was "arbitrary and capricious" as required by section 800.50 As a foundation, the court cited the Commission's good
faith ponderance of the evidence.51 Even though that consideration
failed to guide the Commission in drawing sound legal conclusions,
the supreme court denied Halaco's claim for attorney's fees.52

V. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Reynoso concurred with the majority except for its handling of the settling pond factual issue.53 He framed the settling
pond issue in terms of whether Halaco should be exempt from applying for a permit that allowed for continued waste dumping.54 Justice
Reynoso reiterated that the burden of applying for a permit does not
infringe upon protected vested rights.55 Thus, it is "guesswork" to
conclude that the burdens of the permit process would do so. 5 6
Justice Reynoso interpreted the Coastal Act as empowering the
Commission to determine the manner in which developments may be
performed, not just whether they may be made at all. 5 7 Thus, the
dissent reasoned that Halaco may have vested rights against the outright denial of a permit for the pond, but not against the placement
of reasonable permit conditions concerning the ongoing use of the
pond.Ss
The thrust of the dissent was that the majority had applied case
law dealing with "static" developments to facts involving continued
49. This section provides as follows:
[I]n any civil action to appeal or review the award, finding, or other determination of any administrative proceeding under this code or under any other
provision of state law.., where it is shown that the award, finding, or other
determination of such proceeding was the result of arbitraryor capriciousaction or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof in his official capacity,
the complainant if he prevails in the civil action may collect reasonable attorney's fees, but not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500),
where he is personally obligated to pay such fees, from such public entity, in
addition to any other relief granted or other costs awarded ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West 1980) (emphasis added).
50. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 79, 720 P.2d at 33, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 80, 720 P.2d at 33, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 82, 720 P.2d at 35, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 81, 720 P.2d at 34, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 81-82, 720 P.2d at 35, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).

use. 59 Justice Reynoso pointed to "continuing use" case law which
held that non-conforming uses may be subject to legislation when
they become a nuisance.60 Justice Reynoso found this case law more
applicable to the Halaco facts. The dissent would have reversed the
trial court's granting a vested rights exemption to the continued use
of the settling pond.61
VI.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court held that the trial court had properly employed
its independent judgment in reviewing the denial by the Coastal
Commission of a vested rights exemption from the permit requirements. In summary, the court held the following: the continued interference was upheld; an 18,000 gallon tank (installed after the
Coastal Act became effective) was subject to Commission permit requirements; and attorney's fees were not allowed, given the absence
of evidence showing that the Commission's denial of Halaco's vested
rights claim was capricious or arbitrary.
VALERIE FLORES

B. A rent control ordinance which required consideration of
the hardship to low-income tenants of a rent increase was
neither arbitrarynor did it violate a landlord'sdue
process rights: Pennell v. City of San Jose.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228
Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986), a landlord filed a declaratory relief action in
Santa Clara Superior Court seeking a ruling on the constitutionality
of the local rent control ordinance. The trial court declared that the
portion of the ordinance which required a consideration of the hardship on low-income tenants of a rent increase was unconstitutional
on its face. In a four-three vote, the California Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the contentions that the ordinance arbitrarily put
the burden on landlords with hardship tenants and that it violated
the due process rights of those landlords. The court further held that
a yearly rental unit fee imposed on landlords to defray the administrative cost of the ordinance was not a "special tax" governed by article XIIIA, section 4 of the California Constitution.
In July, 1979, the City of San Jose enacted a rent control ordinance. The ordinance allowed the landlord to raise his rents accord59. Id. at 81, 720 P.2d at 34-35, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
60. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510, rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1980); City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1973); County of
San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1959).
61. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 82-83, 720 P.2d at 35, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
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ing to the highest of any of four methods of computation: (1) an
automatic increase of eight percent; (2) a five percent increase plus
specified pass-through costs; (3) an increased cost of debt service; or
(4) an amount reasonable under the circumstances. In determining
what is reasonable under the circumstances, the rent control hearing
officer is directed to consider and balance any of seven factors, one of
which is the hardship to a tenant.
Although the tenant hardship factor is to be balanced along with
six other factors, it is given potentially overriding weight in a related
section of the ordinance. This section provides that the hearing officer is permitted to disallow all or part of an increase which would
impose an unreasonably severe financial or economic hardship on a
particular tenant.
Both parties observed that no California case had addressed the
specific issue posed here. Furthermore, the court itself stated that it
was aware of no other rent control ordinance that contains a tenant
financial hardship provision, much less one that operates in the same
fashion as the San Jose ordinance.
The court first addressed the plaintiff's assertion that the ordinance arbitrarily selects those landlords with hardship tenants to
bear the burden of the rent control ordinance. The court noted that
it had often confirmed the propriety of local rent control legislation
that in effect placed the burden of "subsidizing" tenants on the citizenry at large, but not on local landlords. The possibility that the local government could subsidize these tenants through a general tax
revenue has never been considered a bar to the validity of such legislation. In disposing of the argument that the ordinance was arbitrary, the court noted that the ordinance grants a "generous"
automatic increase of eight percent to all landlords along with the potential for an even more liberal increase. Furthermore, the financial
hardship provision is consistent with the ordinance's stated purpose:
the prevention of excessive and unreasonable rent increases and the
alleviation of undue hardship upon individual tenants.
The court next turned to the equal protection argument. The
plaintiff had suggested that the ordinance violated the rights of landlords under the fourteenth amendment because of its disparate treatment of landlords with and without hardship tenants. Relying on
Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d
280, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1983), the court stated that "'equal protection
is not denied simply because some landlords may receive rents different from those received by other landlords, as long as there exists a

rational basisfor the distinction."' Pennell, 42 Cal. 3d at 373, 721
P.2d at 1117, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 732 (emphasis in the original). The
burden of disproving a rational basis was on the plaintiff, who had
suggested nothing to convince the court otherwise. Again, the court
emphasized the generous yearly increase of eight percent which the
ordinance allowed. Finally, the court concluded that to attack the ordinance's tenant hardship provision under the equal protection
clause, the ordinance must be applied to a particularlandlord and a
particulartenant.
The court affirmed the superior court's holding that the $3.75 annual rental unit fee imposed under the ordinance is not a special tax.
First, the court noted that the relatively minor unit fee imposed here
did not exceed a sum reasonably necessary to cover the cost of the
regulatory purposes. Also, the special tax referred to in article
XIIIA, section 4 of the California Constitution has never been held to
embrace fees charged in connection with regulatory activities which
do not exceed the reasonable cost of providing necessary services.
JEFF BOYKIN

C.

A former landowner is not liablefor negligent
construction of an improvement, when the defect is
patent, after the sale and transfer of the premises:
Preston v. Goldman.

In Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476, 227 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1986), the court discussed the issue of premises liability. In Preston, a child sought to recover damages against former property owners who had constructed the fountain in which the child sustained
injuries. The court concluded that premises liability is tied to the
possession and control of property. As such, liability for an owneroccupier terminates once control is lost by virtue of a sale or transfer.
In 1972, the Kubichans designed and constructed an inexpensive
fountain and pond on property which they owned and occupied. The
following year, they sold their property to Goldman who leased the
property to the Reids, under an option-to-buy agreement. While in
possession of the property, the Reids made numerous improvements
to the pond's exterior wall. Thereafter, the Reids were entertaining
the Preston family in the backyard. The adults, however, were separated from the children. After a while, the adults became concerned
with the children's whereabouts. Upon searching, they discovered
Clinton, the two-year old Preston child, submerged in the fountain.
As a result of his prolonged submersion, Clinton sustained extensive
brain damage and paralysis.
Clinton's parents filed a suit for damages on his behalf. The fol-
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lowing were named as defendants: the Reids (lessees); Goldman (lessor); and the Kubichans (former owners and constructors of the
pond). After a trial on the complaint, the jury specifically found that
the Kubichans were not negligent. The plaintiff appealed, inter alia,
the issue of the Kubichans' liability. The appellate court reversed
the trial court's holding with respect to the Kubichans. The court of
appeal likened them to developers, and found that they were negligent in their construction of the pond. The supreme court agreed to
consider the case limiting its review to the Kubichans' liability.
The supreme court noted that three different theories have been
applied to cases seeking to impose liability on a former owner for the
condition of property subsequent to relinquishment of possession.
First, the court noted that the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor still
precludes liability. Second, the court mentioned the existence of a
broader view of premises liability which allows for two exceptions to
the doctrine of caveat emptor: one for latent defects in the property
which the seller knows are unlikely to be discovered by the buyer;
and, another for property which, when transferred, is so dangerous as
to constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to persons outside the
premises. The court stated that even courts recognizing exceptions to
the caveat emptor doctrine have terminated liability when the new
owner has had sufficient time to discover the defect, absent active
concealment by the seller. The third doctrine that the court recognized was that merely transferring title should not relieve a vendor
of liability when that vendor affirmatively created a dangerous
condition.
The court also looked to jurisdictions other than California. In the
recent New Jersey case of Cogliati v. Ecco High Frequency Corp., 92
N.J. 402, 456 A.2d 524 (1983), the court found a previous owner liable
where the owner had been factually responsible for the presence of
the hazardous condition. The California Supreme Court was careful
to point out, however, that the Cogliati ruling limited itself to public
property. The supreme court also drew attention to the New York
case of Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975).
Although Merrick advocated the imposition of liability on a previous
owner, the California Supreme Court was quick to distinguish that
case as involving property with a latent defect. In Preston, the court
determined that the pond, if defective, was patently so as a matter of
law. The court stated that a pond of any depth is hazardous to unsupervised children. Additionally, since the Reids drained and improved the pond, they had actual knowledge of its attributes.

In California, the court noted the existence and relevance of several cases, beginning with the landmark decision in Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 433 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The
court in Preston credited the Rowland opinion with destroying the
necessity of active/passive and invitee/licensee classifications for the
imposition of liability. In addition, the court recognized several postRowland cases which noted that premises liability is related to the
possession and control of property: Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972) (no duty
owed by landlord to tenant injured on balcony while replacing a
street lamp, over which lamp the landlord had neither control nor
ownership); Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121,
178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981) (uphill landowner owed duty to downhill
owner due to uphill owner's possession and right to control and manage his property); and Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38
Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985) (summary judgment deemed appropriate where absence of ownership, possession or
control of property was established). The supreme court's recitation
of cases made it clear that, in California, cases imposing liability on a
landowner have consistently done so on the basis of the owner's possession and inherent rights of control, management and supervision.
The supreme court also looked to statutory law for guidance in determining whether to impose liability on a former property owner.
The court attributed significance to the shorter statute of limitations
set forth in section 337.1 of the Civil Procedure Code for patent defects, as compared to the limitation contained in section 337.15 of the
Civil Procedure Code for latent defects. In addition, since the legislature distinguished between sureties and professional home improvers
to ensure that the latter's liability did not extend unreasonably into
the future, the court concluded that the legislature intended to limit
liability for those persons unable to exercise enough control to remedy property defects.
Lastly, the court weighed the general factors enumerated in Rowland to determine whether extending liability to previous landowners would be just. Rowland set the following guidelines for fairly
imposing liability: 1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 2) the
degree of certainty of the plaintiff's suffering injury; 3) the proximity
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; 4) moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct; 5) the policy of avoiding
future harm; 6) whether finding liability would be burdensome to
either the defendant or the community; and 7) the availability, cost
and prevalence of insurance coverage for the risk involved. Rowland,
69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court
stated that the Kubichans' ability to foresee that the child of a future
owner's guest would lie unattended in the pond was tenuous.
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Neither did the court find any closeness between the Kubichans'
building of the pond and the plaintiff's near drowning, especially in
light of the inattentiveness of the adults. As to moral blame, if any,
the court concluded that it should lie with those defendants who had
more of an opportunity and power to prevent the accident at the time
it occurred. Further, the court felt compelled to conclude that imposing liability on the Kubichans would be oppressive considering the
time elapsed since their loss of control. Finally, the court found that
imposing liability would be inequitable since insurance, the last factor in Rowland, was presently unavailable. However, even if insurance was available, it would likely be expensive and scarce.
In conclusion, the court rejected imposing liability on a former
property owner whose patently negligent improvement caused injury. In making its determination, the court analyzed the three theories of premises liability, case law outside of California, California
case law, insurance interpretation and statutory policies. The court
also noted that the general principles set out in Rowland pointed to
the injustice of imposing liability on a former landowner who did not
have control at the time of the injury. However, since the facts in
Preston presented the court with a patent defect, and the opinion was
specifically couched in those terms, it remains to be seen whether
Preston will provide authority for the extension of liability to a transferor who leaves the property with a latent defect.
VALERIE FLORES

XIII.

TAXATION
A. For purposes of Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution,an ad valorem tax is any source of revenue
derived from applying a property tax rate to the assessed
value of property: Heckendorn v. City of San Marino.

In Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, 42 Cal. 3d 481, 723 P.2d 64,
229 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1986), the supreme court was asked to determine
the meaning of an ad valorem tax. The court held that an ad
valorem tax is any source of revenue derived from applying a property tax rate to the assessed value of property.
On June 7, 1983, the voters of the City of San Marino [hereinafter
the City] approved an ordinance drafted by the City pursuant to section 53978 of the Government Code. This ordinance allowed local
agencies which provided fire protection or prevention services to "de-

termine and propose for adoption a special tax for fire protection and
prevention provided by the local agency, or a special tax for police
protection services provided by the local agency, or both . . .other
than ad valorem property taxes." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53978 (West
1983). The ordinance imposed a graduated tax based on the City's
zoning classifications to be used for police and fire services. A flat
tax rate was imposed on all parcels, despite any variation in size or
property value.
The plaintiff, a property owner within the City, was taxed pursuant to the ordinance. He filed a complaint alleging that the ordinance was invalid because it violated article XIIIA of the California
Constitution by imposing an ad valorem tax in excess of the maximum amount allowed, which was one percent of the full cash value
of the property. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend,
the City's demurrer which asserted that the ordinance was based
solely on the parcel size and did not impose a tax based on the assessed value of the property. The plaintiff appealed contending that
the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend because he could amend his complaint to show
that the tax is in substance an ad valorem tax due to a correlation
between parcel size and value.
The supreme court recognized the general rule that complaints
should be liberally construed. Thus, if there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can cure a defective complaint by amending it,
the trial court should not sustain the demurrer without leave to
amend. However, if it is not reasonably possible to cure the defect
pursuant to the applicable substantive law, then a trial court may,
without abusing its discretion, sustain the demurrer without leave to
amend.
First, the court had to determine the meaning of the term "ad
valorem tax" as it is used in article XIIIA. Since article XIIIA does
not define the term "ad valorem tax," the court had to look to extrinsic aids in ascertaining the meaning. "In the absence of evidence of a
contrary legislative or popular intent, terms used in a constitutional
amendment are normally construed in light of existing statutory definitions or judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the amendment's adoption." Heckendorn, 42 Cal. 3d at 487, 723 P.2d at 67, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 327. At the time that article XIIIA was approved as
Proposition 13 in 1978, the legislature defined ad valorem in section
2202 of the Revenue and Taxation Code as "any source of revenue derived from applying a property tax rate to the assessed value of property." CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 2202 (West 1986). The court held
that under this definition the tax imposed by the City's ordinance
does not constitute an ad valorem tax. In addition, the court ruled
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that it was within the established tax scheme of section 53978 of the
Government Code since parcels within a zone are taxed the same and
no appraisals of value are made. Heckendorn, 42 Cal. 3d at 487, 723
P.2d at 67, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
The court also noted "that the Legislature expressly authorized a
special tax for police and fire protection in Government Code section
53978." Id. at 488, 723 P.2d at 68, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Moreover,
subdivision (b) of section 53978 states that a special tax "shall be levied on a parcel, class of improvement to property, or use of property
basis, or a combination thereof..." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53978 (West
1983). Thus, the "Legislature intended that a special tax levied on a
parcel pursuant to section 53978 would be distinct from an ad
valorem tax prohibited by article XIIIA, section 4." Heckendorn, 42
Cal. 3d at 488, 723 P.2d at 68, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Therefore, the tax
assessed pursuant to the City's ordinance, which was imposed for the
special purpose of providing fire and police protection, fell within the
definition of a special tax and not within the definition of an ad
valorem tax.
The court concluded that its interpretation of ad valorem is consistent with the purpose of article XIIIA in requiring a two-thirds vote
of the electors for a special tax "'to prevent the government from recouping its losses from decreased property taxes by imposing or increasing other taxes.'" Id. at 489, 723 P.2d at 68, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 328
(quoting Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal.
3d 100, 105, 695 P.2d 220, 222, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135 (1985)). The ordinance was approved by approximately eighty percent of the City's
voters. The vote, which was in full compliance with the
supermajority requirement of section 4 of article XIIIA, indicated the
voters' willingness to be taxed for fire and police protection services.
Thus, since there was no reasonable possibility under the substantive
law that the plaintiff's complaint could be cured by amendment, the
trial court correctly sustained the City's demurrer without leave to
amend.
STEPHANIE FANOS

B.

Capacityfee charged by the Water District to fund
capital improvements is a "specialassessment," and not a
"userfee, "from which the School District,as a public
entity, is exempt: San Marcos Water District v. San Marcos
Unified School District.

In San Marcos Water District v. San Marcos Unifed School District, 42 Cal. 3d 154, 720 P.2d 935, 228 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1986), the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the San Marcos
Unified School District [hereinafter School District] was exempt
from a fee assessed by the San Marcos Water District [hereinafter
Water District] to fund its capital expenditures. The court held that
the capacity fee charged was not a fee, but rather was a special assessment from which the School District was exempt as a public
entity.
The facts were agreed to prior to trial. The School District was located in the territory of the Water District and was serviced by the
latter's sewer system. For the ten years prior to 1981, the School District had been paying the capacity fees in question. The capacity fee,
one of three types of fees charged by the Water District, was a onetime payment, with annual additions based on increased use by the
users.
The general rule, set forth in Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles,
207 Cal. 697, 280 P. 360 (1929), provides that a public entity is not subject to special assessments absent express legislative authority to the
contrary.
In upholding the assessment against the School District, the trial
court based its decision on the statutory authority for the fee provided in section 39613 of the California Education Code and in section
31101.5 of the California Water Code which became effective in 1983.
Although the court of appeal upheld the judgment of the trial court,
it categorized the fee imposed as a "user fee" from which the School
District was not exempt. In doing so, the appellate court refused to
follow three contrary appellate court cases: Regents of University of
Californiav. City of Los Angeles, 148 Cal. App. 3d 451, 196 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1983); Regents of University of California v. City of Los Angeles,
100 Cal. App. 3d 547, 160 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1979); and County of Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water District, 84 Cal. App. 3d 655, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 650 (1978). Instead, the court of appeal relied on out-of-state
case law to support its holding.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the capacity fee was a
"special assessment" for which there was no legislative authority to
tax the School District. Although the Water District argued that the
fee was a "user fee" because it was based on anticipated usage, the
court relied on the three cases mentioned above, and held that the
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purpose of the charge was dispositive rather than the means of measurement. Therefore, since the funds were to be used for capital improvements rather than for everyday operating costs, it was a
"special assessment" and not a "user fee."
The Water District's next argument, that the assessment against
the School District was authorized by the Education Code and the
Water Code, was rejected. In analyzing section 39613 of the Education Code, the court reasoned that although the code authorized the
School District to acquire rights in a sewer system, this alone did not
show an express intent of the legislature to allow the School District
to appropriate money to pay special assessments. Section 31101.5 of
the Water Code authorized the Water District to assess a fee against
property not subject to district taxes for the services it provided.
Like section 39613 of the Education Code, this section did not expressly authorize the Water District to assess the School District for
its capital improvements.
The court refused the final two theories propounded by the Water
District: first, that the School District had impliedly agreed to pay
the capacity fee by entering into an agreement to use the Water District's sewer system; and, second, that the School District was estopped from discontinuing its payments by promissory estoppel. In
rejecting the first theory, the court reasoned that the School District
had no legislative authority to pay the special assessment. Therefore,
to agree to do so would be a misappropriation of public funds, which
would constitute a violation of article XVI, section six of the California Constitution. The second theory was rejected because of the rule
that promissory estoppel cannot be used against the government if its
implementation would contravene a strong public policy. City of
Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1975). The court felt that the exemption of public agencies against
special assessments on their property was a strong public policy.
The impact of this case will be to classify as special assessments all
fees or assessments whose proceeds are used by a utility district for
capital improvements which will benefit a specific geographic area.
Absent legislative authority to the contrary, public entities will be
exempt from these assessments.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

C. Former section 225 of the CaliforniaRevenue & Taxation
Code violates the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution by discriminatingagainst a class of
interstatecommerce: Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles.
I.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

In Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,1 the court was
asked to determine whether former section 225 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code violated the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution by discriminating against a class of interstate commerce.
On March 1, 1976, the County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles,
and City of Long Beach assessed and levied ad valorem taxes on the
plaintiff's inventory of canned tuna located in its California warehouses. The plaintiff, Star-Kist Foods, Inc. [hereinafter Star-Kist],
paid the tax and sought a refund pursuant to the exemption contained in section 225 of the Revenue and Taxation Code2 [hereinafter
section 225] for that portion of its inventory that had been manufactured or produced outside the United States and brought into California for shipment to other states for sale in the ordinary course of
business.
Star-Kist brought suit for the refund in Los Angeles County Superior Court after exhausting its administrative remedies. The defendants asserted that section 225's exemption discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution3 and, therefore, was invalid. The trial court denied
the refund claim and Star-Kist filed an appeal.4
II.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Standing

The court first addressed whether the defendants had standing to
challenge section 225; more specifically, "whether counties and mu1. 42 Cal. 3d 1, 719 P.2d 987, 227 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1986). The majority opinion was
authored by Justice Reynoso in which Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard,
Grodin, Mosk, and Uchiyama (Mikio) concurred. Lucas wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Justice Uchiyama (Mikio) was assigned by the chairperson of the Judicial
Counsel.
2. Former section 225 of the Revenue and Tax Code provided an exemption from
taxation for "[p]ersonal property manufactured or produced, (1) outside this state and
brought into this state for transshipment out of the United States, or (2) outside of the
United States and brought into this state for transshipment out of this state, for sale in
the ordinary course of trade or business . . . ." 1975 Cal. Stat. 2746, § 1 (repealed in
1984). All business inventory is now exempt from taxation. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE
§ 219 (West Supp. 1986).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
4. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 6, 719 P.2d at 989, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
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nicipalities may invoke the federal Constitution to challenge a state
5
law which they are otherwise duty-bound to enforce."
The general rule regarding standing is that cities and counties, as
subordinate political entities, "may not challenge state action as violating the entities' rights under the due process or equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment or under the contract clause of
the federal Constitution."6 However, the rule is unsettled beyond the
fourteenth amendment and the contract clause.
In City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe,7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this rule as an absolute bar to
subordinate political entities who wanted to challenge state statutes
on federal constitutional grounds.8 Unfortunately, the supreme court
noted that "the South Lake Tahoe decision provides little guidance as
to the court's reasoning in choosing a per se rule."9
Other courts have held that the "no standing" rule does not apply
to challenges based on the supremacy clause.1O Citing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Brockette, the Star-Kist court concluded that the "no standing" rule has historically been applied in
two types of cases: (1) "those in which the state has altered political
subdivisions' boundaries"; and (2) "those involving state modification
of a benefit previously granted to a subdivision.""
2
In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco,1
the court held
that the supremacy clause may provide subordinate political entities
with a basis for objection, even though they may not raise other constitutional claims.13 The purposes served by the supremacy clause
and other constitutional provisions provide a relevant distinction.
While the fourteenth amendment confers rights on individuals, the
supremacy clause "'establishes a structure of government which de5. Id. at 6, 719 P.2d at 990, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
6. Id.
7. 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039 (1980).
8. "[Ihe City may not challenge... [the] plans and ordinances on constitutional
grounds." Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
9. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 7, 719 P.2d at 990, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
10. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979);
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 651 F.2d
1306 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
11. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 8, 719 P.2d at 991, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
12. 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal.), off'd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1000 (1982).
13. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. at 290.

fines the relative powers of states and the federal government.' "14
Political subdivisions cannot assert constitutional rights conferred on
individuals "but may invoke the supremacy clause to challenge pre15
empted state law."'
The court concluded that the "no standing" rule does not apply to
challenges based on the commerce clause. This conclusion was premised on the similarities between the supremacy clause and the commerce clause, and the line of reasoning in Rogers and Gianturco.
Like the supremacy clause, the commerce clause "define[s] the relative powers of states and the federal government"1 6 and limits the
states' powers even in the absence of federal legislation.17
The defendants claimed that section 225's exemption "interferes
with Congress' exclusive control over commerce by potentially nullifying the value of protective tariffs and by discriminating against domestic commerce."' 8 The court stated that an additional reason for
conferring standing to commerce clause challenges is the realization
that such encroachments on the federal government's power may go
unchecked unless political subdivisions are granted standing.
The court concluded that conferring standing in this case was consistent with the legislature's enactment of section 538 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code in 1978. Section 538 was enacted in "direct response to Los Angeles County's refusal to implement section 225's
exemption .... "19 Instead of making the disputed assessment, section 538 requires the assessor who questions the constitutionality of a
state tax provision to seek declaratory relief against the State Board
of Equalization. Although section 538 generally refers to unconstitutionality without differentiating between state and federal constitutions, the court noted that the legislature, in light of past commerce
clause challenges, anticipated potential federal constitutional
claims.20
B.

Commerce Clause Challenge

There are two competing interests involved in a commerce clause
challenge to a state tax provision: 1) the national interest in free and
2
open trade; and 2) the state's interest in exercising its taxing power. 1
14. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 8, 719 P.2d at 991, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (quoting Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. at 290).
15. Id.
16. Id. The commerce clause empowers Congress "[to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977).
18. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 9, 719 P.2d at 992, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
19. Id. at 10, 719 P.2d at 992, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Each case must be decided on its own facts and the particular provisions of the statute in question.
The commerce clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce "among the several states" and foreign commerce
"with foreign Nations." The court noted that there is authority for
the proposition that "the Founders intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be the greater."22 The United States Supreme
Court, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, stated that "a
more extensive constitutional inquiry is required" when dealing with
foreign commerce as opposed to interstate commerce.23 In addition
to the general rule that prohibits state tax provisions from interfering with Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce, the Japan
Line court set forth two additional factors to be considered: 1) "the
risk of multiple taxation"; and 2) the "potential impairment of the
24
nation's ability to 'speak with one voice' in foreign affairs."
The United States Supreme Court in ContainerCorp. v. Franchise
Tax Board,25 implied that the risk of multiple taxation alone would
not necessarily invalidate a state tax. The context in which the tax is
applied, as well as feasible alternative modes of taxation, are pertinent factors to be considered. For example, a nondiscriminatory tax
may result in multiple taxation but not interfere with Congress' exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce. Therefore, it would be
valid.26 The Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages 27 held the
following:
By definition, such a tax does not fall on imports as such because of their
place of origin. It cannot be used to create special protective tariffs or particular preferences for certain domestic goods, and it cannot be applied selectively
to encourage or2 discourage
any importation in a manner inconsistent with fed8
eral regulation.

The "one voice" standard is violated if a state tax either implicates
foreign policy issues under the exclusive province of the federal gov22. Id. at 11, 719 P.2d at 993, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
23. 441 U.S. at 446.
24. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 12, 719 P.2d at 994, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (quoting Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 446).
25. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
26. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). In Michelin, the Supreme
Court upheld Georgia's nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on business inventories, including imported goods, reasoning that the purpose behind the tax was to recover locally provided services such as fire and police protection.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 286.

ernment or violates an explicit federal directive. 29 The fact that a
state tax has foreign resonances does not necessarily invalidate it as a
violation of the "one voice" standard.
The Star-Kist case is distinguishable from the cases cited previously in that it does not involve the imposition of a tax on foreign
goods, but rather an exemption. An exemption "that appears to discriminate against domestic commerce cannot be sustained on the
traditional ground that the states may not interfere with congressional power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations.' "30 However, such an exemption "can be challenged as interfering with that
power." 3' Thus, the rule set forth in Michelin is applicable.
Michelin held that a state tax "cannot be applied selectively to encourage or discourage any importation in a manner inconsistent with
federal regulation."3 2 A state provision that exempts imports from
taxation would interfere with Congress' power to regulate foreign
commerce by providing a state-originated advantage to foreign commerce. This "may operate to nullify the curative effect of federally
imposed tariffs."33
A four part test is utilized to determine whether a state tax statute
violates the interstate commerce clause. The tax is constitutional if it
meets the following requirements: "[1] [the tax] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
[4] is fairly related to the services provided."34
The court limited its inquiry to the third prong of the four prong
test. Former section 225 exempted the following from the property
tax: inventories of foreign companies transshipping through California; and domestic companies involved in importing and exporting.
Section 225 thus provided a distinct tax advantage to domestic companies (such as Star-Kist) who were involved in importing over domes35
tic companies which operated exclusively within the United States.
Thus, the court concluded that section 225 fails the Complete Auto
test of constitutionality by discriminating against a class of interstate
commerce and "constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce
in violation of the commerce clause."3 6
29. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 13, 719 P.2d at 994, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
30. Id. at 14, 719 P.2d at 995, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3).
31. Id
32. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
33. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 14, 719 P.2d at 995, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
34. Id. at 15, 719 P.2d at 996, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 400 (quoting Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 16, 719 P.2d at 996, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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37
III. THE DISSENT

Justice Lucas stated that section 225 does not violate the foreign or
interstate commerce clause or place an undue burden on interstate
commerce. He stated that there are three policies behind the commerce clause: 1) to enable the federal government to speak with "one
voice" in regulating foreign commerce; 2) to provide a major source
of revenue to the federal government through import revenues; and
3) to promote harmony among the states by prohibiting the seaboard
states from levying taxes on goods in transit. 38 Lucas contended that
section 225 did not conflict with any of these policies.
The "one voice" standard is violated when there is a violation of a
federal directive or where foreign policy issues are implicated which
are in the exclusive province of the federal government. Lucas criticized the majority for failing to cite a directive that was violated by
section 225. Additionally, there was no showing of an implication of
foreign policy issues, only a mere "possibility that some hypothetical
tariff may be impeded by the inventory exemption."3 9 There was no
concrete showing that the federal government was prevented from
speaking with "one voice."
Next, Justice Lucas argued that the majority's use of the Complete
Auto test is inappropriate. Complete Auto involved the applications
of a tax, while section 225 involved an exemption; the majority failed
to cite any cases which applied the Complete Auto test to an
exemption.
In his view, the proper test was "whether the exemption statute,
protecting only imports and exports, burdens the free flow of commerce among the several states." 40 The focus of the analysis was
whether the tax or exemption "provide[s] a direct commercial advantage to local business."41 The courts "must balance the national interest in free trade with the state's interest in exercising its taxing
powers."42 A state may not place a discriminatory burden on other
37. Id. at 17, 719 P.2d at 997, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 401; see also Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 n.14 (1979).
38. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 17, 719 P.2d at 997, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
39. Id. at 18, 719 P.2d at 998, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
40. Id. at 20, 719 P.2d at 999, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 20-21, 719 P.2d at 1000, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (quoting Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984)) (Lucas., J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 21, 719 P.2d at 1000, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Lucas, J., dissenting).

states in order to build up its own commerce. 43 However, a state's
scheme to attract a particular segment of industry is constitutional if
44
it is grounded on a permissible basis.
Justice Lucas contended that section 225 "was not grounded on an
impermissible basis." 45 In support of this contention, he listed various factors which included the following: 1) local interests were not
favored by exemption; 2) the exemption was available regardless of
the residency of the shipper; and 3) penalties were not imposed on
the choice to transact business in another state.46 Thus, section 225
did not burden interstate commerce by discriminating in favor of local interests at the expense of other states and, therefore, did not violate the commerce clause. His final contention was that the
defendant's claim was really based on equal protection, and as such
47
would be denied standing under the majority's analysis.
STEPHANIE FANOS

XIV.

TORTS
A.

A statement appearing in a newspaper review, set off in
quotations, prefaced with a qualificationthat it was the
author's impression, did not constitute defamation:
Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner.

In Baker v. Los Angeles HeraldExaminer, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d
87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), the supreme court considered whether a
statement appearing to be a quote in a review column of a newspaper, was actionable defamation, even though the statement was prefaced as the author's opinion. After considering the article in its
entirety, the court ruled that the statement was not defamatory.
The allegedly defamatory remark appeared in a television review
column of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner [hereinafter Herald Examiner], on December 29, 1983. It was authored by the defendant,
Peter Bunzel, whose featured articles appear regularly in the editorial section of the Herald Examiner. Bunzel critiqued a documentary
produced by the plaintiff, Baker, entitled "Sex Education: How Far
Should We Go."
43. See Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756
(1981).
44. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1977). In
Boston, the Court stated, "Our decision today does not prevent the states from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate com-

merce and industry."
45. Star-Kist, 42 Cal. 3d at 21, 719 P.2d at 1000, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).

46. Id. at 22, 719 P.2d at 1000-01, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 22, 719 P.2d at 1000, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
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Bunzel began the review by relating his own childhood experience
of being informed about sex by his father. Thereafter, Bunzel stated
that parental timidity and the demise of the traditional family unit
has shifted the burden of sex education to public schools. Concluding
that sex education in schools is a controversial topic, Bunzel proceeded to review Baker's documentary on the subject.
Bunzel's first criticism was that Baker's show did "little to advance
the subject and a lot to exploit it." Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
Dec. 29, 1983, at C3, cols. 1-3. The following was the allegedly
libelous statement:
My impression is that executive producer Walt Baker, who is also vice president in charge of programs for Channel 9, told his writer/producer, Phil
Reeder, "We've got a hot potato here-let's pour on titillating inneundo and as
much bare flesh as we can get away with. Viewers will eat it up!"

Id. at C3, col. 2.
Bunzel cited examples of Baker's exploitation of this subject matter, including footage of a nude dancer who was photographed from
the rear, erotic photographs, and an interview with a young, gay
male. Bunzel, in conclusion, termed Baker's program "hypocritical
sleaze." Id. at C3, col. 3.
In consideration of Baker's defamation suit against Bunzel and the
Herald Examiner, the supreme court thoroughly analyzed the nature
of defamation. To constitute defamation, a statement must be both
false and of fact rather than of opinion. Baker, 42 Cal. 3d at 259-60,
721 P.2d at 90, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09. To determine whether the
statement in this case was one of opinion, which is protected by the
First Amendment, the court employed a "totality of the circumstances" test. The court used this test to examine two aspects of the
statement: 1) the actual language and punctuation; and 2) the context in which the statement was made, including the expected impression of the audience.
The court examined the actual language used by Bunzel. It emphasized his use of the word "impression" before the statement. The
court noted that the dictionary defines the word "impression" as

"opinion." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 661, 921 (English Lan-

guage 1970). The court also cited Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976) ("apparently"), and Carrv. Warden, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1984) ("think"), in which similar qualifiers were found to preclude
liability for defamation. By contrast, the court noted Selleck v. Globe
International,Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1985),

wherein words such as "says" and "explains" prompted that court to
regard the accompanying statements as actionable.
The court also considered the punctuation surrounding Bunzel's
statement. Baker asked the court to find that the statement was factual merely because it appeared in quotation marks. The court rejected Baker's argument. Rather, the court deemed that the
statement was a hypothetical quote of what Bunzel imagined might
have been said. In addition to giving weight to the actual language
and punctuation, the court deemed essential the context in which the
statement was made. In this regard, the court mentioned that the entire article was exceedingly critical. Further, it was qualified
throughout by Bunzel's own experiences and opinions.
The court did acknowledge, however, that remarks which are frequently disguised as the author's view imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Slaughter v. Friedman, 32 Cal. 3d 149, 649
P.2d 886, 185 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1982). In Slaughter, the defamatory
statement appeared in a businesslike letter which seemingly advanced the legal position of an insurance carrier. By way of contrast,
the court characterized Bunzel's article as "flashy hyperbole." Baker,
42 Cal. 3d at 267, 721 P.2d at 95, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 214. Moreover, the
entire review was sarcastic in nature.
Lastly, the court took note of the societal context in which the article was set. The court acknowledged that the column was a review,
published in the opinion-editorial section. The supreme court
deemed that readers of reviews do so to obtain the author's opinion
on the subject. In addition, Bunzel's article discussed a very controversial subject: sex education in schools. The court stated that the
more controversial the topic, the more heated the treatment of the
issue was likely to be.
The court examined the actual language, punctuation, context, and
audience expectation of the allegedly defamatory communication. It
concluded that none of these factors supported Baker's contention
that the statement was factual, as required to maintain an action for
defamation. In conclusion, the court found that an undesirable chilling effect on a journalists' ability to inform the public might occur if
unmeritorious defamation assertions were not cautiously scrutinized.
VALERIE FLORES
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B.

The special damages requirement of section 45a of the
Civil Code applies to action for false light invasion of
privacy based on a defamatory publication: Fellows v.
National Enquirer, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc.,1 the California Supreme
Court held that the special damage 2 requirement of section 45a of the
4
Civil Code3 is applicable to actions for false light invasion of privacy
based on defamatory publications. As a result, the court gave greater
protection to publishers by requiring the plaintiff to plead special
damages.5
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 17, 1982, the National Enquirer carried a photograph of
the plaintiff and actress Angie Dickinson. It reported that the plaintiff was the "new man" in Ms. Dickinson's life.6 The court pointed
out that the photograph was taken while the plaintiff and Ms. Dickinson were coming out from a restaurant where he and his wife had
1. 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986). The opinion was written
by Justice Broussard with Chief Justice Bird, Justices Mosk, Reynoso, Grodin, Lucas
and Panelli concurring. Chief Justice Bird also filed a separate concurring opinion.
2. For a definition of "special damages" see CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a.4.(b) (West
1982). "'Special damages' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he
has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as
" Id. See generally, Note, Alternative to
a result of the alleged libel, and no other ..
the General-DamageAward for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504 (1968).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a (West 1982) provides the following:
LIBEL ON ITS FACE; OTHER ACTIONABLE DEFAMATORY LANGUAGE.

A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to
be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special
damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damage is defined in Section
48a of this code.
Id.
4. A cause of action for invasion of privacy can be based on any of the following:
a) false light invasion of privacy; b) intrusion upon one's solitude or seclusion; c) public
disclosure of private facts; and d) appropriation. See 42 Cal. 3d at 238, 721 P.2d at 99,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 218. See also, Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398-401 (1960);
Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S.
CAL. L. REV. 280 (1957); Note, Right of Privacy: Is "FalseLight" Recognized in California?50 CALIF. L. REV. 357 (1962). For general information on false light invasion of
privacy see, 6 CAL. JUR.3D Assault and Other Willful Torts § 122 (1973).
5. Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 251, 721 P.2d 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
6. Id. at 236, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 216.

dined with Ms. Dickinson and a few other people.7
In the first complaint, the plaintiff alleged libel, false light invasion
of privacy, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In both counts of libel and false light invasion, he claimed that
the defamation was based on extrinsic facts. The plaintiff alleged
that the article was defamatory because those who knew of his marital status would assume he had been engaged in immoral conduct.
The plaintiff, therefore, sought general and special damages.8
The defendant demurred, arguing that the plaintiff had pled special damages with insufficient specificity. He also contended that the
claim for false light invasion was "superfluous" because of its similarity to the libel claim. 9
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint. The
first amended complaint was similar to the initial complaint. However, in the second amended complaint, the plaintiff conceded that he
did not suffer any special damages. As a result, he dropped the action for libel. Nonetheless, he maintained the action for false light
invasion of privacy.10
The defendant demurred, arguing that the court should bar the action for want of special damages. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. However, the court of appeal
overruled the trial court's holding. It held that the special damage
requirement should not be applicable to an action for false light invasion because it protected interests different from those protected by
defamatory actions."1
III.

ISSUE

The court stated that the issue of the case was whether the special
damage requirement of section 45a of the Civil Code should apply to
actions for false light invasion of privacy. However, the real issue
was whether to impose the restrictions and limitations of defamation
actions to false light invasion actions. In other words, whether to
treat false light invasion as defamation. This issue was addressed by
the court because it feared that "virtually every published defamation would support an action for false light invasion of privacy."12
Under the language of the statute, the special damage requirement
is limited to a defamation action in which the defamatory language is
7. Id. at 236 n.3, 721 P.2d at 98 n.3, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.3.
8. Id. at 236-37, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
9. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d at 98, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
10. Id. at 237-38, 721 P.2d at 99, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
11. Id. at 238, 721 P.2d at 99, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
12. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See also 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault
and Other Willful Torts § 122 (1973).
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not libelous on its face. 13 Consequently, some facts which could not
be actionable under defamation could be maintained under a different theory. In essence, the court sought to close the "loophole."14
However, in doing so, the court applied a liberal view of the first
amendmentl5 which resulted in giving the publishers almost boundless "freedom."
IV.

OPINION

The court began the discussion by briefly outlining the historical
background of the right of privacy1 6 and the United States Supreme
Court's efforts to balance the first amendment17 right with defamatory actions. In a landmark case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,18
the Court held that the first amendment right of freedom of speech
protected the media from defamatory actions brought by public officials unless the defamatory statements were made with "actual malice."1 9 In a subsequent case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,20 the Court examined
the relationship between the right of privacy and the first amendment right. As a means of balancing the two conflicting rights, the
United States Supreme Court adopted the "actual malice" standard
2
to find liability. 1
In California, the supreme court, through a series of cases, began to
expand the concept of first amendment protection. In Reader's Di13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. "When the false publicity is also defamatory ... (the) limitations . . . for the
action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by proceeding upon a different
theory .... " 42 Cal. 3d at 246, 721 P.2d at 105, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 E comment e (1977)).
15. Id. at 251, 721 P.2d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
16. Id. at 238, 721 P.2d at 99, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 218. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 383 (1960). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Id. "Actual Malice" is any statement made "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 239,
721 P.2d at 100, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (quoting New York Times, Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80
(1964)). CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a.4.(d) (West 1982) provides the following:
"Actual malice" is that state of mind arising form hatred or ill will toward the
plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good
faith belief on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or broadcast shall not constitute
actual malice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.4.(d) (West 1982).
20. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
21. 42 Cal. 3d at 239, 721 P.2d at 100, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 219.

gest Association v. Superior Court,22 the court expanded the requirement of actual malice to other causes of action. If the nondefamation
claims, such as false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are based on the defendant's defamatory
actions, the court held that failure to allege facts which would indicate the presence of actual malice barred not only defamation claims
but also other claims.23
In Werner v. Times-Mirror Co.,24 the court of appeal imposed the
requirement of section 48a of the Civil Code25 on actions for invasion
of privacy. In Werner, the plaintiff had not demanded a retraction
and as a result, section 48a would have barred a libel action. 26 The
Werner holding was adopted 27 by the supreme court in Kapellas v.
Kofman.28 In Kapellas, the court found that the plaintiff's claim for
false light invasion was equivalent in substance to a libel action. Consequently, the court ordered the plaintiff to satisfy all the require29
ments of a libel action.
In addition, if the nondefamation actions were based on defamatory
language, the court has not hesitated in applying the restrictions of
defamation actions to nondefamation claims.30 For example, in
3
Grimes v. Carter,
1 the court of appeal held that a nondefamation action based on defamatory language was not exempt 3 2 from the requirements of section 830 of the Civil Procedure Code.33 Therefore,
22. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 690 P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (1984).
23. Id. at 265, 690 P.2d at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
24. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961) (the plaintiff brought an action
for invasion of privacy based on a newspaper article that alleged plaintiff's involvement in political scandals and crimes).
25. CAL. CIv. CODE § 48a. (West 1982) provides in part:
In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a
slander by a radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as
hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at the place of
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous
and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and demand must be
served within 20 days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the
statements claimed to be libelous.
Id.
26. Id. See generally Bevier, The FirstAmendment and Political Speech. An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 347 (1978).
27. 42 Cal. 3d at 241, 721 P.2d at 101, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
28. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969) (the plaintiff brought an action for false light invasion against the defendant who carried an editorial which reported that there were numerous complaints and arrests involving the plaintiff's
children).
29. 42 Cal. 3d at 242, 721 P.2d at 102, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
30. Id., 721 P.2d at 102, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
31. 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1966).
32. 42 Cal. 3d at 243, 721 P.2d at 103, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
33. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 830 (West 1982) provides the following:
UNDERTAKING; NECESSITY; AMOUNT; CONTENTS. Before issuing the summons

in an actionfor libel or slander,the clerk shall require a written undertaking
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in Grimes, the appellate court promptly dismissed the plaintiff's actions for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress for failure to satisfy section 830.34

The court noted that the basic policy behind these decisions was
that privacy suits threaten the freedoms of speech and press in the
same manner as defamation suits.35 Consequently, the court has
sought to prohibit independent causes of action based on the same
facts under which a defamation action would not stand.36
Turning to the issue of the applicability of the special damage requirement to false light invasion actions, the court began the discussion by acknowledging that it was a question of first impression.3 7
However, the unanimous court showed little hesitancy in overruling
the appellate court. It reasoned that although the two separate actions protected different interests, they could, nonetheless, be based
on the same publication.38 The court recognized that "the purpose of
the rule requiring proof of special damages when the defamatory
meaning does not appear on the face of the language used is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in themselves that are
defamatory only because of extrinsic facts known to the reader."39
Therefore, the court concluded that "[s]ince virtually every published defamation would support an action for false light invasion of
privacy, exempting such actions from the requirement of proving special damages would render the statute a nullity."40 Thus, the court
found that section 45a applied to a cause of action for false light invaon the part of the plaintiff in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500), with at
least two competent and sufficient sureties, specifying their occupations and
residences, to the effect that if the action is dismissed or the defendant recovers judgment, they will pay the costs and charges awarded against the plaintiff
by judgment, in the progress of the action, or on an appeal, not exceeding the
sum specified. An action brought without filling the required undertaking
shall be dismissed.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 42 Cal. 3d at 243, 721 P.2d at 103, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22. For the court's further discussion of the expanded application of section 47 of the Civil Code, see 42 Cal.
3d at 244, 721 P.2d at 103, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23 (discussion of decisions in other
jurisdiction).
35. Id. at 241, 721 P.2d at 101, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
36. Id. at 246, 721 P.2d at 104, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
37. Id. at 247, 721 P.2d at 105, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
38. Id. at 247-49, 721 P.2d at 105-07, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25. See also id. at 247
n.12, 721 P.2d at 106 n.12, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 224 n.12.
39. See id. at 249, 721 P.2d at 107, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. (quoting Justice Traynor in McClead v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 550, 343 P.2d 36 (1959)).
40. Fellows, 42 Cal. 3d at 252, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.

sion of privacy based on defamatory language.41 However, the court
noted that the holding would not apply to a false light invasion action
which could also stand as an action for public disclosure of private
2
facts.4
V.

CONCURRING OPINION

Chief Justice Bird filed a separate concurring opinion to express
her support for the minority view in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.43 The Chief Justice stated that "[t]o be truly free, the press
must feel free-free to be wise and free to be foolish; free to be constructive and free to be destructive."44 Concerning such an extreme
view, it is suggested that "freedom" should always be distinguished
from "irresponsibility."45
VI.

CONCLUSION

Based on the court's holding, several conclusions are warranted.
First, the court is continuing to treat actions for false light invasion
as defamation actions; second, the press, under the umbrella of first
amendment, will enjoy almost a boundless "freedom."
King Solomon once wrote, "[t]he mouth of the righteous is a fountain of life, [b]ut the mouth of the wicked conceals violence." 46 It is
this author's opinion that before expanding the first amendment
freedom of speech, the court should question the wisdom of allowing
an untamed press from roaring in an irresponsible and destructive
manner.

47

SUNG-DO GONG
41. Id. at 252, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
42. Id. at 252 n.13, 721 P.2d at 109 n.13, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.13.
43. Id. at 252, 721 P.3d at 108, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
44. Id. at 252, 721 P.2d at 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
45. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 491, 640 (9th ed. 1983).
46. Proverbs 10:11.
47. The author does not oppose "free press," and the above statement should not
be construed as suggesting such. It is, however, the author's view that one's freedom
should not intrude upon the rights of others in a destructive manner. Consequently,
the author believes that the press should bear a duty to make a reasonable investigation with respect to the truth of the matter.
Furthermore, the proverbs of King Solomon was quoted to suggest that societal
freedom does not soley depend on a free press, but rather on responsible leaders who
are sensitive to the needs of the general public.
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C. A tractoroperatoracts within the scope of his
employment when, in the course of performing his duties
as an employee, he extends an unauthorized invitation to
another to ride on his employer's tractor, thereby
triggering the doctrine of respondeatsuperior: Perez v.
Van Groningen & Sons, Inc.
The plaintiff in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d
962, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986), received an unauthorized
invitation to ride in the defendant's tractor solicited by the defendant's employee. While the employee was disking the defendant's
orchard, a task he was employed to perform, the plaintiff accompanied him for an unauthorized ride. In the process, the plaintiff was
injured, and he brought suit against the employer under the theory
of respondeat superior.
The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant's employee
negligently acted within the scope of his employment as a matter of
fact, not law. The plaintiff appealed these instructions and the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision regarding
the scope of employment instructions, but affirmed the instructions
that the employee was negligent as a matter of fact.
The court initially focused on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
which imposes the risk of injury arising out of the employment on
the employer as a consequence of doing business. Pursuant to this
doctrine, an injured party may recover damages from the employer
regardless of proof of the employer's fault, so long as the employee
was acting within the scope of his employment.
Next, the court considered "whether the risk [acceptance of an unauthorized passenger] 'was one that may fairly be regarded as typical
of or broadly incidental' to the enterprise undertaken by the employer [disking an orchard]." Id. at 968, 719 P.2d at 679, 227 Cal. Rptr.
at 108 (quoting Rogers v. Kemper Construction Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d
608, 619, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (1975) (citation omitted)). Concluding
that the risk was inherent in the enterprise, the court further held
that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment because he had not "'substantially deviated from his duties for personal
purposes'" when the accident occurred. Rather, he operated the defendant's tractor in the defendant's orchards during working hours,
as designated. 41 Cal. 3d at 968, 719 P.2d at 679, 227 Cal. Rptr. 109
(quoting Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 960, 471
P.2d 988, 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1970) (citation omitted)). The

defendant argued that because he had expressly forbidden his employees from allowing passengers on the one-seated tractor, the respondeat superior theory should not apply. The court disagreed,
stating that "[a]s long as it is clear that at the time of the injury the
employee was following his employer's instructions to disk the
orchard, the fact that he was not authorized to take a passenger [was]
immaterial." 41 Cal. 3d at 969, 719 P.2d at 679, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
See Meyer v. Blackmun, 59 Cal. 2d 668, 381 P.2d 916, 31 Cal. Rptr. 36
(1983), and Foos v. Anothony Industries, 139 Cal. App. 3d 794, 189
Cal. Rptr. 31 (1983) (liability imputed as a matter of law).
The defendant also argued that it should not be principally responsible under an agency theory because it did not benefit from its employee's action. The court refuted this contention and explained that
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior does not require that a benefit be conferred upon the employer. See Carr v.
William C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946) (employer is
liable for employee's intentional tortious acts committed within the
scope of employment despite lack of benefit to employer). Since the
presence of an unauthorized invitee was not sufficient to take the
employee outside the scope of his employment, the court ruled that
the scope of employment should have been instructed as a matter of
law, not fact.
The plaintiff's final contention was that the defendant's employee
was negligent as a matter of law. Although the evidence supported
this finding, the court concluded that it also supported a different
conclusion, requiring the court to instruct the jury that the employee
was negligent as a matter of fact, not law. The supreme court remanded the case for retrial so that proper jury instructions could be
made.
ARIAN COLACHIS
XV.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board may reserve
its jurisdictionfor the purpose of rating permanent
disability of employees with progressivedisease: General
Foundry Service v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.

In General Foundry Service v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, 42 Cal. 3d 331, 721 P.2d 126, 228 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1986), the
supreme court unanimously held that the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board [hereinafter the Board] may tentatively recognize the
permanent disability of an employee with a progressive illness. In
addition, the court held that the Board may also reserve its jurisdiction, despite the five-year statutory limitation on its jurisdiction, for a
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first evaluation until the employee's condition becomes permanent or
when the further deterioration would be irrelevant for the purpose
of rating permanent disability. The case was then remanded with an
instruction that the Board should examine the employee's eligibility
for rehabilitation.
In this case, the disabled employee, a molder for General Foundry
Service, developed lung cancer as a result of being exposed to asbestos and silica dust while at work. Consequently, he was prohibited
from working in the same environment, although he was capable of
working within his capacity. The court noted that the employee's
condition was progressively deteriorating. As a result, the court first
had to determine how the Board should rate the permanent disability
of an employee with a progressive disease. The court was attempting
to avoid the injustice of the five-year statutory limitation on the
Board's jurisdiction which commenced once the disability was established as permanent.
In wrestling with the first question, the court struggled to find an
appropriate definition for "permanent disability." It rejected the definition provided in section 9735 of Title 8 of the Administrative Code
as being inadequate when applied to progressive disability. See CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § R.9735 (1980). The court also overruled the appellate court's approach.
The court of appeal had ruled that the Board should rate a progressive disease as a permanent disability when the prognosis was "sufficiently ascertainable." The supreme court disagreed. First, the court
pointed out that the employee's risk of preclusion from full compensation due to the five-year statutory limitation on the Board's jurisdiction made it inequitable. Second, the court noted that the present
rating procedure would not make the scheme practical.
In conclusion, the court resolved the issue by allowing the Board to
rate the employee's permanent disability while reserving jurisdiction
to make a final determination once the illness became stationary. It
reasoned that in accordance with the legislative intent, the statute of
limitations must be liberally construed in favor of the employee.
The second question addressed by the court was the employer's
duty to rehabilitate employees with progressive illnesses. The court
emphasized that the employer had an affirmative duty to not only
make rehabilitation available, but also to inform the disabled employee of his rights. The court further held that if the injured employee was qualified for the benefit, the employer was obligated to
develop a plan which would provide him with maximum self-support.

Should the employer breach his duty, he would be required to pay
rehabilitation benefits from the date of the breach.
Procedurally, the court instructed the Board to first determine
whether the employee would qualify for a rehabilitation program. If
he would not be eligible, the court directed the Board to consider it
as a factor in evaluating the rate of permanent disability.
In conclusion, the court's decision should be welcomed for its practicality and fairness. First, the court wisely evaded the problem of
defining "permanent disability" by enabling the Board to reserve its
jurisdiction. As the court noted, this was the practical approach to
which both parties agreed. Second, the court's reiteration of the employer's duty to provide his disabled employees with a rehabilitation
program was fair and equitable. Such a program will not only encourage cooperation between employers and employees, but it will
also uphold human dignity and give a disabled person a sense of selfworth. Therefore, the court's decision should be applauded.
SUNG-DO GONG

